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Abstract 
 
The doctoral thesis Who Am I? Subjectivities in the Society of 
Accountability aims to demonstrate that accountability is one of the most 
powerful processes of subjectivation in our contemporary era. The 
background is constituted by ordinary daily practices, born from the 
propagation of digital media in the last twenty years. Accountability is 
defined as the peculiar anthropotechnic that derives from the extension of 
the subject in the form of the account. Account is defined as every 
extension of the subject in the digital world, so that these extensions are 
univocally attributable to a singular physical body of a singular human 
being. The concept of subjectivity is considered as outlined by Michel 
Foucault in the period 1977-1984. The dissertation also aims to 
demonstrate that the society of control, investigated by Foucault and 
Gilles Deleuze, finds its present fulfillment in the form of the society of 
accountability. Accountability is considered in three moments, connected 
by a circular movement instead of a causal sequence. The first moment 
describes how dispositives act on subjects. The scene of address is 
constituted by the request of performativity made by dispositives to the 
subject. This request takes place in the account, to be understood as the 
interface between dispositives and subjects. Secondly, the same process 
is taken in consideration from the point of view of the subject, who is 
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invited to answer the question: Who am I? Thus the subject understands 
him/herself as a subjectivity without ground, because the hermeneutics of 
the self, derived from dispositives, finds the foreclosure of the referent as 
its foundation. In a third moment accountability is considered from the 
point of view of the statements (énoncés). The conversion of statements 
into information, and the statistical inferences operated on it (basically, 
the processes related to big data), are the focus of this moment. The 
outcome of this analysis is a second hermeneutics of the subject, 
characterised by the discourse of the master. Convergences and 
divergences between this (digital) hermeneutics, the Christian 
hermeneutics derived from the confession and the Cartesian moment are 
explored in order to outline the actual accountability as pastoral power 
and discourse of the master at the same time. In conclusion, 
accountability is considered as a possible ethics. If anomie and 
anonymity are excluded as far as they exclude the scene of address, and 
consequently the very possibility of existence of a bios, the valorisation 
of opacity is identified as the grounding of a possible ethical action based 
on freedom, an exercise of freedom to be understood as resilience to the 
complete panoptical visibility and the consequential proceduralisation of 
the scene of address. 
Keywords: Accountability, Account, Subjectivity/Subjectivation, 
Dispositive, Ethics 
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Not predicting, but being attentive to the unknown knocking at the door. 
Gilles Deleuze  
 
To Mia and Novak, kids. 
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Introduction 
 
The Banality of the Digital 
This thesis is about ethics and, specifically, about the ethical issues 
generated by the digital world that the contemporary human being faces 
nowadays. The preliminary assumption that fuelled this research when it 
started some years ago, was that an anthropological change has taken 
place, and that the cause of this anthropological change was situated in 
the eruption of the digital medium, and in all of the brand new practices 
that it had generated. Now, only a few years later, the preliminary 
assumption about this change has been completely revised. In fact, 
through the careful reading of Michel Foucault,1 I decided to abandon the 
cumbersome, and not very fruitful adjective “anthropological” in favour 
of a new approach based on a different conceptual research tool: the 
practices of subjectivation. The initial question, therefore, moved from: 
Which anthropological change has been generated by the digital world? 
to What processes of subjectivation arose from the practices induced by 
digital media surrounding the contemporary human being? 
However, research willing to answer this question risks being almost 
endless. The pervasiveness of the digital medium in our contemporary 
                                                 
1
 Michel Foucault is discussed so widely throughout this dissertation, that it is not 
considered appropriate to give here any reference. 
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world is too extensive and its features too various—indeed a sharp eye 
can see the presence of the digital medium in every moment and every 
aspect of the daily life of the contemporary human being—that the 
purview of this dissertation cannot provide a comprehensive analysis of 
the digital. A lifetime would not be enough. 
Consequently, the field of research was reconsidered and differently 
outlined. This review has led to the identification of a specific practice of 
subjectivation among many possible practices, “accountability”.2 The 
notion of accountability has allowed the setting up of a plane of 
immanence3 deeply connected to the digital world. A series of 
operational concepts has been placed on that new plane of immanence in 
order to produce an isomorphism between the general context of the 
research, its object of investigation and the specific method applied. The 
text that follows argues that accountability is one of the main operative 
processes of subjectivation in the contemporary world, thus the subtitle 
of the dissertation proposes that the contemporary era should be defined 
as society of accountability. The society of accountability hence follows 
the disciplinary societies of the 19th century and the recent society of 
control, rooted in the second half of the 20th century. Proving that we 
live in the society of accountability is one of the primary aims of this 
                                                 
2
 The reason why accountability has been taken into account instead of other practices is 
fully explained in this dissertation. 
3
 The notion of plane of immanence is here derived from Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari (1996). 
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dissertation. The writer, who is not a native English speaker, has had the 
task of working out a polysemic and elusive concept such as 
accountability;4 for instance in the first chapter of this dissertation the 
term is stressed in order to build a possible analogy between the nouns 
accountability and account (in a digital sense). Due to the absence of 
appropriate literature on the digital account, the analogy is only partially 
demonstrated. Nevertheless, the reader is asked to accept this analogy, at 
least in terms of postulate or heuristic tool. The benefits deriving from 
this analogy will be further explored in the following chapters. 
The beginning of this introduction states that this research deals with 
ethics. The text that follows doesn’t aim to provide a strict definition of 
ethics, such as the one deriving from the classic tripartition between 
politics (state affairs), ethics (the community affairs) and moral (the 
individual affairs). Ethics is here understood as the set of processes of 
subjectivation generated from the relationship between the single human 
being and the environment that surrounds him or her. Elements of this 
environment are: other human beings, the living world, the not-living 
world and technology. Consequently, the ethics that this dissertation 
discusses is consequently the relationship between the individual and the 
ecological niche he or she inhabits. Within this niche—the second 
                                                 
4
 Please note that the Romance languages do not have a specific word to translate 
accountability. In fact, within all the Italian and French publications taken into account 
in this dissertation the word is never translated.  
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purpose of this dissertation—a specific focus is placed on all forms of 
relationships that involve, in any way, the digital medium.5 
One will find quite often the expressions processes of subjectivation and 
contemporary age in this text. As for the second term, this dissertation is 
the output of a research developed at the beginning of the third 
millennium and related to what is happening in the current context, here 
and now. This research does not deal with essentialism and invariance; it 
is expression of the épisteme6 of this time, in which it resides and from 
which it is derived. This approach led to two methodological problems. 
The first concerns the content of the research. Since contemporary 
technological acceleration will soon cause many digital objects to 
become obsolete,7 selecting references in the digital world is quite 
difficult. While waiting for the appearance of the next big thing on the 
horizon, social media—which has dominated the digital practices of the 
last decade—has been selected as privileged object. But only a few 
references about specific cases will be provided. They will be 
appropriate, precise and detailed so that a future reader of this 
dissertation can still understand the text’s references. 
                                                 
5
 The meanings of digital medium and digital world are clearly illustrated in the first 
chapter. 
6
 The épisteme is a basic notion of the Foucauldian production (Foucault 1982, 2002a). 
7
 Two examples, paradigmatic for this obsolescence, are: the decline of portals (in 
vogue in the Nineties) and the collapse of Second Life, which no more than ten years 
ago was supposed to be a second world, similar and fascinating as the physical one. 
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The second problem relates to the setting of the research: the 
contemporary age. When Kant writes An Answer to the Question: “What 
Is Enlightenment?”(2010), he revolutionises the philosophical method 
because, instead of an investigation about what is universal or 
immutable, philosophy for the first time attempts to offer an answer to 
the question: What do I have in front of my eyes, here and now? In other 
words: What is the present time in which I live? The present time 
provides some additional methodological difficulties compared to what is 
invariant in time, because the writer lives in the present time. In a certain 
way, the writer is the present time. What kind of perspective can be 
assumed that will allow the researcher to describe that in which the 
perspective itself is immersed?8 We will leave this question open for the 
time being, as it will reappear several times during the dissertation. 
The processes of subjectivation are the first roots of this research. These 
processes result from the set of practices that a human carries out in 
relation to the environment that surrounds him/her, in order to establish 
him/herself as a person: a self-definition and differentiation from the 
others. The subjectivations—which are always single and plural at the 
same time—are ongoing and unstable processes that make each human 
being what he or she is. These definitions of the human being are never 
sharp, essentialist or immutable. On the contrary, they are always tied to 
                                                 
8
 The question can be expressed also in this way: How can the fish know the water in 
which it swims? 
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the here and now that everyone experiences in a given time: this peculiar 
thing is happening to me here and now, but the processes of 
subjectivation could make me different in the future. And the processes 
of subjectivation are never distinctly divided, but constantly intersect 
with one another in the modelling the subject: my use of public 
transportation, my workplace that I travel to with this public 
transportation, the lectures I deliver at the academy where I teach and the 
education that led me to the books necessary for this research. These 
things are all forms of a relationship with the environment that generates 
the subject. Always fluctuating and unstable, it is the one who is saying: 
I. 
No process of subjectivation is harmless and without consequences. 
However, I do not aim to establish any categorisation about values in this 
dissertation and will avoid defining good or bad processes of 
subjectivation. Yet a thesis that deals with ethics cannot avoid the matter 
of freedom, a question that is deeply tied to the contemporary age. This 
dissertation does not seek to offer a comprehensive illustration of the 
principle that human beings are supposed to be suffocated by dispositives 
that model him/her in the new millennium—a scenario in which the 
ethical imperative of freedom resonates repeatedly. A psychiatrist like 
Miguel Benasayag emphasises the sadness—in the form of despair and 
disintegration—that characterises modern human beings, especially the 
adolescent (2003). Peter Sloterdijk has titled his recent book You Must 
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Change Your Life (2013), an invitation to perform freedom. Giacomo 
Marramao (2012) illustrates that the fracture generated by the difference 
between the ground we walk upon, always local, and the world of signs 
that we inhabit, increasingly global, is an issue that creates an abyss of 
sense—even amplified by digital medium. Gilles Deleuze wrote about 
thirty years ago: ‘It is in man himself that we must liberate life, since 
man himself is a form of imprisonment of man’ (1988, 92). 
The notion of a society of accountability seeks to test this theoretical 
denial of freedom (with all the consequences deriving from this denial), 
to first assess whether the denial of freedom is really happening, and 
secondly to ascertain which strategies of freedom can be brought into 
play. The act of reading is sometimes suggested as solution, for example. 
Michel Houellebecq makes the protagonist of Whatever (2011) dream of 
a life dedicated to reading. The a-topic space of the act of reading—
which isolates the subject from the ecological niche in which s/he lives—
looks like a partial and inadequate response to the problem, but it is 
interesting that it is expressed as a potential answer. Likewise, another 
answer is the contemplative freedom of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who is 
lying on a boat lulled by the waves on the lake of Biel in Switzerland 
completely abandoned to his rêverie (Rousseau 2011, reported in 
Sloterdijk 2015). Sloterdijk (2011) also suggests the state of apparent 
death as a possible solution, as practiced by Snow White and all 
philosophers who abstract themselves from the contingent and wander 
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around in the hyperuranium. The act of reading, rêverie, attests to 
apparent death: certainly an interesting practice, but hardly workable and, 
above all, only a partial response that is far from daily practices. In fact, 
daily practices are something else, the processes of subjectivation at work 
in the contemporary era are different (nobody is supposed to know 
anyone that when asked: Who are you ? would answer: I’m a person 
lying on a boat and looking at the sky). So the question that guides this 
research could be expressed at this point as follows: What processes of 
subjectivation allow a practice of freedom, within the set of practices 
induced by digital media that surround the modern human being? 
To answer this question, a fundamental overview shall be outlined. Thus 
the basis of this research is the banal, the everyday, and the known. 
Nietzsche (1997) observed more than a century ago that one is so used to 
the “known” that it no longer creates wonder. What is known is the usual, 
something that is more difficult to recognise, that is: something that is 
more difficult to consider as a problem, as foreign, distant, located 
outside. Of course extraordinary events sometimes occur (although an 
Italian writer, Ennio Flaiano, stated: The meaningful days of a life are 
four or five; others make up the numbers), and only exceptional events 
are deposited in the memory. But they are not relevant in this research, 
which instead investigates the insignificant. Why? Because it is the trivial 
and banal that give shape to everyday life. Everyday life determines the 
trivial—and the subject usually has no consciousness of the power of the 
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trivial. Thus, the banal, which models and conditions everyday life 
comprises the fundament of this research. And, in the realm of banal, the 
unnoticed and ubiquitous ordinary practices induced by digital media are 
investigated. Following Arendt (2010), the aim of this dissertation is an 
analysis of the banality of digital. 
 
Subject and Power 
The digital is perhaps trivial, but it is definitely not innocent. Innocence 
is not understood here as pertaining to the moral sphere. On the contrary, 
the lack of innocence is due to the close link with relations of power. In 
order to explain the relations of power—and thus to provide one of the 
conceptual milestones of this dissertation—it is useful to briefly outline 
Subject and Power, the transcript of a conference held by Michel 
Foucault in 1982, which was immediately published in English in the 
compendium Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics 
(Dreyfus 1983). In this text, subject and power are argued and twisted in 
a way that undergirds this research, and will provide important context 
for this survey on accountability.  
As the text was one of the writings from the last years of Foucault’s life, 
the author himself provides us with an analysis of his intellectual 
journey. 
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After the famous opening words ‘the ideas which I would like to discuss 
here represent neither a theory nor a methodology’ (208), Foucault 
exposes the general sense of his entire research: ‘My objective, instead, 
has been to create a history of the different modes by which, in our 
culture, human beings are made subjects. My work has dealt with three 
modes of objectification that transform human beings into subjects’9 
(208). At the beginning of his career, Foucault sought to understand 
‘modes of inquiry which try to give themselves the status of science’. 
This phase was followed by a time in which he focused on what he calls 
“dividing practices” (between normal and crazy, sick and healthy, 
criminal and just). The third moment of investigation, which Foucault 
claimed to follow when he convened the conference Subject and Power, 
is ‘the way a human being turns him- or herself into a subject’. (208) He 
concluded this introduction by saying: ‘Thus it is not power, but the 
subject, which is the general theme of my research’ (209).   
In the following paragraph the French philosopher has the need to justify 
how power and the subject are related, why in a survey on the subject the 
theme of power should appear. Foucault says: ‘It soon appeared to me 
that, while the human subject is placed in relations of production and of 
signification, he is equally placed in power relations which are very 
                                                 
9
 This statement is a clear answer to all the superficial readers of the French thinker, 
who have accused him of frequent discontinuity in his conceptual development. The 
reply provided by Foucault is peremptory: his purpose was the constant investigation of 
what one calls the subject. 
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complex’ (209). Hence the inquiry about the subject cannot, according to 
Foucault, be reduced to a theoretical investigation that includes the 
question—already Socratic, Cartesian, Kantian—: What is the subject? 
but it must take into account the reality of relations of power that 
innervate the subject. Knowledge and power come to be two sides of the 
same coin. 
Foucault does not aim to provide only a conceptual definition of power. 
He seeks to analyse power in the forms in which it is practiced in order to 
bring to light an economy of power, as well as to understand power in 
both a theoretical sense (what it is) and practical sense (how it is 
exercised). The French author detects a crucial historical moment in the 
development of the practices of power at the end of the 18th century. 10  
He claims, ‘from the same moment—that is, since the development of the 
                                                 
10
 Some years before this work, Foucault was already explaining his own articulated 
notion of power: ‘Now, the study of this micro-physics presupposes that the power 
exercised on the body is conceived not as a property, but as a strategy, that its effects of 
domination are attributed not to 'appropriation,' but to dispositions, manoeuvres, tactics, 
techniques, functionings; that one should decipher in it a network of relations, 
constantly in tension, in activity, rather than a privilege that one might possess; that one 
should take as its model a perpetual battle rather than a contract regulating a transaction 
or the conquest of a territory. In short this power is exercised rather than possessed; it is 
not the ‘privilege,’ acquired or preserved, of the dominant class, but the overall effect of 
its strategic positions—an effect that is manifested and sometimes extended by the 
position of those who are dominated. Furthermore, this power is not exercised simply as 
an obligation or a prohibition on those who ‘do not have it’; it invests them, is 
transmitted by them and through them; it exerts pressure upon them, just as they 
themselves, in their struggle against it, resist the grip it has on them. This means that 
these relations go right down into the depths of society, that they are not localized in the 
relations between the state and its citizens or on the frontier between classes and that 
they do not merely reproduce, at the level of individuals, bodies, gestures and 
behaviour, the general form of the law or government; that, although there is continuity 
(they are indeed articulated on this form through a whole series of complex 
mechanisms), there is neither analogy nor homology, but a specificity of mechanism 
and modality.’ (1995, 26–27) 
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modern state and the political management of society—the role of 
philosophy is also to keep watch over the excessive powers of political 
rationality. Which is a rather high expectation’ (210). Why does Foucault 
take political rationality as a ground for the study of the role of power in 
the processes of subjectivation? At the time of the conference, he had just 
devoted a couple of courses at the Collège de France to examining this 
conjunction (2009; 2010), in order to understand how, at the end of the 
process triggered by the political rationality, there is the ordinary life of 
all human beings. The political economy of the state had created a certain 
type of societies—disciplinary societies—in which individuals are 
subjected to laws and norms that shape them. Those laws and norms and 
regulations generated microphysics of power that builds the ordinary. 
Foucault describes the return of the ordinary: ‘Everybody is aware of 
such banal facts. But the fact that they're banal does not mean they don’t 
exist. What we have to do with banal facts is to discover—or try to 
discover—which specific and perhaps original problem is connected with 
them’ (1983, 210). The French philosopher clearly states in the following 
paragraphs that it is not the political rationality itself that must be to be 
placed in question: the fact that one had Auschwitz must not lead to 
execrate the rationalisation itself, or even to the prohibition of reason (an 
attitude that would only be a source of sterile irrationalism). He 
otherwise suggests a possible alternative method of investigation that 
may escape the above-mentioned risk:  
 25 
 
I would like to suggest another way to go further towards a 
new economy of power relations, a way which is more 
empirical, more directly related to our present situation, and 
which implies more relations between theory and practice. It 
consists of taking the forms of resistance against different 
forms of power as a starting point. To use another metaphor, 
it consists of using this resistance as a chemical catalyst so as 
to bring to light power relations, locate their position, find out 
their point of application and the methods used. Rather than 
analyzing power from the point of view of its internal 
rationality, it consists of analyzing power relations through 
the antagonism of strategies. (210-211)11   
 
Although Foucault has established the relationship between the subject 
and power, and it has been identified a field—or historical moment—for 
research, which is represented by the advent of political rationality about 
two centuries ago, the urgency of this investigation has not yet been 
explained. Foucault briefly argues for the need for further study: ‘I think 
we have to refer to much more remote processes if we want to understand 
how we have been trapped in our own history’ (210). In this passage the 
key word is trapped: the condition of prisoners. Even if a kind of 
pessimism lurks beneath Foucault’s discourse, a historic trap is 
nonetheless to be understood here—both in a contingent manner (relative 
to this historical moment), as well as in its absolute sense. Is it possible 
for an individual to escape the historical time to which s/he belongs? 
Furthermore, is it possible to bring to light practices of freedom that 
allow one to evade getting ensnared in this historical moment? This is 
                                                 
11
 This assumption is one of the guidelines of this research. Accountability is seen as a 
specific process of subjectivation, and the field in which it is applied is the digital 
world. 
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both the profound ethical question that Foucault proposes in this short 
essay, as well as the ambition of this dissertation. 
After a few passages dedicated to the analysis of some possible forms of 
resistance to power, Foucault then outlines the question of the subject in 
a famous passage: 
All these present struggles revolve around the question: Who 
are we? They are a refusal of these abstractions, of economic 
and ideological state violence which ignore who we are 
individually, and also a refusal of a scientific or 
administrative inquisition which determines who one is. (…) 
This form of power applies itself to immediate everyday life 
which categorizes the individual, marks him by his own 
individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law 
of truth on him which he must recognize and which others 
have to recognize in him. It is a form of power which makes 
individuals subjects. There are two meanings of the word 
subject: subject to someone else by control and dependence, 
and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-
knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which 
subjugates and makes subject to. (210)   
 
Here Foucault summarises three years of courses held at the Collège de 
France. The answer to the question: Who are we? is never innocent. 
Whether the individual is conscious of it or not, the answer to this 
question is constituted by the outputs of the regimes of truth that act on 
the subject and of the dispositives by which the subject is modelled. The 
state in first place, furnished with the rationalising violence that it bears; 
but also family, school, work: any element inside the position in which 
the subject lives. The verbs used by the French philosopher are quite 
drastic: mark, attach, impose. Operated by the forms of power, the 
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regimes of truth tend to crystallise the individual as an understandable 
subject, recognisable by him/herself and others, substantialised. In other 
words, easily quantifiable and quantified: a subject that is easier to make 
predictable and, therefore, to govern. If a complete disappearance from 
the regimes of truth is impossible,12 understanding them, which could 
possibly provoke a detachment from the power relations that innervate 
them, stands as an ethical imperative. Thus, at the end one finds a subject 
who cannot be completely subjected (by forms of power, regimes of 
truth), but who can utilise practices of freedom as a form of 
resilience/resistance to actual forms of subjugation. Foucault’s 
conceptual acumen has earned him a position as one of the most 
important philosophers of the latter half of the 20th century. His thinking 
                                                 
12
 In this point Foucault differs from contemporary authors like Jürgen Habermas and 
Jean-Paul Sartre. In a very pertinent comment about Habermas, Foucault says: ‘The idea 
that there could exist a state of communication that would allow games of truth to 
circulate freely, without any constraints or coercive effects, seems utopian to me. This is 
precisely a failure to see that power relations are not something that is bad in itself, ‘that 
we have to break free of.’ I do not think that a society can exist without power relations, 
if by that one means the strategies by which individuals try to direct and control the 
conduct of others. The problem, then, is not to try to dissolve them in the utopia of 
completely transparent communication but to acquire the rules of law, the management 
techniques, and also the morality, the ethos, the practice of the self, that will allow us to 
play these games of power with as little domination as possible.’ (1997, 298) And then, 
questioned about Sartre: ‘Power is not evil. Power is games of strategy. We all know 
that power is not evil! For example, let us take sexual or amorous relationships: to wield 
power over the other in a sort of open-ended strategic game where the situation may be 
reversed is not evil; it's a part of love, of passion and sexual pleasure. And let us take, as 
another example, something that has often been rightly criticized—the pedagogical 
institution. I see nothing wrong in the practice of a person who, knowing more than 
others in a specific game of truth, tells those others what to do, teaches them, and 
transmits knowledge and techniques to them. The problem in such practices where 
power—which is not in itself a bad thing—must inevitably come into play is knowing 
how to avoid the kind of domination effects where a kid is subjected to the arbitrary and 
unnecessary authority of a teacher, or a student put under the thumb of a professor who 
abuses his authority. I believe that this problem must be framed in terms of rules of law, 
rational techniques of government and ethos, practices of the self and of freedom.’ (298-
299) 
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is able to connect two radical questions that the individual might pose to 
him or herself and arrive at the same conclusion: Who are we? and How 
do we live our world?  
This possibility to combine such different questions would seem 
unreasonable, if Foucault hadn’t argued shortly thereafter that the 
Western world has subsumed in the power of the State a form of power 
older than the state itself: the pastoral power of Christianity. For all 
human beings and for the single individual, omnes et singulatim: 
This is due to the fact that the modern Western state has 
integrated in a new political shape, an old power technique 
which originated in Christian institutions. We can call this 
power technique the pastoral power. (…) 
This word designates a very special form of power. 
1) It is a form of power whose ultimate aim is to assure 
individual salvation in the next world. 
2) Pastoral power is not merely a form of power which 
commands; it must also be prepared to sacrifice itself for the 
life and salvation of the flock. Therefore, it is different from 
royal power, which demands a sacrifice from its subjects to 
save the throne . 
3) It is a form of power which does not look after just the 
whole community, but each individual in particular, during 
his entire life. 
4) Finally, this form of power cannot be exercised without 
knowing the inside of people' s minds, without exploring 
their souls, without making them reveal their innermost 
secrets. It implies a knowledge of the conscience and an 
ability to direct it. 
This form of power is salvation oriented (as opposed to 
political power). It is oblative (as opposed to the principle of 
sovereignty); it is individualizing (as opposed to legal 
power); it is coextensive and continuous with life; it is linked 
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with a production of truth—the truth of the individual 
himself. (Dreyfus 1983, 213-214)   
 
This dissertation aims to show that accountability is a contemporary form 
of remediation of pastoral power. If not all features of pastoral power can 
be retraced in accountability, the question of the production of the truth 
of the subject,13 the need for accounting of this truth and the ability of 
directing consciousnesses are proper elements of accountability. Found in 
the digital world, these elements provide a fertile ground for growth. 
 
Workplan 
This dissertation comprises an introduction, five chapters and a 
conclusion. The chapters are meant to be read consecutively, even if each 
one maintains a form of autonomy that aims to exhaustively explain its 
content. 
The first chapter is devoted to the building of the scenario and is divided 
into three parts: the world of reference, the object of analysis and the 
Foucauldian toolbox that will be applied. The world of reference is the 
digital world. The first section will provide an overview of a text that has 
been the foundational paradigm of this world: Being Digital by Nicholas 
Negroponte (1995), which at the time of writing of this dissertation will 
                                                 
13
 ‘Tell me who you are: this is the spirituality of Christianity’ (Foucault 2001, 621 [my 
translation]). 
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be twenty years old. In parallel, a partial history of digital media over the 
past twenty years will be summarised, witnessing at the end the 
quantitative explosion of this world. 
Thereafter, the chapter will explore various theories about digital media. 
Remediation: Understanding New Media (Bolter and Grusin 2000) and 
The Language of New Media (Manovich 2001) will provide some basic 
notions to understand the digital world. While Manuel Castells is the 
deputy role to provide the tools of analysis of a subset of the digital 
world (The Internet Galaxy (2003)), Roy Ascott will shed light on the 
digital world as a set of behaviours (Ascott and Shanken 2007). With its 
location of narrative in the digital environment, David Eggers’ novel The 
Circle (2013) will provide a counterpoint to theoretical analysis in this 
chapter. In the second part of the discussion of the digital world, the field 
of concrete practices will be explored and analysed according to different 
methods of discipline. Sherry Turkle (1997; 2005; 2012) and danah boyd 
(2015) will provide a means of social analysis for the understanding of 
contemporary digital practice, with particular emphasis on adolescents 
and digital natives. Derrick De Kerckhove will allow the analysis of our 
being digital in the light of the principle of connectivity. In this phase 
some key words will emerge to define our relationship with digital 
media: publicness, curiosity, immediacy, participation, connection. 
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After providing an overview of the digital world, the second part of the 
scenario will introduce and explain the concept of accountability. 
Accountability is a polysemic concept, ambiguous and complex. The 
etymology of the word will shed light on several possible ways to 
understand this concept. The clash of accountability and the digital world 
will see the birth of the notion of digital accountability, a form in which 
accountability is practiced in the digital world. Accountability is then 
defined as a possible anthropotechnic, according to the definition 
provided by Peter Sloterdijk. The framing of the accountability as 
anthropotechnic will allow us to consider this practice as fundamental in 
the contemporary era. 
As third element of the scenario, to complete the conceptual tools for the 
continuation of the dissertation, a brief but thorough explanation of 
Foucault’s toolbox is provided. The concepts of subject, dispositive and 
care of oneself will be defined and subsequently operatively adopted in 
the pursuit of this research.  
Once the scenario is explained and the conceptual toolbox is defined, the 
following chapter, entitled “The Scene of Address,” is based on a first 
investigation of the issue of accountability. The purpose of this chapter is 
to address accountability in terms of the relationship between the subject, 
the account and the other. The starting point is Judith Butler’s text Giving 
an Account of Oneself (2005). Unlike Butler, who follows Friedrich 
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Nietzsche in the reconstruction of the genealogy of the account 
(Nietzsche 2014), the hypothesis put forward here, already partially 
exposed in the introduction, is that the account has a Christian origin in 
the confession. If the account is constituted as production of statements, 
their production is investigated from the point of view of the relationship 
between poiesis and praxis (Arendt 1998; Virno 2004). The analysis of 
the genealogy of the accountability from the Christian confession will be 
derived from the work of Michel Foucault, who in the course On the 
Government of the Living (2014a) has investigated the origin of the 
Christian confession. At the end of this chapter, using the paradigm of 
Christian confession, the relationship between subject, account and truth 
will be grounded. 
In the following chapter, “The First Hermeneutics of the Subject”, the 
subject will be investigated from four point of views, according to its 
modality of being on social networks: the unscreaming subject, the free 
subject, the disembodied subject and the coherent subject. These four 
declinations of the subject aim to illustrate four main discourses about the 
presence of the subject on social networks. 
While the third chapter seeks to define the presence of the subject on 
social networks from the point of view of the subject, the fourth chapter, 
“The Second Hermeneutics of the Subject”, illustrates the same presence 
from the point of views of dispositives. The analysis of Big Data will 
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shed light on the fact that the subject can be accounted in a different way, 
namely: as a quantified subject. The quantified subject is the human 
being interpreted by the digital machine in terms of numeric 
symbolisation. As the chapter unfolds, a critique of the quantification of 
the subject will be offered. Michel Foucault and Edmund Husserl will 
provide the tools for demonstrating that the quantified self is the last 
stage of a vision of the human being inaugurated with René Descartes in 
the modern era. The critique of the quantified self will be based on a 
review of the digitalisation of the human being as new discourse of the 
master. Consequently in the following chapter, “The New Panopticon”, 
accountability will be seen as the present form of the panopticon. 
Conclusions are dedicated to the exploration of some possible lines of 
flight from the panopticon. Since a contemporary ethics can be defined 
only from the relationship with this panopticon, entropy will be verified 
as a possible common ground for every ethical behaviour in the digital 
world. Some possible subjects will be outlined in order to show how 
entropy can be linked within accountability: the untimely subject, the 
moveable subject, the friend, the subject exploring the body without 
organs. These figures will allow the reader to answer the question driving 
the entire dissertation: which hypotheses of freedom can be formulated in 
the contemporary digital world? 
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1 Scenario 
1.1 Being Digital 
In the play Millenovecentonovantadieci, Italian comedian Corrado 
Guzzanti performed one short, ridiculous and very famous sketch. He 
asks: ‘If I had this new medium, the ability to convey a huge amount of 
information, in a microsecond, to an Aborigine living at the opposite side 
of the planet ... but the problem is: Aborigine, but you and I ... what the 
f.ck should we say each other?’ (Guzzanti 2007). 
The question raised by Guzzanti is still tremendously current today, 
twenty years after the explosion of the Net and almost thirty years after 
the invasion operated by binary code throughout the houses of the 
western world. The present work does not aim to propose a historical 
reconstruction of the spread of the digital medium, about which there are 
already several very qualified references. Because an operative definition 
of the digital medium shall be provided, here the digital medium is 
defined as any medium that implies binary code for the storage, 
processing and transmission of information, according to the Jakobsonian 
analysis of communication. The digital world refers to the set of 
ecological niches in which human beings and the digital medium are 
present at the same time and in the same place. Sometimes a narrower 
definition of “digital world” will be implied: the kind of environment 
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where the digital medium has a clear supremacy over other media (paper, 
electronic, even orality). 
Given these definitions, the field taken into consideration by this 
dissertation is the ordinary world where the Internet is the most important 
means of communication, the processor is the primary tool and the 
memory has a material substrate made by silicon. If the origin of this 
digital world must be told, its beginnings should be situated between the 
Sixties and the Seventies, with the first implementation of the ARPAnet 
and the Italian physician Federico Faggin’s invention of the 
microprocessor at Intel. If this is the beginning of the digital world, the 
following chapters of this story would be the diffusion of the personal 
computer in the consumer market during the Eighties and the creation of 
the HTTP protocol at the beginning of the Nineties, which made the Net 
accessible to the entire world.14 The Nineties saw the advent of a new 
technological paradigm based on the digital medium, which became 
transparent to the whole world: the Internet and personal computing 
broke through the consumer market, and the Western world entered a 
new era that was superimposing onto the electronic one. If globalisation 
was already understood from the point of view of the media theories 
(Lévy 1999; McLuhan and Powers 1993), globalisation and the Net at 
that moment seemed to be two sides of the same coin:  the human being 
                                                 
14
 More comprehensive and precise references can be found in Castells (2003). 
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was invited to interface and communicate with any other being in the 
human world. Within this context enthusiasm for the new medium 
exploded. 
One feature of the new digital medium fascinated most: the horizontality 
of communication. If the traditional medium succumbed to a rigid 
hierarchical structure, characterised by a one-to-many communication, 
which historically had been a powerful tool in the hands of totalitarians 
and also a means of soft persuasion in the hands of Western democracies 
(Wolf 2001), the new digital medium seemed to offer a promise of 
liberation. As Negroponte said in one of his fundamental works, inflated 
by a critical optimism towards the new digital medium: ‘On the Net each 
person can be an unlicensed TV station’ (1995, 176). In this text, which 
is rooted in a strong sense of messianism and liberally interspersed with 
verbs conjugated in the first person plural (we will), readers were offered 
a bright future built by the digital medium, and they were asked to reflect 
upon questions about the interaction between computers and human 
beings, where the accent was on the computer instead of the human 
being. Among these naïve considerations, it seems interesting instead to 
underline a further step, whose purpose—at first glance—reveals a 
sinister aspect that will be argued later: ‘Being digital will change the 
nature of mass media from a process of pushing bits at people to one of 
allowing people (or their computers) to pull at them’ (1995, 84). Moved 
by this revolutionary inspiration, the past was sounding ugly and 
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outdated15 compared to the magnificent and progressive future offered by 
the digital medium. 
The magazine Wired took on the role of the herald of the digital 
revolution, uncritically giving voice to any innovation introduced by the 
digital medium into the human environment.16 Its former director Kevin 
Kelly became the prophet and the proponent of a confused political 
theory: digital socialism, a kind of merging of politics and digitalism, 
socialism and capitalism. The bestsellers of that time loved to cite the 
word revolution, which for instance appears in the titles of Rheingold’s 
two fundamental works: Virtual Reality: The Revolutionary Technology 
of Computer-Generated Artificial Worlds—and How It Promises to 
Transform (1992) and Smart Mobs: The Next Social Revolution (2003). 
Web 2.0 appeared later: a world where friendly interfaces allowed any 
Internet user to post content on the network, giving voice to his/her own 
identity and erasing any gate-keeping of the content—like mass 
communication systems—or technological gate-keeping (as in the first 
phase of the network, where at least the user had to know some coding).17 
                                                 
15
 ‘The digital superhighway will turn finished and unalterable art into a thing of the 
past’ (Negroponte 1995, 224). 
16
 The role that Wired plays has never diminished, and it can still be checked by simply 
reading daily headlines (WIRED, 2015). 
17
 The epitome of the sensationalism of this time was the famous cover of Time devoted 
to the person of the year 2006: You (Wikipedia, 2006). The tagline on the cover read: 
‘Yes, you. You control the information age. Welcome to your world’. About YouTube, 
Lovink commented: ‘YouTube’s slogan, ‘Broadcast Yourself,’ is put into action by less 
than 1 per cent of its users. In this Long Tail age, we know that it’s mainly about 
‘Broadcasting to Yourself’. The Internet is used mainly as a mirror. In a macroeconomic 
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As with the advent of mass communication, the world was divided into 
apocalyptic and integrated masses (Eco 2000), in which the latter had a 
clear upper hand over the former. In this context, the political needs of 
liberation, which found international visibility during the rallies that took 
place in Seattle in 1997, perfectly fit with the novelty of the new 
medium. While Hardt and Negri’s work became the Bible of the these 
movements (2001), the concept of general intellect that both authors 
argued in philosophical terms at great length—exposed briefly and 
elliptically by Marx in the Grundrisse—seemed like such a well 
calibrated anticipation18 of the Net that many authors saw in the Internet 
a tool for social liberation.19 
                                                                                                                       
sense, it’s about the millions of films watched every day, which provide Google 
(YouTube’s owner) with a treasure trove of user data. What is your ‘association’ 
economy worth? Am I really aware of why I’m clicking from one clip to the next? If 
not, we can always reread our own history on YouTube. We can find out everything— 
but mainly about ourselves: what the most popular channel is, which friend has watched 
this video’ (Lovink 2008, 11). 
18
 ‘Nature builds no machines, no locomotives, railways, electric telegraphs, self-acting 
mules etc. These are products of human industry; natural material transformed into 
organs of the human will over nature, or of human participation in nature. They are 
organs of the human brain, created by the human hand; the power of knowledge, 
objectified. The development of fixed capital indicates to what degree general social 
knowledge has become a direct force of production, and to what degree, hence, the 
conditions of the process of social life itself have come under the control of the general 
intellect and been transformed in accordance with it. To what degree the powers of 
social production have been produced, not only in the form of knowledge, but also as 
immediate organs of social practice, of the real life process’ (Marx 1973, 706). For an 
exhaustive understanding of the use of the notion of the general intellect versus the 
dominion of cognitive capitalism, see Vercellone 2007. 
19
 Of course some contemporary approaches to this theme are more articulated. The 
artist Hito Steyerl, who coined the concept of the poor image, elaborated one of those, 
which is still the most convincing. The poor image is a low quality and corrupt image 
that is generally used by users via illegal downloads. However, this lawlessness, which 
frees the poor image from the market system, opens the possibility of a democratisation 
of content and at the same time offers new creative possibilities generated by a kind 
manipulation of it (such as the world of mashups). As Steyerl says: ‘The economy of 
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While a rupture with the past and liberation from the present mass 
mediatic yoke were the two reasons that widely thrilled proponents of the 
digital world, some voices began to argue in detail some of the issues 
raised by the advent of the digital medium by providing less inaccurate 
historical and theoretical frameworks. Pierre Lévy’s text Collective 
Intelligence: Mankind's Emerging World in Cyberspace (1999) led to the 
emergence of the notion of collective intelligence, a concept which was 
collocated into the historical level of human evolution and which was 
equipped with an in-depth analysis of the functioning mechanisms of the 
digital medium.20 
Manuel Castells realised a monumental analysis of the individual in the 
network society (2009), but at the same time he understood that a new 
culture—the culture proper of the network—was emerging. Thus in his 
analysis, the Spanish sociologist investigated the origins of the ideology 
of freedom that dominated the discourse of the network, and—outside of 
any hypothesis of a radical break made by the network— identified an 
object, namely the network culture, which he characterised by four 
influences: the meritocratic culture; the hacker culture; the culture of the 
virtual community and the corporate culture. With Castells, after the 
                                                                                                                       
poor images, with its immediate possibility of worldwide distribution and its ethics of 
appropriation and remix, enables the participation of a much larger group of producers 
than even before’ (2013, 40). 
20
 Notions like noosphere (Teilhard de Chardin 2008) and global village (McLuhan 
1964, 1993) are obvious predecessors. 
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dominance of some naïve dualisms that conceived of the network and 
open source as revolutionary tools against the neoliberal context, 
dualisms that had found a theoretical framework in the model of the 
cathedral and the bazaar theorised by Raymond (2001), the digital 
medium began to be understood more in its forms of connection with the 
past than as a form of absolute otherness in relation to it. 
In 2000 and 2002, two works were published that became fundamental 
references for future digital studies. The first, Remediation: 
Understanding New Media (Bolter and Grusin 2000), asserted that every 
medium is the remediation of other media (following McLuhan 1964): in 
this sense any medium is affected by an ontological singularity, and also 
the digital medium is then connected with the rest of the mediatic 
apparatus. In this work, the remediation process is read by the categories 
of immediacy and hypermediation. The first eliminates the need for any 
trace of authorship and opens the user’s own point of view to a second 
interactivity; immediacy is based on transparency and hides the interface 
in the background. On the contrary, hypermediation makes visible the 
presence of other media, and it is the category with which one can 
establish the connections between the different media. 
In 2001, Lev Manovich published The Language of the New Media 
(2001), which articulated an analysis of the relationship between digital 
media and contemporary culture. Manovich’s first assertion is that the 
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computer has a specificity compared to its context: while the printing 
press influenced media distribution, and photography influenced only one 
type of cultural communication (still images), the media revolution made 
by the computer has influenced all levels of communication. The digital 
medium then arises as a meta-medium, able to encompass all other media 
(Manovich 2001, 23). The main features of new media outlined by 
Manovich are: numerical representation, modularity, automation (that 
excludes intentionality), variability and transcoding (which consists of a 
mutual influence between culture and computing). The importance of 
Manovich’s work is based then on the dismantling of some previous 
assumptions concerning the question of the organisation of information. 
Manovich in fact shows that in the digital medium two opposite modes of 
data organisation coexist side by side. The first is the hierarchical file 
system, which reduces the world to a logical order and hierarchy, 
wherein each object has a distinct place, defined and structured. The 
second is the World Wide Web, in which all objects are equally 
important and everything, according to Ted Nelson’s original definition 
of the network, can be connected to anything else.21 In his description of 
                                                 
21
 What Manovich describes, but does not have the courage to analyze in these terms, or 
simply ignores, is what Foucault defines discourse. The analogy between Manovich’s 
analysis and Foucault’s notion of discourse is evident here: ‘In semiotic terms, the 
computer interface acts as a code that carries cultural messages in a variety of media. 
When you use the Internet, everything you access— texts, music, video, navigable 
spaces—passes through the interface of the browser and then, in its turn, the interface of 
the OS. In cultural communication, a code is rarely simply a neutral transport 
mechanism; usually it affects the messages transmitted with its help. For instance, it 
may make some messages easy to conceive and render others unthinkable. A code may 
also provide its own model of the world, its own logical system, or ideology; 
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the interfaces,22 Manovich shows how they act as representations 
according to which one organises data in special forms that are made 
accessible in particular ways. The result, demonstrated by Manovich, is 
that interfaces are not at all neutral, but they favour some particular 
models of the world and of the human being. This assertion made clear 
that no network is originally innocent, but—like any other human 
creation—it is articulated from its inception in relations of knowledge 
and power. 
Alongside these studies that privilege the ontology of the digital medium 
and its relationship with the cultural context,23 a number of authors began 
to work on the user’s position in this new media context. If we find the 
description of the processual aspect of any kind of screen in Caronia 
(2012), so that there would be continuity between television and 
computer, Ascott provided a basic insight on the computer early on. As 
Ascott says in a work originally published in the Nineties: ‘The computer 
is not primarily a thing, but a set of behaviours. Its purpose is not only 
computation but transformation’ (Ascott and Shanken 2007, 225). 
Ascott’s invitation is thus to pass from the dimension of ontological 
                                                                                                                       
subsequent cultural messages or whole languages created using this code will be limited 
by this model, system or ideology’ (2001, 76). 
22
 The definition of interface given by Lévy is applied here and subsequently: all media 
materials that enable interaction between the universe of information digitised and the 
ordinary world (Lévy 2001). 
23
 A work that adequately summed up a vast number of studies at the beginning of the 
new millennium is The New Media Reader (Wardrip-Fruin and Montfort (eds) 2003). 
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analysis of the digital medium to investigating the new experiential 
dynamics that it opens.24 The numerical computation performed by the 
computer is only one side of the processes operated by it, which is 
inseparable from environmental change introduced by the machine. If the 
computer provides a new set of behaviors,25 it follows that aesthetic 
apparatuses, which shed light on the relationship between the human 
being and the environment, should change: ‘The new aesthetic deals with 
forms of behavior’ (2007, 375).26  Especially within the French culture, 
some positions critical of the new contexts emerged, highlighting the 
dangers arising from the explosion of the digital world—comparable to 
those risked by human beings after the invention of the atomic bomb27—
or resuming the possibilities of perfect crimes operated even by the old 
media, like in Jean Baudrillard (2008). 
Furthermore, American scholarship reveals a sociological approach 
interested in answering the question of what users do with new media. 
Turkle, after her seminal work in the Nineties that investigated the forms 
                                                 
24
 In this sense Ascott comes close to Foucault’s analysis of the processes of 
subjectivation, even if just rooted in the field of digital media. 
25
 Some years later, it is interesting to consider how the set of behaviors have become a 
set of habits. 
26
 An author who thoroughly analyzes the dynamics of the relationship between new 
media, the individual and society is Casalegno (2007), who coined the concept of 
cybersociality. The cybersociality is the presence of the biological substrate in the 
cybernetic forms of relationship produced by the new media. 
27
 See for example the work by Paul Virilio The Information Bomb (2006), in which the 
insight, already Mcluhanianan, of the instantaneity conveyed by the electric medium is 
eviscerated in environments both electrical and digital. 
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of identity triggered by the arrival of the digital medium (1997), has now 
undertaken an extensive analysis of the forms in which the digital 
medium is used in the new millennium, and sheds light on an atomic-
sised and—at the same time—distributed subject who is in contact with 
new media (2012). 
Firstly, Turkle points out the ability of the subject to adapt to the new 
context introduced by media, in which simulation plays an important 
role: ‘Immersed in simulation, it can be hard to remember all that lies 
beyond it or even to acknowledge that everything is not captured by it. 
For simulation not only demands immersion but also creates a self that 
prefers simulation. Simulation offers relationships simpler than real life 
can provide’ (2012, 285). A first element, for which the subject’s 
adaptation to new media has been so rapid and fruitful, is the simplicity 
of new social media itself, which provides a simulated and simplified 
form of existence.28 
And one of the factors of new media’s success is the possibility of 
existing regardless of the content. As Turkle writes, analysing instant 
                                                 
28
 Jaron Lanier exposes the same idea even more radically. He keenly points out, for 
instance, that the possibility of changing the height of an avatar also changes one’s self-
esteem (2011). Lanier, who was a pioneer of coding in virtual reality, has become 
twenty years later one of the fiercest critics of the positivist vulgate about new media. 
The main argument brought forward by Lanier is that software exerts domination on an 
ingenuous subject, who does not see the cage in which the computer imprisons him and 
all of the obligations that arise from this captivity. He also describes information, in all 
its aspects, as an alienated form of experience (Not a Marxist, Lanier assumes that 
alienation operates here as subsumption and impoverishment of experience under the 
constraints of invisible factors). 
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messaging: ‘IM does not require “content.” You just need to be there; 
your presence says you are open to chat’ (198). The poverty of 
information is, however, bypassed by the overload of emotional tones 
present in the moment of messaging: ‘Texts fill a moment emotional, 
insightful, and sexy’ (168). Social media then shifts from being a means 
of disseminating information to the role of a tool for the emotional 
affirmation of the existence of the sender; in Jakobsonian terms, one sees 
a clear prevalence of emotional work and effort on the referential and 
poetic functions. As Turkle observes, in new media it takes a reversal for 
which ‘Things move from “I have a feeling, I want to make a call”, to “I 
want to have a feeling, I need to make a call”’ (2012, 176). The overall 
discourse of Turkle should be read, moreover, according to a scenario in 
which new media would manifest a human side, too human (in the sense 
that Nietzsche attributes to this concept) of the subject. Starting from the 
premise that ‘On Second Life, a lot of people, as represented by their 
avatars, are richer than they are in first life and a lot younger, thinner, and 
better dressed’ (1), the immediate conclusion that comes intuitively to the 
American author is that ‘Technology is seductive when what it offers 
meets our human vulnerabilities’ (1). 
Analysing then new media in functionalists terms, in order to answer the 
question of what people do with new media, the conclusion is that new 
media makes possible the compensation of the difficulties, vulnerabilities 
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and lacks one is forced to endure in real life.29 As it is stated in the text: 
‘People talk about digital life as the “place for hope”, the place where 
something will come to them’ (Turkle 2012, 153). New media are 
conceived of as a place for hope and desire, the desire ‘... to live your life 
that will enable you to love your life’ (2012, 158). A basic vulnerability 
that new media allows us to bridge is anonymity. If the individual feels a 
social lack—the lack of attribution and construction of identity resulting 
from confrontation with others and relationships more generally—new 
media provides a continuous reaffirmation of one regardless of the 
presence of the other. As Turkle observes, a great feeling of well-being 
comes from being immediately responsive to the stresses from the 
environment, whether by individuals or by the machine: ‘The self shaped 
in a world of rapid response measures success by calls made, e-mail 
answered, text replied to, contacts reached. This self is calibrated on the 
basis of what technology proposes, by what it makes easy’ (2012, 66).30 
                                                 
29
 Nicoli finds in this regard some significant key terms for Facebook: shame, seduction, 
confession and suicide (2010, 150). 
30
 This long quote from The Circle by Eggers (2013) is a perfect illustration in narrative 
form of Turkle’s assumptions: ‘Mae’s new feeling of competence and confidence 
carried her through the week, and given how close she was to the top 2,000, she stayed 
at her desk late through the weekend and early the next week, determined to crack 
through, sleeping in the same dorm room every night. She knew the upper 2,000, 
nicknamed T2K, was a group of Circlers almost maniacal in their social activity and 
elite in their corresponding followers. The members of the T2K had been more or less 
locked in place, with few additions or movements within their ranks, for almost 
eighteen months. But Mae knew she needed to try. By Thursday night, she’d gotten to 
2,219, and knew she was among a group of similar strivers who were, like her, working 
feverishly to rise. She worked for an hour and saw herself climb only two spots, to 
2,217. This would be difficult, she knew, but the challenge was delicious. And every 
time she’d risen to a new thousand, she received so many accolades, and felt she was 
repaying Annie in particular, that it drove her on. By ten o’clock, just when she was 
 47 
 
But, even if the digital medium allows a reinforcement of the self 
calibrated on responses from the environment,31 at the same time the 
confrontation with the Other must be taken into account. And new media 
offers a wide possibility of forms of self-representation, mediated by an 
interface between our physical body and the Other. Within the variety of 
possibilities of representation given by the distance between the physical 
self and the digital self, Turkle sees the moment of birth of a fundamental 
                                                                                                                       
tiring, and when she’d gotten as high as 2,188, she had the revelation that she was 
young, and she was strong, and if she worked through the night, one night without 
sleep, she could crack the T2K while everyone else was unconscious. She fortified 
herself with an energy drink and gummy worms, and when the caffeine and sugar 
kicked in, she felt invincible. The third screen’s InnerCircle wasn’t enough. She turned 
on her OuterCircle feed, and was handling that without difficulty. She pushed forward, 
signing up for a few hundred more Zing feeds, starting with a comment on each. She 
was soon at 2,012, and now she was […] was the number of queries handled that day 
thus far, 221, and the number of queries handled by that time yesterday, 219, and the 
number handled by her on average, 220, and by the pod’s other members: 198. On her 
second screen, there were the number of messages sent by other staffers that day, 1,192, 
and the number of those messages that she’d read, 239, and the number to which she’d 
responded, 88. There was the number of recent invitations to Circle company events, 
41, and the number she’d responded to, 28. There was the number of overall visitors to 
the Circle’s sites that day, 3.2 billion, and the number of pageviews, 88.7 billion. There 
was the number of friends in Mae’s OuterCircle, 762, and outstanding requests by those 
wanting to be her friend, 27. There were the number of zingers she was following, 
10,343, and the number following her, 18,198. There was the number of unread zings, 
887. There was the number of zingers suggested to her, 12,862. There was the number 
of songs in her digital library, 6,877, number of artists represented, 921, and based on 
her tastes, the number of artists recommended to her: 3,408. There […] could see how 
many people had viewed her profile that day, 210, and how much time on average they 
spent: 1.3 minutes. If she wanted, of course, she could go deeper, and see precisely what 
each person had viewed. Her health stats added a few dozen more numbers, each of 
them giving her a sense of great calm and control. She knew her heart rate and knew it 
was right. She knew her step count, almost 8,200 that day, and knew that she could get 
to 10,000 with ease. She knew she was properly hydrated and that her caloric intake that 
day was within accepted norms for someone of her body-mass index. It occurred to her, 
in a moment of sudden clarity, that what had always caused her anxiety, or stress, or 
worry, was not any one force, nothing independent and external—it wasn’t danger to 
herself or the constant calamity of other people and their problems. It was internal: it 
was subjective: it was not knowing’ (Eggers 2013, 193-196). 
31
 Susca goes further, describing the relationship between the digital platform (in this 
case Facebook) and the human being in terms of automatism: ‘Facebook is a multilayer 
universe where the connectivity is stimulated both technically and socially, and 
becomes an automatic process’ (2010, 74 [my translation]). 
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question for the wired subject: ‘What kind of personal life should I say I 
have?’ (Turkle 2012, 180). If  ‘Networking makes it easier to play with 
identity (...) but harder to leave the past behind, because the Internet is 
forever’ (159), and if at the base of the work in the digital world one has 
the too human desire to represent him/herself better (whatever this may 
imply of each subject/user may be the meaning of this word) than what 
one really is, it is up to the contemporary subject to face the difficult task 
of finding the balance between the physical self and the digital self. And 
the quest for this balance, as keenly identified by Turkle, is even more 
difficult because of the fact that the digital itself can easily be in the 
plural form, in the sense that it allows the subject to take multiple 
identities. As Turkle argues, ‘When identity is multiple in this way, 
people feel ‘whole’ not because they are one but because the relationship 
among aspects of self are fluid and undefensive. We feel “ourselves” if 
we can move easily among our many aspects of the self’ (2012, 194). 
In summary, Turkle following the survey conducted in 2012, makes 
evident a complex world of relationships between the physical self and 
digital self, in which the projections of the physical self on one hand 
complicate the statute of the digital representation that the subject aims to 
offer, and on the other hand, allow the subject to feel alive. As Turkle 
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summarises happily, the contemporary subject lives in a fundamental 
shift ‘from life to life mix’ (2012, 157).32 
In a study of digital behaviours of the younger generation, boyd (2015) 
starts instead from the assumption that media has always worked to 
create public identities. While mass media have kept separate audiences 
and performers, so that the audience became an abstraction defined by 
the purposes of mass communication, within social media the audience 
acquires a statute of visibility. However, while the contexts in the media 
are usually profiled, in social media contexts collapse and continuously 
change, so as to engage the audience in a constant redefinition of their 
public dimension that should be consistent with objectives (boyd 2015). 
De Kerckhove and Susca, in a text dedicated to the exploration of 
political phenomena within the context of social media, emphasise the 
importance of the emotional factor, triggered by contemporary 
technologies: ‘The technology relies on social subjectivities around 
emotional vibrations, info-aesthetic pleasures, ludic drives’ (Susca and 
De Kerckhove 2013, 6 [my translation]). If the background of Susca’s 
and De Kerckhove’s discourse is the impossibility of existing in the 
contemporary world without digital visibility,33 contemporary technology 
is identified as a factor that subsumes the emotional aspect of 
                                                 
32
 Lévy keenly describes the cyberculture as ambivalent pharmakon (2001, 32). 
33
 ‘I don't exist if not sharing the trivial elements giving body to my existence’ (Susca 
and De Kerckhove 2013, 13 [my translation]). 
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interpersonal communication and takes it to a kind ecstatic state: ‘The 
sensibility becomes a vector of a situated, partial, local knowledge, a 
product of the conversation where the electronic aura envelops the 
communicative relationship and expresses it as ecstasy’ (2013, 25 [my 
translation]).34 Susca and De Kerckhove  thus identify a new category to 
be included in the political analysis, which takes the form of a new social 
contract based on emotional contagion rather than arising from utilitarian 
rational choices: ‘... a social contract grounded on the emotional 
contagion’ (2013, 28 [my translation]), a new form of political 
communication in which the stimulation of emotions prevails over 
rational discourse. 
At the end of this short survey on contemporary theories about social 
media, some more relevant topics emerge. First of all, there is great 
emphasis on the emotional dimension present in social media, which 
consists of sharing feelings, emotions and collective vibrations—
sometimes in the form of such a strong stimulation to the subject that it 
may lead to a state of ecstasy. Secondly, there is the dimension of desire 
as a key factor on social media: a desire that manifests itself as a will 
towards the persistence of the self, as an alienated, yet reassuring 
representation of a better life—a place for hope, a possibility of 
designing another life in new transcendent forms. The secret and sharing 
                                                 
34
 Everyone who has had the experience of following some hashtags related to recent 
global collective events (the earthquake in Fukushima, the Arab Spring) is well aware 
of the emotional tension conveyed from the screen. 
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are two problematic forms of relationship between real self and digital 
self, in which the subject has to make rational and strategic choices to 
maintain consistency between the self and the body, whether the digital 
identities that he/she can take are single or multiple. The matter of 
identity (which will then be eviscerated in the form of subjectivation) 
remains crucial in the whole discourse. These are some of the reasons 
why social media has had the explosion that we all know, whose numbers 
are discussed in the following chapter. 
 
1.1.1 New Media Numbers 
But what is the scenario that this overview about social media theories 
refers to? To define this, it is necessary to make a quick quantitative 
analysis about social networking platforms patronised by large amount of 
users.35 
The site that has the most active users, with reference to the data 
available in March 2015, is Facebook (www.facebook.com), which totals 
more than a billion and four hundred users, to which half a billion users 
of Facebook Messenger should be added. In early 2009, Facebook 
accounted about two hundred million users, which has multiplied seven 
times in the last seven years. It’s well known that Facebook is the most 
                                                 
35
 All the following data are taken from the website Statista. The Statistics Portal 
(Statista. The Statistics Portal, 2015). 
 52 
 
populated country in the world, surpassing China and India. It is also 
interesting to consider what the most popular pages on Facebook are: 
Coca-Cola is number one, with some ninety million users following it, 
YouTube follows with about eighty million. Lagging significantly behind 
in third place is Red Bull with 43 million (data referred to May 2015). 
Nike Football, Oreo, Converse All Star, PlayStation, Starbucks Coffee, 
Pepsi and iTunes follow in the top ten. 
The second largest social network in the world is the instant messaging 
platform QQ (www.qq.com), used mainly in China, with about 830 
million users. The Chinese audience also boasts the fourth largest social 
network ranked for the amount of its users: Qzone (qzone.qq.com), 
which comes to about 630 million users. This Chinese App is preceded 
by the primary system of instant messaging in the Western World, 
WhatsApp (web.whatsapp.com), which has 700 million active users. In 
seventh place, with about 350 million active users, is LinkedIn 
(www.linkedin.com), a strictly professional social network. Skype 
(www.skype.com), a pioneer of the VoIP platform, follows in 8th place. 
One finds the photosharing platform Instagram (instagram.com) in 10th 
place with about 300 million users. Only in twelfth place is it possible to 
find Twitter (twitter.com) with its 288 million active users.36 
                                                 
36
 Although Twitter’s numbers are not very high when compared to those of other 
similarly less popular platforms, it is the social network with the highest public 
visibility on other media. One reason for this success is the massive presence of 
celebrities on Twitter. In 2015, within the top ten Twitter accounts with the largest 
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A summary table of the Global social networks ranked by number of 
users in 2015 follows: 
Leading social networks worldwide as of March 
2015, ranked by number of active users (in millions) 
  
Facebook 1.415 
QQ 829 
WhatsApp 700 
QZone 629 
Facebook Messenger 500 
WeChat 468 
LinkedIn 347 
Skype 300 
Google+ 300 
Instagram 300 
Baidu Tieba 300 
                                                                                                                       
number of followers worldwide, only one site is counted (YouTube). The other 
positions are occupied by US President Barack Obama (in third place with 60 million 
followers), a TV anchor woman (Ellen DeGeneres, in ninth place with 44.5 million 
followers) and seven singers. Katy Perry dominates above all with her seventy-two 
million followers (the following ones are: Justin Bieber, Taylor Swift Lady Gaga, Justin 
Timberlake, Rihanna, Britney Spears). Interestingly, all the profiles reported above are 
from the US. Regarding Twitter’s metrics, boyd  and Crawford affirm: ‘Twitter 
provides an example in the context of a statistical analysis. First, Twitter does not 
represent ‘all people’, although many journalists and researchers refer to ‘people’ and 
‘Twitter users’ as synonymous. Neither is the population using Twitter representative of 
the global population. Nor can we assume that accounts and users are equivalent. Some 
users have multiple accounts. Multiple people use some accounts. Some people never 
establish an account, and simply access Twitter via the web. Some accounts are ‘bots’ 
that produce automated content without involving a person. Furthermore, the notion of 
an ‘active’ account is problematic. While some users post content frequently through 
Twitter, others participate as ‘listeners’ (Crawford 2009, p. 532). Twitter Inc. has 
revealed that 40 percent of active users sign in just to listen (Twitter, 2011). The very 
meanings of ‘user’ and ‘participation’ and ‘active’ need to be critically examined’ (boyd 
and Crawford 2001, 6). 
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Twitter 288 
Viber 236 
Tumblr 230 
Snapchat 200 
LINE 181 
Sina Weibo 167 
VKontakte 100 
 
This survey would not be complete if another activity, which parallels 
and intersects social networking, were not included: online purchases 
made by users. In this case the available data are referred to the US 
market in March 2015. 
Monthly unique visitors to U.S. retail websites 2015 
Most popular retail websites in the United States 
as of March 2015, ranked by visitors (in millions) 
 data 
Amazon Sites 175 
eBay 122 
Wal-Mart 82 
Apple.com Sites 77 
Target Corporation 51 
Best Buy Sites 31 
The Home Depot 29 
Kohl's 28 
Etsy.com 25 
Macy's 22 
 
Interestingly, two sites that have an exclusively online presence occupy 
the first two positions: Amazon (www.amazon.com) and eBay 
(www.ebay.com), the first a worldwide leader in e-commerce B2C, the 
second one in C2C. For both companies the issue of feedback is an 
absolute priority. In third place is the largest retailer in the world, Wal-
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Mart, while the world of Apple ranks only fourth, despite the huge 
worldwide exposure. 
The explosion of this world would not have been possible without one of 
the fundamental inventions of this era: the account, which is discussed in 
the next chapter. 
 
1.2 Accounting 
1.2.1 Account and Digital Account 
In order to reach a general definition of account, one must first undertake 
an etymological analysis of the various meanings that the word assumes 
in contemporary English. 
The suggested starting point is the etymology of the term account, which 
comes from the Latin computare.37 Computare is itself a composite of 
cum (together) + putare, whose original meaning is to clean, to prune the 
trees of dead leaves.38 Putare passed from a material sense, related to 
cleaning of the plant, to an immaterial sense, which focuses on the 
meaning of give an order, especially between thoughts and words; and, in 
                                                 
37
 It is not intended in this case to assume that the etymology is a comprehensive 
explanation of the meaning, especially if referring to etymological origins that date back 
thousands of years. However, as in this case, etymology is a useful tool to bring to light 
the deposits of sense that are sedimented in a term. 
38
 For this etymological reconstruction see Messori (2007, 17-19). 
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a proper sense, to assign a value through the words. Consequently, from 
the verb putare another verb is derived: disputare, to dispute, which 
means to put words in order clearly, for a speech that is not confused; but 
above all—the purpose of this etymological reconstruction—the word 
computare is derived from putare, a word that takes on a double 
meaning. Computare generally means the possibility of formulating a 
judgment, but a judgment that may lean in two directions, which in the 
past were considered closer than at the present time. The first meaning of 
computare is to calculate, or to rationalise reality through numeric 
symbols.39 But, secondly, the symbolic order that one aims to give the 
experience can also be produced through the use of another set of 
symbols: words. Hence computare can take on, in Latin, the meaning “to 
tell”.40 The activities of calculating and telling a story are very close in 
Latin and share the same root: giving a symbolic order to the world, both 
in the form of numerical calculation and in the form of a told story. 
                                                 
39
 It seems appropriate also to u that the noun ‘computer’ designates both a person and a 
machine in English language, as brilliantly delineated by Hayles (2005). 
40
 In Italian this common origin sounds clear, if one pays attention to the fact that the 
words racconto, “story,” and conto, “count,” contain the same root, which is lent to 
Italian from the adaptation of the Latin word computare. And the same relationship can 
be found in the Ancient Greek that offers different etymological roots but maintains the 
same ambivalence. Legein is the Greek word that means “to say,” but at the same time 
keeps the original material root material of “to collect”. The act of saying, and its 
figurative meaning—the act of storytelling—is the manifestation of the outcome of a 
collection, a selection of what happens in the experience. From the verb legein, then the 
philosophical term for excellence, “logos”, is derived; translated generically with 
thought, but its etymology contains the idea of giving a symbolic order to reality. For an 
accurate reconstruction see Messori (2007, 19). 
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From the Latin language, which hinted at the double sense of 
computation expressed above (but without the epistemological harshness 
that the two overlapping meanings could generate in the contemporary 
world), computare moved to a neo-romance language, French. From the 
Middle Ages up to the contemporary French language, two terms with a 
strong similarity are still adopted: the verb compter, “to tell,” and the 
word conter, “to count.” The words in French lost the lexical unit that 
was typical of the Latin, but they shared semantic origin remained in the 
phonetics. France then exported the two words to England, in the form of 
the Middle English acounte and accompte, whose first known use dates 
back to the 14th century. They will soon drift into the contemporary term 
account. 
And the contemporary word account retains all its semantic ambiguity, or 
rather: in the various meanings it can have in contemporary times, it 
demonstrates the potential meaning present in its etymological root. As a 
first definition (from the Merriam-Webster dictionary), account finds a 
meaning—very Latin, very archaic—in the term computation. Secondly, 
as part of the jargon of banking and finance, it indicates both a ‘record of 
debit and credit entries to cover transactions involving a particular item 
or a particular person or concern’, and ‘a statement of transactions during 
a fiscal period and the resulting balance’.41 Thirdly, the account is 
                                                 
41
 This definition will not be subsequently taken into consideration. 
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delivered in order to explain a behaviour, so that one can understand the 
reasons, causes or motives of said behaviour.42 Fourth, the account is a 
‘formal business arrangement for providing regular dealings or services 
(like banking, advertising or store credit) and involving the establishment 
and maintenance of an account’. This definition implies a shift in the 
word’s meaning, but still has a strong bond with the Latin etymology: the 
account in this case is the factor of order in a system. Furthermore 
account appears several times in constructs that, as in the third definition, 
imply forms of attribution of value (for example in the expression “it's of 
no account to me”: in this way account is close to synonyms like 
appreciation, esteem, regard and respect). In the fifth variation of the 
word’s meaning, account significantly includes the idea of narrative, in 
the form of a reasoned description of facts, circumstances or events. In 
this case the word account finds synonyms in history, narration, record, 
report and story. 
The rise of the word account in information technology is accredited to 
the Unix operating systems (from a private conversation with Denis Roio 
aka Jaromil, June 2015).43 It was introduced to regulate a multi-user 
operating system. Since the early Unix operating systems, in 1969, the 
                                                 
42
 Surely one finds here a strong influence of the Latin verb putare, from which 
computing is derived, which implies an attribution of value to the object of the verb. 
This third definition of account is critical to understanding the transition from account 
to accountability. 
43
 A specific literature about this topic does not yet exist. What follows was borrowed 
from a private conversation with the hacker and media artist Jaromil 
(https://jaromil.dyne.org/), which took place in June 2015. 
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account is understood as a login process, which usually comprises a 
username and password that determine the login credentials and then the 
user’s position in the hierarchical structure of the multi-user operating 
system. However, the login is not a full account. The login can be 
understood as an access procedure, which verifies one’s credentials to 
something more complex, which is known as the account. The account in 
this case would be a set of functions, tools and content associated with a 
specific username in an operational context related to the network. 
Understood in this sense, the digital account has its origins in the fourth 
standard definition presented above, which conceived of the account as a 
set of services, guaranteed by an agreement with the user; services that 
are primarily banking services but could also be associated with other 
operational areas (market, advertising, etc).44 Besides the account has 
also some further features, which will be explored in more depth in the 
following pages: it does not only consist of accessing a number of 
services, but it also transforms the simple login into a complete profile, 
which includes extensive data about the user, and is generated by a 
system that depends on operations performed by user.  
                                                 
44
 In this sense, the concepts of account and ID will never overlap. The account will 
always be considered a login giving access to a set of services, with a special emphasis 
on the relationship that one has with the services that the account offers; while the ID is 
the unique key in a system that allows the identification of an item out of the system 
(for example, the ID of a citizen with respect to the physical body of the individual). 
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Thus Facebook offers an account that lets the user post, share content 
from other users, create communities of friends, like and comment on 
other content, create pages and events, subscribe to groups and so forth. 
The use of Twitter is another kind of digital account, allowing its users to 
post pictures and tweet notes (with a rigorous 140 character limit) and 
follow or be followed by other users. With its instant messaging service 
of icons, text, images and video, and the possibility to create groups, 
WhatsApp can also be understood in terms of the digital account. The 
same can be said for the system that Amazon provides the user.  While 
Amazon is first a system for online purchases, it is also equipped with a 
powerful profiling system that identifies the user’s tastes in order to offer 
him/her very accurate suggestions for further purchases. The perfect and 
definitive account is the one described by Eggers in his latest novel, 
already quoted in a previous footnote, The Circle:  
Ty had devised the initial system, the Unified Operating 
System, which combined everything online that had 
heretofore been separate and sloppy—users’ social media 
profiles, their payment systems, their various passwords, their 
email accounts, user names, preferences, every last tool and 
manifestation of their interests. The old way—a new 
transaction, a new system, for every site, for every 
purchase—was like getting into a different car to run every 
different kind of errand. “You shouldn’t have to have eighty-
seven different cars,” he’d said, later, after his system had 
overtaken the web and the world. (…) Instead, he put all of it, 
all of every user’s needs and tools, into one pot and invented 
TruYou—one account, one identity, one password, one 
payment system, per person. There were no more passwords, 
no multiple identities. Your devices knew who you were, and 
your one identity—the TruYou, unbendable and 
unmaskable—was the person paying, signing up, responding, 
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viewing and reviewing, seeing and being seen. You had to 
use your real name, and this was tied to your credit cards, 
your bank, and thus paying for anything was simple. One 
button for the rest of your life online. (2013, 21-22) 
 
However this dissertation aims to demonstrate, above all in chapters two 
and three, that the digital account preserves all the possible meanings of 
the word account, derived from its Latin roots. Thus the account is not 
only a simple, ingenuous and spontaneous modality of accessing services 
provided by the Net, but is also the most relevant tool of a specific mode 
of anthropotechnic operating in the contemporary era. This 
anthropotechnic is given the name of accountability, and is explained in 
the following chapter. 
 
1.2.2 Accountability as Anthropotechnic 
While the first use of account in the English language dates back to the 
14th century, the first known use of accountability is dated 1770. The 
general definition of accountability is related to the state of being 
accountable, or to be responsible for certain actions, events or 
circumstances, and to be able to give account for them. 
However, in the 20th century, accountability has also become a keyword 
for systems of organisation and governance, and an almost infinite body 
of literature devoted to this ‘fashionable’ (Schedler 1999, 13) and 
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‘chameleon-like’ (Mulgan 2000, 555) term has been generated. In a text 
found on the World Bank’s website, accountability is defined as follows: 
‘broadly speaking, accountability exists when there is a relationship 
where an individual or body, and the performance or tasks or function by 
that individual or body, are subject to another’s oversight, direction or 
request that they provide information or justification for their actions’ 
(Accountability in Governance, 1). Thus, to have accountability there 
must be first and foremost a relationship between an individual/body and 
an observer. The observer exerts his/her report in three forms, according 
to this categorisation: supervision, direction or request of information or 
justification. What is subject to supervision/ direction/request for 
information or justification, and pertains to the individual, is the 
performance relative to his/her objectives or functions. Accountability is, 
in this sense, a specific relation of power, as clearly stated by Schedler: 
‘Today, it is the fashionable term accountability that expresses the 
continuing concerns for checks and oversight, for surveillance and 
institutional constraints on the exercise of power’ (1999, 13). It is 
exercised within a relational environment and in which the dynamics of 
knowledge and power are all put into play.45 
                                                 
45
 For instance, ‘Accountability is central to the way the CEOs (…) structure their 
understanding of their jobs (…). In its simplest sense, accountability entails a 
relationship in which people are required to explain and take responsibility for their 
actions’ (Sinclair, 220-221); ‘Accountability in management is: ‘The process of making 
top corporate leaders responsible for their actions, goals and so on, utilizing available 
objective measures (Rosenberg 1993, p. 4)’ (Mraović 2003, 168). 
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Continuing with the definition of accountability, one finds that it 
involves two distinct stages: answerability and enforcement. 
Answerability refers to the obligation of the government, its 
agencies and public officials to provide information about 
their decisions and actions and to justify them to the public 
and those institutions of accountability tasked with providing 
oversight. Enforcement suggests that the public or the 
institution responsible for accountability can sanction the 
offending party or remedy the contravening behaviour. As 
such, different institutions of accountability might be 
responsible for either or both of these stages (Accountability 
in Governance, 1).46  
 
In both cases, accountability operates as a very complex machine. In a 
moment of answerability, the accountable operator must be able to 
provide appropriate information. This information must contain at a 
certain stage a form of storytelling or symbolisation (verbal or numeric) 
in order to make the work performed accountable. Secondly, this first 
form of storytelling could even not be sufficient, and must be helped by a 
supporting apparatus that makes it right according to a system of values. 
Furthermore, an additional element is defined at the second stage of 
accountability: enforcement, for which there is a system of sanctions for 
the individual/body who has not justified, due to negligence or 
misalignment with the value system, his/her actions. With the notions of 
answerability and enforcement the list of the elements of accountability 
is enriched by new factors: an individual/ body, an observer in relation to 
                                                 
46
 It should be, not that this definition of accountability principally concerns 
governance. However, the context taken into account in this dissertation is broader. 
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him/her, a kind of story shared by both, a system of values that supports 
the justification of the story, a penalty system that sanctions deviant and 
unaccountable behaviour. 
The same essay suggests a definition of accountability according to 
typology. In a first moment systems of governance, mostly political, are 
identified according to the categories of vertical and horizontal 
accountability.47 Subsequently a definition of a further model of 
accountability, the social accountability, is provided:  
The prevailing view of social accountability is that it is an 
approach towards building accountability that relies on civic 
engagement, namely a situation whereby ordinary citizens 
and/or civil society organisations participate directly or 
indirectly in exacting accountability. Such accountability is 
sometimes referred to as society driven horizontal 
accountability (Accountability in Governance, 3).  
 
This category of accountability is so defined as ‘demand-driven and 
made from the bottom up’ (3). While many elements of this definition 
are, in an analytical overview of the governance, fairly hazy (the concept 
of the ordinary citizen or that of civil society, as opposed to systems of 
governance), and find fertile ground in the nebulous, undefined  political 
cultural broth called direct democracy, what is interesting in this context 
is that accountability can even grow from bottom-up processes. A key 
factor in these processes is engagement—a voluntary factor therefore, 
                                                 
47
 For which, respectively, citizenship controls the actions of the government, and some 
entities within the system of government control each other. 
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neither necessarily political nor organisational, which arises because of 
this operativity.  
To complete the first definition of accountability, engagement should be 
added as a key element. It follows that accountability is constituted by an 
individual/body, an observer in relation to him/her, a kind of story shared 
by both, a system of values that supports the justification of the story, a 
penalty system that sanctions deviant and unaccountable behaviour, and a 
motivation that possibly pushes a non-observer to act as observer and, 
consequently, to inaugurate a process of accountability. 
A second text (Lindberg 2009) 48 introduces additional elements to the 
definition of accountability. The author defines accountability as follows:  
More or less all of the literature referred to in this paper 
agrees that the following should be included in the defining 
characteristics of any form of accountability: 
1. An agent or institution who is to give an account (A for 
agent); 
2. an area, responsibilities, or domain subject to 
accountability (D for domain); 
3. an agent or institution to whom A is to give account (P for 
principal); 
4. the right of P to require A to inform and explain/justify 
decisions with regard to D; 
and 
5. the right of P to sanction A if A fails to inform and/or 
explain/justify decisions with regard to D. 
                                                 
48
 It contains an impressive bibliography about accountability. 
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(…) It should be noted at the outset that none of these 
conditions specify that these relationships have to be formally 
codified or that the agents and institutions involved are 
formal institutions or hold an official office. (8) 
 
Compared to what was included in the first definition of accountability, 
in this case accountability is defined more clearly in terms of the form of 
account of his/her work that the agent is required to give. This request is 
introduced as “giving an account”, action which will have great 
importance in the next steps of this dissertation. It furthermore precisely 
defines that accountability is never a holistic process, but is instead a 
unique process performed on specific domains, and then—when 
described as a practice—should be always described in plural form. 
Furthermore, it is added that the relations between the various factors that 
operate within an accountability process do not need a formal coding, or, 
in other words, it is not necessary a socially valid contract before the law 
to make a process of accountability operate. 
To include the concept of accountability in an epistemological matrix 
that is more consistent with the discourse that will be developed later in 
this dissertation, accountability is understood as an anthropotechnic, 
according to the meaning of this term coined by German philosopher 
Peter Sloterdijk. According to the definition given by Giovanni Leghissa, 
an anthropotechnic is a set of exercises (Leghissa 2012, 23). Sloterdijk 
defines the exercise as follows:  
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If man genuinely produces man, it is precisely not through 
work and its concrete results, not even the 'work on oneself' 
so widely praised in recent times, let alone through the 
alternatively invoked phenomena of 'interaction' or 
'communication'; it is through life in forms of practice. 
Practice is defined here as any operation that provides or 
improves the actor's qualification for the next performance of 
the same operation, whether it is declared as practice or not’. 
(2013, 4).  
 
If life allows us all kinds of exercises (for instance, Sloterdijk himself 
classifies phenomenology as modest exercise (2012, 9)), and the purpose 
of each exercise is to change one’s life, which is made more intense by 
the intensification of the performance, anthropotechnics also have a 
downside. Leghissa keenly observes that freedom can be defined in 
opposition to the habits induced by the anthropotechnics. Every 
anthropotechnic, in this sense, is in conflict with freedom (Leghissa 
2012, 24). 
But, whether anthropotechnics are good or not, surely accountability is a 
kind of anthropotechnic, or better: accountability is the most relevant 
anthropotechnic in the contemporary digital world. Firstly, exercise and 
accountability share the common feature of having a person doing a 
performance as common ground. Then, the action made in the 
accountable process is iterated. In addition, both exercise and 
accountability have the common purpose of the qualification of the 
subject: in the first case, through an improvement of performance and, in 
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the second case, according to a process accounting the performance 
which aims to lead to the improvement of the performance. 
This chapter intends to argue that a digital account implies an 
anthropotechnic based on accountability, and therefore—given the 
pervasiveness of the digital account in the contemporary world—that 
contemporary society finds in accountability one of its fundamental 
processes, thus they should be defined as societies of accountability. The 
result of this merging of the digital account into an anthropotechnic is the 
lack of differentiation between having an account and giving an 
account.49 
One must first go back to the definition of digital account given above. 
The account is a set of services uniquely associated with a username that 
is accessible in a hierarchical system through the login. However, a 
number of characteristics of the digital account are derived from the 
historical meaning of the term account. First of all, the digital account is 
a factor of order. This is carried out in two directions: on one hand, a 
factor of order in a hierarchical system allows the username associated 
with the account to apply some features and inhibit others; on the other 
hand, the account allows the user to select, among all the possibilities in 
the network, those that are more appropriate: this purchase rather than 
                                                 
49
 In the following pages, the relationship having an account—giving an account is 
viewed through the difference possible—real, as theorised by Gilles Deleuze in 
Difference and Repetition (1995): giving an account is having an account plus the 
material existence of the account itself. 
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another one, one posted argument rather than others that are available, 
“following” a certain celebrity rather than someone else, etc. 
Furthermore, the order given by the user through the account is never 
purely theoretical. In social media, the user is always driven to do 
something, it is an agent, an active subject, before being an observer.50 
The activity by the user is never sterile, but it is automatically designated 
to generate an account. That is the specific difference between “material” 
and digital accounts. In the digital world, social media, but also outside 
of them, the fact of having an account (operating also silently) is 
automatically a form of narration, in which the dimensions of counting 
and accounting collapse, according to a sense that can be traced back to 
the ancient Latin computare. Having an account (Facebook, Twitter, 
WhatsApp) is automatically a factor that generates accounting. Having 
an account necessarily implies giving an account. The account that one 
creates can have verbal form—almost all social media operate at this 
level, asking to write something—or having an iconic form (like 
                                                 
50
 Because of this, no definite theory of the observer has been taken into account in this 
dissertation.  Maturana and Varela (1980) were instead taken into consideration during 
the research development. For the same reason, it was decided to avoid any ontological 
matrix derived from Deleuze. Deleuze observes in The Fold: ‘Every point of view is a 
point of view on variation. The point of view is not what varies with the subject, at least 
in the first instance; it is, to the contrary, the condition in which an eventual subject 
apprehends a variation. (…) It is not a variation of truth according to the subject, but the 
condition in which the truth of a variation appears to the subject’ (2006, 21). And soon 
after: ‘In each area point of view is a variation or a power of arranging cases, a 
condition for the manifestation of reality’ (23). Deleuze’s approach to the question of 
point of view implies an ontology of the existing in conflict with the central theme of 
this dissertation, i.e. the subject historically placed in a here and now according to a 
Foucaldian matrix. 
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Instagram, which nonetheless also includes a verbal component); or a  
numerical form in the forms of inferential statistics that the system 
generates in relation to the action of the user. Thus the operation of the 
user on social media is an automatic act of computation that generates 
statements. These statements are forms of narrative addressed both to the 
user his/herself and to the other, where the other is both the community 
participated in by the user and the digital system which the user is 
dealing with. 
All these forms of accounting are a specific anthropotechnic (or a set of 
repeated exercises), which is here defined as accountability. The previous 
chapter intended to define accountability as a process, not necessarily 
agreed by a contract, which involves a person/apparatus that performs an 
action (first agent) who should give an account of his/her actions 
articulated in the form of narration and justification of the action based 
on a reference domain and expressed in symbols (numeric or verbal 
language) to a second person / apparatus, the recipient of the account, 
who performs the function of verifying the account, and consequently 
can impose penalties for lack in the account. 
Thus digital accountability is a specific kind of digital anthropotechnic 
that implies the equality of having an account and giving an account. In 
order to demonstrate this, the features of accountability above illustrated 
are verified through the notion of digital account. 
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a) Digital accountability undoubtedly arises in the form of process. Every 
social media activity is transcribed in the form of operating algorithms, 
which can be simple and limited to a single operation (a post on 
Facebook) but can also take more complex forms (for instance a 
suggestion based on previous purchases made by the Amazon’s 
algorithm, which pushes the user to an exploration of other books, read 
comments, etc.). 
b) The issue of the contract in the digital accountability is twofold. On 
one hand, there is an agreement that is given by the user to the terms of 
use of the digital platform it is running on. Usually this type of contract is 
called the “Terms of Use,” and involves a list of rights/duties that the 
user must follow and accept in order to operate on that platform. The 
terms of use are much debated at the time of writing this dissertation. For 
instance, one might compare the terms of use of Facebook 
(www.facebook.com/legal/terms) with those of the rival platform Ello, 
which is considered to be the anti-Facebook (ello.co/wtf/policies/terms-
of-use). However, here it is believed that the terms of use are a marginal 
issue. In fact, digital accountability of course implies a contract with the 
platform used, but most of all with the community. What is meant here is 
to postulate that—in light of the processes of subjectivation that will be 
explained afterwards—the responsibility that the individual user 
exercises in the process of digital accountability is above all towards 
him/herself in relation to the community which he/she belongs to.  
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This ambivalence—which is not dialectic—is believed to deeply 
permeate the perception of themselves as users, and that the form 
assumed by the power in social networks is manifested as a hierarchical 
system platform (from here all the controversy over privacy about some 
platforms). In the three following chapters, digital accountability is 
demonstrated as a relational field that involves the self, community and 
digital platforms, as it is reductive to reduce it to a dualism—
user/platform. 
c) The presence of a subject is necessary in the process of digital 
accountability. In this analysis, possible forms derived from a cybernetic 
matrix are not taken into account—forms that would put a digital 
machine in place of the human agent, nor functional forms of 
accountability, in which the individual exercises the accountability 
function of assuming a role (for example, any institutional role), nor the 
ways in which institutions or apparatuses are subject to accountability 
(for example, vertical or horizontal accountability models, related to 
processes of governance). Digital accountability is the practice of being 
on social networks made by the human being in his/her everyday life. 
d) If in traditional accountability the system imposes the production of an 
account onto the agent, so that the account is a necessity arising from the 
forms of power hidden in the process, in digital accountability giving an 
account of oneself is immanent in the process. In other words, when an 
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account is opened into a process of digital accountability, there is an 
implicit acceptance that an account of oneself shall be given, so that 
having an account and giving an account collapse one into the other. The 
question then is not about the “duty” to provide an account, but the 
choice of the individual to enter into a system of digital accountability.51  
e) In this case too, digital accountability demonstrates a certain non-
dialectical ambivalence. The account provided is in fact an account about 
oneself, which preserves the original feature of ordering the world 
according to one’s way of computare. This order given to the world 
embraces both oneself and one’s experience of the world. The notion of 
accountability as a process of subjectivation, which will be presented in 
the following chapters (at the root of the Sloterdijk’s notion of 
anthropotechnic), will erase any kind of dualism behind it. As outlined 
above, a specific difference regarding narration in digital accountability 
is that the system itself is not limited to providing only the framework for 
the production of the narration, but also—through inferential systems 
based on a statistic matrix—it provides a second-level narration, built 
upon the interpretation of the intentionality of the subject made by the 
algorithm. 
f) The domain of reference of digital accountability is determined by the 
mission of each digital platform that hosts a subject’s account. For 
                                                 
51
 The reasons for this acceptance are ethical rather than political or legislative, and they 
will be discussed in detail in chapter two. 
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instance, Facebook’s mission reads as follows: ‘Founded in 2004, 
Facebook’s mission is to give people the power to share and make the 
world more open and connected. People use Facebook to stay connected 
with friends and family, to discover what’s going on in the world, and to 
share and express what matters to them’ 
(www.facebook.com/facebook/info?tab=page_info).52 Twitter laconically 
posts: ‘Our mission: To give everyone the power to create and share 
ideas and information instantly, without barriers’ 
(about.twitter.com/company). Digital accountability has—as domain of 
reference—the tasks of the mission exposed in each platform.53 
g) As explained above, digital accountability is based on a sorting of the 
experience of the user, translated into an account of oneself on/by the 
digital platforms.54 Digital accountability is always a representative form, 
based on a symbolic order. This order, from the user’s point of view, can 
be limited to these forms of expression: verbal, written, oral (it’s 
superfluous to consider the explosion of the instant messaging based on 
the delivery of oral messages), iconic (in the form of photography, video, 
self-generated memes and so on). According to the specific digital 
                                                 
52
 Facebook is often taken into account here as synecdoche for the whole world of social 
networks, given the incredible vastness of users worldwide. 
53
 It is unnecessary to consider that the user does not adhere to the platform after reading 
the mission, but s/he usually subscribes due to a social convention deriving from word 
of mouth. However, a reading of the various mission statements coincides almost 
perfectly with the specific uses that are known by the users on that specific platform. 
54
 The relationship with the habeas corpus of the user is one of the topics to be 
discussed widely in the continuation of the dissertation. 
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platform, one or more of the aforementioned symbolic tools is prevalent. 
But, while these forms of symbolisation are based on intentionality, they 
also offer a further level of the account: a level directly operated by the 
digital machine. First of all, the digital machine extrapolates a second 
semantic level from the discourse generated by the user, according to 
predefined algorithms. Secondly, this level is processed by systems of 
statistical inference, which transform the user into a numeric target.55 
h) Digital accountability is again ambivalent about the recipient of the 
account given on digital platforms. In giving an account of him/herself, 
the user is not fully influenced by a possible model-reader. S/he aims to 
address the digital community of which s/he is a member within the 
digital platform. However, since digital machines also process all 
accounts, each social network has its own way of giving meaning to the 
account given by the user, according to specific algorithms. Even though 
the user is not aware of it, a phantom-reader, generated by the digital 
machine, is deployed to read his/her own account. 
i) The community operates on the first level by reading the account 
provided by the user. The feedback by the community is the unit of 
measure of the validation of the account. The feedback can have many 
forms: silence, which implies in itself an attribution of value; the dispute, 
                                                 
55
 This level is extensively treated within chapter four. 
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which can—in different forms—lead to the exclusion of the user from the 
community; and appreciation, which drives up the ranking of the user.  
In addition to this first level, there is one more validation of the account, 
which takes the form of a sophisticated statistical inference. This 
validation of the user's account operated by the digital machine is strictly 
close to the neoliberal biopolitical paradigm: the validation of the data 
provided by the user is done when it is inserted in a process of economic 
rationalisation.56 
j) While the digital machine does not tend to generate penalties for the 
account given by the user, according to principles that will be shown in 
the third chapter, the user is subject to definitely sanction when s/he 
violates the terms of use of the digital platform. However, the key 
moment of enforceability—at a first level—is provided by the 
community,57 and within the processes of subjectivation regarding the 
relationship with the other. 
In this chapter a classification of digital accountability has been provided 
in order to firstly verify the possibility of its existence and, secondly, its 
essential structure. Once these items are ascertained, the exploration of 
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 This will be explained in chapter four. 
57
 The writer of this dissertation is no longer on Facebook because, in June 2015, his 
account was suspended for an alleged bot behind the account, rather than a physical 
person. After the account’s restoration through the production of legal documents that 
attested to the physicality of the writer, he decided anyway to erase it, given the 
totalitarian despotism under which the process was managed, starting with the first 
statement ethically untenable in any democratic system: “We suspect you're a machine.” 
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its theoretical features will be the task of the chapters two, three and four. 
Upon completion of the scenario, a description of methodological tools 
that will conduct the investigation must be provided. These tools will be 
discussed in the next chapter, devoted to Foucault’s toolbox. 
 
1.3 The Foucauldian Toolbox 
Michel Foucault58 was undoubtedly one of the most influential thinkers 
of the second half of the 20th century, both by his publications (books, 
transcripts of interviews and seminars, essays) and by his active role in 
French and global politics. For instance, he was founder of the Group 
d’information sur le prisons (GIP) in 1971 (Eribon 2011, 351), and 
correspondent for the Italian newspaper Corriere della sera about the 
Iranian Revolution in 1978, and he was for sure fascinated by this 
political experience (448-498). Several times he took publicly position 
about French political affairs, and he was a militant during the Seventies. 
The trajectory of his political consciousness has been winding, so that the 
French writer has been  considered to belong alongside with, and 
sometimes accused to adhere to, Marxism, Maoism, Anarchism, Social 
Liberalism, Neoliberalism. Nevertheless, after sympathising with 
Marxism in his early years, his intensive reading of Nietzsche at the 
                                                 
58
 Didier Eribon provided the most exhaustive biography about the French philosopher 
(2011). 
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beginning of the Fifties supported him in acquiring a definite political 
point of view, based on a very simple assumption: the contestation of the 
‘notion of adequate truth’ (Veyne 2008, 218), whichever form it might 
take in the development of political affairs. So it seems useful, in this 
work, to understand the French philosophers through his works more 
than his political life, knowing that each position he assumed was 
instable by definition. Veyne brilliantly synthetised this approach, 
undoubtedly very Foucauldian: ‘Give word only to things, so to become 
a mute ghost oneself’ (217 [my translation]). 
 His cultural legacy is still fundamental for the understanding of the 
contemporary age. This dissertation intends to apply epistemological 
tools derived from the Foucauldian toolbox to investigate the digital 
world.59 The digital world—for obvious historical reasons—was not 
known by Foucault; however, the conceptual tools provided by the 
French author can be adapted to any context in which the human being 
will be investigated as an open question. For convenience, at least three 
of these conceptual tools have been adopted for the construction of the 
scenario of this dissertation (namely: subject, dispositive, care of the self) 
so that these definitions can be applied immediately in the following 
chapters without the need of further explanation.  
                                                 
59
 Clearly this is not a dissertation about Foucault, but it is believed that the toolbox 
provided by the French author is the best method of analysis for approaching these 
issues. 
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1.3.1 The Subject 
The question of the subject has always been the primary concern of the 
French author. As Foucault expressly states in one of his last interviews, 
“The Ethics of the Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom”, in 1984:  
I have always been interested in the problem of the 
relationship between subject and truth. I mean, how does the 
subject fit into a certain game of truth? The first problem I 
examined was why madness was problematized, starting at a 
certain time and following certain processes, as an illness 
falling under a certain model of medicine. How was the mad 
subject placed in this game of truth defined by a medical 
model or a knowledge? And it was while working on this 
analysis that I realized that, contrary to what was rather 
common practice at that time (around the early sixties), this 
phenomenon could not be properly accounted for simply by 
talking about ideology. In fact, there were practices—
essentially the widespread use of incarceration which had 
been developed starting at the beginning of the 17th century, 
and had been the condition for the insertion of the mad 
subject in this type of truth game—that sent me back to the 
problem of institutions of power much more than to the 
problem of ideology. This is what led me to pose the problem 
of knowledge and power, which for me is not the 
fundamental problem but an instrument that makes it possible 
to analyze the problem of the relationship between subject 
and truth in what seems to me the most precise way. 
(Foucault 1997, 289-290) 
 
In this long quote Foucault clearly exposes the concern of his whole 
research—the subject—in the form of an intellectual journey. The 
starting point for the delineation of a methodology of research about the 
subject is a radical anti-essentialism. For it, Foucault refuses to consider 
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the question: What is the subject? According to the French author, it is 
not possible to give an unambiguous and invariant definition of the 
subject, even if great philosophical traditions have afforded it. Foucault 
rather outlines himself as a relativist, in opposition to the great 
intellectual constructions of the subject made in the history of 
philosophy, and first among them, the line that can be drawn through the 
work of Descartes, Kant, Hegel and Husserl. As he soon makes clear in 
the same conference: ‘What I rejected was the idea of starting out with a 
theory of the subject—as is done, for example, in phenomenology or 
existentialism—and, on the basis of this theory, asking how a given form 
of knowledge [connaissance] was possible’ (1997, 290). 
If an a priori constitution of the subject is rejected as impossible, what is 
the process by which the establishment of the subject happens? Returning 
to the quote that opens this chapter, Foucault indicates that the subject 
arises from regimes of truth. The first example is about the definition of 
the foolish man, which Foucault provides in his first fundamental work 
(Foucault 1988a). The foolish is not constituted by an ideological 
apparatus, but is rather the outcome (here the Copernican revolution 
made by Foucault in defining human being) of concrete practices for 
which he is defined as such (for example, the practice of internment). 
What are such practices, and how do they work? Foucault, in the Sixties, 
identifies knowledge as the ground for any possible definition of the 
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human—however, a knowledge that should not be understood in a purely 
theoretical sense, but as result of a network of relations innervating all 
the instances that constitute practices. In this sense, knowledge is 
absolutely concrete, and it is produced either in the scheme of visibility 
or in that of speakability.  
Within the realm of knowledge, the statements (énoncés) acquire a key 
role. They are investigated in his following influential book, The 
Archeology of Knowledge (Foucault 1982). While language allows 
infinite possible combinations of enunciations, and it can unearth any 
possible sentence, in the world only a few selections of these possibilities 
are indeed brought to light (or rather, as opposed to the endless 
possibilities of language, only some things are said). The French 
philosopher then raises the question: why, within all the possibilities 
offered by language, do only a few things appear in the world? Foucault 
calls what is actually being said “statements”, énoncés.60 Archaeology is 
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 Foucault defines the statement as thus: ‘the statement is not the same kind of unit as 
the sentence, the proposition, or the speech act; it cannot be referred therefore to the 
same criteria; but neither is it the same kind of unit as a material object, with its limits 
and independence. In its way of being unique (neither entirely linguistic, nor 
exclusively material), it is indispensable if we want to say whether or not there is a 
sentence, proposition, or speech act; and whether the sentence is correct (or acceptable, 
or interpretable), whether the proposition is legitimate and well constructed, whether the 
speech act fulfils its requirements, and was in fact carried out. We must not seek in the 
statement a unit that is either long or short, strongly and weakly structured, but one that 
is caught up, like the others, in a logical, grammatical, locutory nexus. It is not so much 
one element among others, a division that can he located at a certain level of analysis, as 
a function that operates vertically in relation to these various units, and which enables 
one to say of a series of signs whether or not they are present in it. The statement is not 
therefore a structure (that is, a group of relations between variable elements, thus 
authorizing a possibly infinite number of concrete models); it is a function of existence 
that properly belongs to signs and on the basis of which one may then decide, through 
analysis or intuition, whether or not they 'make sense', according to what rule they 
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defined as the discipline that seeks to understand why only some 
statements are effectively produced, and some others not. He defines 
archive61 as the network of relations of knowledge that allow the 
emergence of some statements rather than others. To understand the 
evolution of the concept of madness, one must then investigate the 
statements that relate to madness—a role delegated to archaeology—
while the archive has the role of investigating the dynamics of knowledge 
that lead to the constitution of the subject as mad. As summarised by 
Foucault himself:  
What I wanted to try to show was how the subject constituted 
itself, in one specific form or another, as a mad or a healthy 
subject, as a delinquent or non delinquent subject, through 
certain practices that were also games of truth, practices of 
power, and so on. I had to reject a priori theories of the 
subject in order to analyze the relationships that may exist 
between the constitution of the subject or different forms of 
the subject and games of truth, practices of power, and so on. 
(1997, 290) 
 
However, one element is still missing in this overview about the 
constitution of the subject in order to reach a complete description of the 
original relationship between subject and games of truth. This element is 
power. In his production of the Sixties, the analysis of power is absent, 
although it becomes a priority in a text edited in 1971, entitled Nietzsche, 
                                                                                                                       
follow one another or are juxtaposed, of what they are the sign, and what sort of act is 
carried out by their formulation (oral or written)’ (Foucault 1982, 97). 
61
 In a text devoted to Foucault, Deleuze defines him as an “archivist” (Deleuze 1988). 
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Genealogy, History (1984, 76-100). This short text offers a deep reading 
of Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals (Nietzsche 2014) and the second 
untimely meditation On the Use and Abuse of History for Life (Nietzsche 
1997, 57-124). The reading of these Nietzschean texts compels Foucault 
to move from the notion of archaeology to the one of genealogy. The 
essence of the genealogical method is clearly explained in a famous 
passage about the inquiry of the origin, namely what justifies and 
legitimises the truth of things in the world:  
Why does Nietzsche challenge the pursuit of the origin 
(Ursprung), at least on those occasions when he is truly a 
genealogist? First, because it is an attempt to capture the 
exact essence of things, their purest possibilities, and their 
carefully protected identities; because this search assumes the 
existence of immobile forms that precede the external world 
of accident and succession. This search is directed to “that 
which was already there,” the image of a primordial truth 
fully adequate to its nature, and it necessitates the removal of 
every mask to ultimately disclose an original identity. 
However, if the genealogist refuses to extend his faith in 
metaphysics, if he listens to history, he finds that there is 
“something altogether different” behind things: not a timeless 
and essential secret, but the secret that they have no essence 
or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion 
from alien forms (1984, 78) 
 
If, as Foucault states, ‘History also teaches how to laugh at the 
solemnities of the origin’ (79), then  
a genealogy of values, morality, asceticism and knowledge 
will never confuse itself with a quest for their ‘origins’, will 
never neglect as inaccessible the vicissitudes of history. On 
the contrary, it will cultivate the details and accidents that 
accompany every beginning; it will be scrupulously attentive 
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to their petty malice; it will await their emergence, once 
unmasked, as the face of the other. Wherever it is made to go, 
it will not be reticent in ‘excavating the depths’, in allowing 
time for these elements to escape from a labyrinth where no 
truth had ever detained them. (1984, 80) 
 
 “Excavating the depths” will remain a key feature of the genealogical 
method. Instead of looking for a sort of mythical origin that gives 
legitimacy to what exists, genealogy searches for completely random 
emergencies, moments where history fractures, and something new will 
be born. In the genealogical method, the investigation of the mechanisms 
of knowledge is then combined with the analysis of the mechanisms of 
power, by which a human being can exercise dominion and truth upon 
another human being. Genealogy has the merit of having taught that what 
is determined by truth, which Descartes understood in a solely theoretical 
way, is at the same time constituted by the dynamics of power. Due to 
this, an allocation of value is always accompanied by a set of obligations 
to respect. In this sense, when one says about oneself: ‘I am a fool,’ one 
at the same time sets up a series of obligations to which one is subjected 
due to the fact that one is fool. An objectification of oneself follows, so 
that one is “substantialised” according to a definitory system that does 
not pertain to the subject itself, but to the truth of that particular 
substantialisation. 
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Thus the subject is defined by relationships of knowledge and power. But 
Foucault demonstrates this definition as always unstable. In a famous 
passage, he describes the subject as follows:  
It is not a substance. It is a form, and this form is not 
primarily or always identical to itself. You do not have the 
same type of relationship to yourself when you constitute 
yourself as a political subject who goes to vote or speaks at a 
meeting and when you are seeking to fulfill your desires in a 
sexual relationship. Undoubtedly there are relationships and 
interferences between these different forms of the subject; but 
we are not dealing with the same type of subject. In each 
case, one plays, one establishes a different type of 
relationship to oneself. And it is precisely the historical 
constitution of these various forms of the subject in relation 
to the games of truth which interests me. (1997, 290-291) 
 
The subject is not only a substance, but s/he is not even a static subject. 
There are many dynamics of knowledge and power that cross him/her in 
the historical time of his/her life. These continuously variable relations 
cause the subject to continuously change over time. This continuous 
variation then creates a shift from the investigation of the 
(substantialised) subject to the investigation of the processes of 
subjectivation. The processes of subjectivation are the encounters, based 
on a historical here and now, between the subject and certain regimes of 
truth. These encounters make that the subject what it is. The standard 
processes of subjectivation that one meets in one’s life are one’s 
relationships with family, educational institutions, a given citizenship, a 
medical system and judicial system—but also a digital world and a 
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natural environment. All these encounters become the trigger of specific 
historical becomings, which can be called processes of subjectivation. 
The subject cannot be understood if not from the point of view of 
processes of subjectivation. The human being living in the liminal 
condition of deprivation of every process of subjectivation is the human 
being with no qualifications, who cannot say anything about him/herself 
and about which no one can say anything.  
But, in this way, the subject is always also object, when s/he preaches 
something of himself: “I am ...” Automatically s/he objectifies 
him/herself in front of the eyes of the others. But this objectification is 
made according to regimes of truth that do not belong to the subject, but 
pre-exist him/her and innervate him/her. Namely: the “I” understands 
itself only when duplicated; and in this duplication acquires a self-
consciousness that would not otherwise appear, remaining forever fixed 
in the identical. Revel pointedly sets an appropriate terminology to 
describe the status of the subject determined by the processes of 
subjectivation: ‘One is never singular, but, on the contrary, because one 
becomes s/he can reach the singularity’ (Revel 2008, 140 [my 
translation]). She continues: ‘It is as if life is a power of subjectivation—
the development of this long differential becoming through individual 
differences, namely the construction of the ‘common’, always re-enacted 
as a weaving of differences’ (Revel 2008, 145 [my translation]). 
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An element remains untapped in this introduction: the regimes of truth. 
Foucault says several times that the subject is determined by the regimes 
of truth and that the processes of subjectivation are the result of the 
encounter between a subject here and now and the regimes of truth. They 
will be treated in the following chapters; however, one preliminary 
definition should be provided. The truth Foucault discusses has neither 
logical, epistemological nor ontological meaning, according to the 
canons of classical philosophy. According to the French author, if 
subjectivity is seen as that which varies in the relationship with its own 
truth, ‘the truth is conceived as a system of bonds’ (Foucault 2014b, 15 
[my translation]). The truth, as Foucault conceives it, is not at all 
theoretical. Rather, truth is what ensures that the subject is what s/he is. 
In other words, truth is the element that arises from the relationships 
between knowledge and power that generate an obligation to the subject. 
This obligation should not necessarily be understood as physical 
constraint: it may take this form, but mostly it is something that can 
incline the subject towards a certain direction. For instance, the 
educational system is not true because it is bonded to a theoretical 
horizon that determines the truth, but rather because it models knowledge 
and behaviours of its students. Equally, the medical system is a regime of 
truth because it describes the human being as sick or healthy and, in 
doing so, triggers a process of subjectivation concerning it (typically 
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based on the bipolarity sick/healthy, while for education it could be 
argued educated/uneducated). 
After defining the processes of subjectivation from the side of the 
subject, Foucault proposes a concept in 1977 to synthesise the relations 
of knowledge and power. This concept is the dispositive. 
 
1.3.2 The Dispositive62 
One is writing a paper on a laptop equipped with a word processor. S/he 
is lying on a couch lined with an unidentified fabric. A lamp is pointed at 
the white wall in front of the writer on a fairly dark day in November. 
One wears a shirt and pants, and glasses to protect him/her from the light 
waves of the screen. Next to him/her, on a shelf next to the sofa, there is 
a Blackberry that hasn’t rung since the previous day. In front of him/her, 
to the left of the screen, his/her eyes meet the spines of some coloured 
publications, neatly lining a shelf made from cheap plywood. In his/her 
back pocket there is a wallet containing money, credit cards, a couple of 
passport photos, cards for discounts at the supermarket and receipts—
some of them very old. One is lining up some pixels. Every object named 
in this list is a dispositive. 
                                                 
62
 The English translation of the French word dispositif has been uncertain for a long 
time. The proposal advanced by Bussolini (2010) has been adopted in this dissertation.  
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Dispositive is a polysemic and ambiguous word, but it is also a precise 
and fruitful notion. It is a precise notion, because the dispositive can have 
many definitions, but some of them (which will be discussed in this 
chapter) are absolutely grounded, calculated in their formulations. It is 
fruitful because the dispositive is one of the most powerful concepts of 
contemporary era that allows one to give an order, albeit tentative and 
uncertain, to the chaos in which our lives unfold. The purpose of this 
chapter is to bring out this fruitful sense of the word dispositive from the 
background noise from which the informational era is delivering it. 
Thus, it makes sense to begin this analysis of the dispositive with a 
cliché: the relevant page in Italian from Wikipedia 
(/it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dispositivo). The page is sparse and indexes a set 
of definitions that show that the dispositive can be: a device, a tool and 
something concerning legal acts. It may indicate components of a 
computer, an operating system or a medical device. The page is linked to 
pages from the Iberian region, built according to a taste for bizarre 
taxonomy: a list of seven items can be found on the Spanish page and 
twenty-two in Portuguese. If the Internet offers us a slight, uneven 
definition of the dispositive, it is then appropriate to return to different 
authoritative sources. The austere Treccani, the standard Italian 
encyclopaedia, focuses on the dispositive as an adjective. It reiterates the 
legal sense of the noun and adds a tasty military deviation, for which the 
dispositive would function here as the manner in which a unit is disposed 
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on the ground to meet the attacks of the enemy and the unit itself 
(www.treccani.it/vocabolario/ device). Otherwise the well-known Italian 
dictionary, the Sabatini Coletti, outlines the meaning of the legal term 
and proposes a second definition that underlines the computational aspect 
of the term. It is relevant that the definitions of this term suggested by the 
Italian Wikipedia page and the Sabatini Coletti are close to the English 
word “device” (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device), which is explained as 
both a tool and an electronic apparatus. This page does not connect to 
any Italian or French pages. Assonance with the Italian word occurs with 
the French word dispositif: ‘The dispositif, in a philosophical sense, is a 
concept theorised by many thinkers of the twentieth and twenty-first 
century to describe a mode of strategic governance’ 
(fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dispositif_%28philosophie%29). The French page 
quotes Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben and is linked to an English 
page, which lists a French term (dispositif), a German (Dispositiv) and a 
Danish (Anordning). Curiously, although the Foucauldian definitions of 
the term are quoted, the noun appears as apparatus. Device, dispositif, 
apparatus, philosophy, medicine, computer science, law: it seems that the 
dispositive does not allow itself to be easily imprisoned. 
All iPhones are dispositives, but not all dispositives are iPhones. Or, put 
in other words: devices are a subset of dispositives, and it is not possible 
to reduce dispositives to devices. It is therefore time to abandon 
Wikipedia and systematically explaining the concept of the dispositive, 
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taking into account the meaning of dispositive that has persisted on the 
philosophical scene since the mid-Seventies, which was elaborated by 
Michel Foucault. Consequently, the concept will be updated by the work 
of two significant authors, Gilles Deleuze (2007a) and Giorgio Agamben 
(2009), who both devoted short essays to the topic bearing the same title: 
What is an apparatus? 
To understand how and why Foucault aimed to fully delineate the 
concept of dispositive, it is worth remembering the brief philosophical 
journey that led him to this outcome. A constant in Foucault’s thought is 
the process of subjectivation (as explained in the previous chapter), or the 
way in which the Western human being has come to define itself as a 
subject, and according to what features. What is the historical element 
that has enabled the contemporary human being, and their ancestors 
before them, to define him or herself as a subject? This is the question 
that unites almost all of Foucault’s production—a question not idly 
theoretical but highly practice-oriented. While, in the Sixties, Foucault 
was still focused on the analysis of the dynamics of knowledge, in the 
Seventies another foundational term appeared on his conceptual scene: 
Power. It is this articulation of knowledge and power that allows 
Foucault, at least from Discipline and Punish (1995) onwards, to make a 
structured analysis of the processes of subjectivation. This articulation of 
knowledge and power has been termed dispositive since the early 
Seventies onwards. 
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Foucault uses the term dispositive several times in the Seventies, and in 
Discipline and Punish, published in 1975, the concept is so widely 
developed that it became one of the fundaments of the structural analysis 
of the disciplinary systems exposed in this text. However, a complete and 
articulated definition of the term dispositive is not found in Foucault’s 
texts until an interview published in 1977 entitled The Confession of the 
Flesh (original French: Le jeu de Michel Foucault; in Foucault 1980, 
194-228). Upon the interviewer’s question ‘You speak of “apparatus of 
sexuality.” What is the meaning or the methodological function for you 
of this term, apparatus (dispositif)?’, Foucault exposes his own 
definitions of the dispositive, which I have quoted below almost in its 
entirety. 
What I'm trying to pick out with this term is, firstly, a 
thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, 
institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, 
administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, 
moral and philanthropic propositions —in short, the said as 
much as the unsaid. Such are the elements of the apparatus. 
The apparatus itself is the system of relations that can be 
established between these elements. Secondly, what I am 
trying to identify in this apparatus is precisely the nature of 
the connection that can exist between these heterogeneous 
elements. Thus, a particular discourse can figure at one time 
as the programme of an institution, and at another it can 
function as a means of justifying or masking a practice which 
itself remains silent, or as a secondary re-interpretation of this 
practice, opening out for it a new field of rationality. In short, 
between these elements, whether discursive or non-
discursive, there is a sort of interplay of shifts of position and 
modifications of function which can also vary very widely. 
Thirdly, I understand by the term “apparatus” a sort of—shall 
we say—formation which has as its major function at a given 
historical moment that of responding to an urgent need. The 
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apparatus thus has a dominant strategic function. This may 
have been, for example, the assimilation of a floating 
population found to be burdensome for an essentially 
mercantilist economy: there was a strategic imperative acting 
here as the matrix for an apparatus which gradually 
undertook the control or subjection of madness, mental 
illness and neurosis. (Foucault 1980, 194-195) 
 
The definitions given above of the dispositive are crystal clear yet 
abstract, so they require a brief contextualisation to unlock the power of 
the concept.  First of all, dispositives should never be considered as 
single entities, but always as a plurality—in Foucault there is no 
essentialist instinct in any of his formulations. Dispositives are networks 
and hierarchies of discursive elements. A division between concrete and 
abstract, physical and symbolic is useless and misleading. The dispositive 
is the net linking what has been in history verbalised and what is given in 
the world of the visible. To introduce an example: a school is made at the 
same time by the walls of the classrooms, by the forms compiled by the 
students, by the knowledge that is taught. A car is a dispositive as 
tangible object, but also the dispositive “car” includes the engineering 
that produced it, as well as its instruction manual of use or the 
photograph of the same car on the Amalfi coast that persuaded the 
purchaser to buy it. The dispositive is then the network that connects all 
these elements. 
But these networks have one specific feature: they are formations and, as 
such, have some kind of internal consistency. This consistency can easily 
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become absolutely vast. In this sense, the health care system—made up 
of hospitals, medical practices, nursing gowns, public funding, bills and 
neurology textbooks—is a dispositive. The Federal Reserve is also a 
dispositive, from the pipes inside the walls of its Washington 
headquarters to the cost of fruit in a market stall in Quito, considering 
that the cost of the fruit is determined by the Fed’s economic policies. 
Given the consistency and flexibility of dispositives, Foucault introduces 
the criterion of the generation of the dispositive. The dispositive is 
formed as a response to an urgency. Urgency can be understood as an 
impetus, a pressure that determines that the previous dispositives, or 
system of dispositives, which crystallised and perpetuated a certain 
situation, are no longer adequate. This push—vital, biological, social, 
anthropological (the urgency may have different historical reasons)—
requires a new response. The emergence of a new dispositive is this 
response. Foucault, both in courses at the Collège de France and in 
fundamental texts like Discipline and Punish, unabatedly applies his 
conceptual effort to investigate some urgencies, and explains the 
dynamics that have created the large dispositives of the modern era: 
hospitals, schools, police. But it would be naïve to think that there is a 
master of puppets governing the dispositives. The dispositives are 
numerous, and there is no absolute sovereign or central government 
managing them. Here the radical difference with some Marxist theories, 
like the ones advanced by Louis Althusser (1969), emerges clearly, as for 
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Foucault ‘The state is superstructural in relation to a whole series of 
power networks that invest the body, sexuality, the family, kinship, 
knowledge, technology and so forth’ (Foucaul 1984, 64), without 
entitling the State of the role of a machine of repression. 63 They are 
different responses to different urgencies, and although it is possible that 
there is, at any given moment, a certain homogeneity among them 
(homogeneity that, on a theoretical level, Foucault called épisteme), the 
correct approach is to look at the individual dispositive, to dissect it from 
the inside, to see the dynamics of knowledge and power within it, and 
then build relationships with other dispositives.  
Dispositives and processes of subjectivation are two sides of the same 
coin. Because this is ultimately the heart of Foucault’s thought. During 
these decades he incessantly questions power, asking which hypotheses 
of freedom can be formulated for the modern human being. There is not a 
subject—Cartesian, Christian, in other words, essential—but the 
processes of subjectivation instead makes the human being an individual, 
giving a shape to his/her living flesh from the moment of birth. This 
work of modelling is accomplished by the dispositives, the dynamic 
forces that within historical time have the function of directing the human 
                                                 
63
 Ryder keenly summarises the position of Foucault underlining the distinction between 
the notion of repression, from the Marxist vocabulary, and the Foucauldian notion of 
power:  ‘He [Foucault] considers the juridical not as the repressive apparatus controlled 
by the bourgeoisie as a method of class domination, or at least not only that, but rather 
as a technique of power, the effect of a transformation on the way in which the body 
itself is invested by power relations’ (Ryder 2013, 150). 
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being according to the relations knowledge/power that structure him/her. 
Thus, which hypotheses of freedom can be formulated for the human 
being, emerging from the system of dispositives? It’s worth pointing out 
when looking for an answer that the hypotheses of freedom cannot be 
practiced out of dispositives, as if it were possible a release from the 
dispositives that consist of breaking the wall of any institution; but it is 
also never “internal”, at least in a trivial psychoanalytic sense. It is 
intended as a way to deal with that set of tools with which one lives, the 
story of one’s practices with which one takes care of oneself. Since the 
environment in which the human being is collocated is made by 
dispositives, it results that the analysis of dispositives is at the same time 
the analysis of the processes of subjectivation. And if the understanding 
of dispositives is an approach to a preliminary understanding of the 
human being, the hypotheses of freedom with respect to them cannot be 
other than the mot trenchant Foucault coined a few years later: se 
déprendre de soi même, to uproot oneself. 
Deleuze is the one who understood and clarified this strong ethical and 
political side of the dispositive, rather than conceiving of it only as an 
epistemological tool. In a conference held in Paris in 1988 dedicated to 
Michel Foucault, Deleuze held his last public address, and dedicated it to 
the concept of dispositive (Deleuze 2007). After an analysis of the device 
in the highly practical, dynamic style we can expect from Deleuze, the 
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French philosopher proposed a link between the dispositive and the 
development of history: 
We belong to these apparatuses and we act in them. The 
newness of an apparatus in relation to those preceding it is 
what we call its currency, our currency. The new is the 
current. The current is not what we are but rather what we 
become, what we are in the process of becoming, in other 
words the Other, our becoming Other. In every apparatus, we 
have to distinguish between what we are (what we already no 
longer are) and what we are becoming: the part of history, the 
part of currentness. (Deleuze 2007a, 345) 
 
And a little further: 
In every apparatus we must untangle the lines of the recent 
past from the lines of the near future: the archive from the 
current, the part of history and the part of becoming, the part 
of analysis and the part of diagnosis. If Foucault is a great 
philosopher. it is because he used history for something else: 
like Nietzsche said, to act against time and thus on time in 
favor, I hope, of a time to come. What Foucault saw as the 
current or the new was what Nietzsche called the untimely, 
the "non-current", the becoming that splits away from history, 
the diagnosis that relays analysis on different paths. Not 
predicting, but being attentive to the unknown knocking at 
the door. (2007a, 346) 
 
Deleuze always takes conceptual systems built by other authors and, as 
with Nietzsche or Spinoza, folds them, violates them, forces them to 
unleash the power of thought that they contain. Becoming and bifurcation 
are certainly also current themes in Foucault. However, in Deleuze’s 
synthesis they find a new background and, above all, they grasp the 
dispositive from another point of view, that of novelty. The subject of 
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novelty’s close association with dispositives—which one can certainly 
also find in Foucault, but Deleuze illuminates further—finds an 
explanation in the distinction presented above between analysis and 
diagnosis. One can make an analysis of dispositives, which relates to 
history. But one can also look at current dispositives and dissect them to 
bring out the lines of force that are working right now—this is the 
diagnosis of the governing forces of contemporary dispositives. This 
diagnosis aims to understand the actual forces acting in contemporary 
dispositives, in order to have an insight about the direction that history 
will take in the near future. 
While Deleuze considers the society of control, such as the effect of the 
diagnosis of contemporary dispositives, Giorgio Agamben offers a 
different diagnosis of contemporary society formulated from the point of 
view of dispositives (in Agamben 2009, 1-24). He instead traces the 
genesis of the dispositive in Foucault's thought from the influence 
exerted by the French author Jean Hyppolite, Foucault’s teacher, whose 
fundamental contribution is the review of the Hegelian-Marxist works. If 
Agamben identifies the Hegelian concept of positivity as the main 
influence on the development of Foucault’s conception of the dispositive, 
what matters here is the proposal to conceive of the dispositive 
differently: ‘I wish to propose to you nothing less than a general and 
massive partitioning of beings into two large groups or classes: on the 
one hand, living beings (or substances), and on the other, apparatuses in 
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which living beings are incessantly captured’ (Agamben 2009, 13). 
Surely this is a liminal, unworkable and impossible idea if aimed at 
establishing the foundation of any epistemology, because it would be 
based on assuming a state of nature, essential and unhistorical, of living 
beings, an infinitesimal “time zero” at the moment of the birth, a purely 
conceptual abstraction. However, what follows is a successful and 
articulated development of the notion of dispositive: 
I shall call an apparatus literally anything that has in some 
way the capacity to capture, orient, determine, intercept, 
model, control, or secure 
the gestures, behaviors, opinions or discourses of living 
beings. Not only, therefore, prisons, mad houses, the 
panopticon, schools, confession, factories, disciplines, 
juridical measures, and so forth (whose connection 
with power is in a certain sense evident), but also the pen, 
writing, literature, philosophy, agriculture, cigarettes, 
navigation, computers, cellular telephones, and—why not—
language itself, which is perhaps the most ancient of 
apparatuses—one in which thousands and thousands of years 
ago a primate inadvertently let himself be captured, probably 
without realizing the consequences that he was about to face. 
To recapitulate, we have then two great classes: living beings 
(or substances) and apparatuses. And, between these two, as a 
third class, subjects. I call a subject that which results from 
the relation and, so to 
speak, from the relentless fight between living beings and 
apparatuses. (Agamben 2009, 14) 
 
In this ternary relationship—dispositives, living beings and the result of 
these items: the subject—what emerges as a development of Foucault’s 
discourse is that all that exists, except for the raw and neutral flesh, is a 
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dispositive.64 This allows Agamben to make an additional step. The 
history of human beings, from the appearance of Homo sapiens, is made 
up of an intensification of dispositives, up to the present situation of their 
out of control proliferation and accumulation: ‘What we are looking for 
is neither simply to destroy them nor, as some naïvely suggest, to use 
them in the correct way’ (Agamben 2009, 15). If the human being has 
made his/her desire for happiness solid, tangible and separate through 
dispositives, the hypotheses of freedom can be grounded on the 
abstraction of this desire for happiness from the externalisation into 
dispositives, and making it available as a common good. This action is 
called the profanation of dispositives. 
Likewise, the analysis continues in Agamben. Foucault had shown how 
the disciplinary dispositives generated processes of subjectivation, 
namely that ‘Apparatus, then, is first of all a machine that produces 
subjectifications, and only as such is it also a machine of governance’ 
(Agamben 2009, 20), and that in every process of subjectivation a reverse 
moment of de-subjectivation is necessary (to gain a new piece of identity 
offered by a dispositive, a piece of the previous identity is lost earlier). 
Agamben consequently argues: 
What defines the apparatuses that we have to deal with in the 
current phase of capitalism is that they no longer act as much 
                                                 
64
 Leghissa keenly observes that the neoteny of the human being implies that one can 
never choose the dispositives, which are given by necessity before birth, in a here and 
now (Leghissa 2012, 24). 
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through the production of a subject, as through the processes 
of what can be called desubjectification. A desubjectifying 
moment is certainly implicit in every process of 
subjectification. (…) what we are now witnessing is that 
processes of subjectification and processes of 
desubjectification seem to become reciprocally indifferent, 
and so they do not give rise to the decomposition of a new 
subject, except in larval or, as it were, spectral form. (2009, 
21) 
 
Some examples provided by Agamben (the purchase of a mobile phone 
that forever reduces the person to a phone number; television that reduces 
the viewer to an infinitesimal number for the composition of the share) 
are weak. At the same time, the idea that the transition for which the 
proponents of the proper use of technology should necessarily be, ‘for 
their part, the product of the media apparatus in which they are captured’ 
(21) deserves further analysis. However, this provisional conclusion does 
not alter the final result that has been reached in this digression about the 
dispositive: namely that in the contemporary dispositive there is a 
considerable threat that everyone is subjected to processes of de-
subjectivation without any real possibility of re-subjectivation. It would 
be useful to think about what the devices are that mark the end of the era 
of modernity at the moment, to understand what, to return to the 
Deleuzian lexicon, is “current” at this time and thus indicates the way for 
a new humanity. As Deleuze states at the end of his text dedicated to 
Foucault: ‘As Foucault would say, the superman is much less than the 
disappearance of living men, and much more than a change of concept; it 
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is the advent of a new form that is neither God nor man and which, it is 
hoped, will not prove worse than its two previous forms’ (Deleuze 1988, 
132). 
 
1.3.3 The Care of Oneself 
Foucault is very often considered to be an author who has developed his 
ideas through breaks and ruptures, while on the contrary his work is 
characterised by a strong sense of continuity, with the purpose of 
investigating the subject. Frederic Gros, a former student of Foucault 
who edited and published the transcripts of some of Foucault’s courses at 
the Collège de France, defines Foucault's research on the subject as 
follows:  
On the subject: 1. The subject should be questioned not as 
eternal essence, but as someone who is constructed through 
some historical techniques. 2. The subject should not be 
questioned as an a priori structure, but as someone who 
changes into a process of subjectivation that is also a game of 
freedom. 3. The subject should not be questioned only as 
cognitive structure, but also as an ethical substance’. (Gros 
2008, 301 [my translation]) 
 
The new keywords that are learned from reading this passage are 
historical techniques and games of freedom, which are also the two 
biggest questions that Foucault raises in the last years of his production. 
Foucault himself states:  
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I would say that if I am now interested in how the subject 
constitutes itself in an active fashion through practices of the 
self, these practices are nevertheless not something invented 
by the individual himself. They are models that he finds in 
his culture and are proposed, suggested, imposed upon him 
by his culture, his society, and his social group. (1997, 291) 
 
What are these practices of the self that the individual finds in his/her 
own culture? Foucault, during the 1981-1982 fundamental course 
devoted to the hermeneutics of the subject (2005), identifies that the 
Greek culture consists mainly of two poles with respect to the subject. 
The first pole is the gnothi seauton, the invitation for which the human 
being is required to have knowledge of himself in order to better 
understand him/herself and thus to be able to better govern him/herself. 
This pole has been absolutely dominant in western culture according to 
Foucault, and was then replaced first by the Christian confession and 
later by the Cartesian moment, which considers the knowing subject as 
first substance of the universe.65 But Foucault also identifies a second 
                                                 
65
 ‘First, the Cartesian moment philosophically requalified the gnothi seauton (know 
yourself). Actually, and here things are very simple, the Cartesian approach, which can 
be read quite explicitly in the Meditations, placed self-evidence (l’évidence) at the 
origin, the point of departure of the philosophical approach—self-evidence as it appears, 
that is to say as it is given, as it is actually given to consciousness without any possible 
doubt [...]. The Cartesian approach [therefore] refers to knowledge of the self, as a form 
of consciousness at least. What's more, by putting the self-evidence of the subject's own 
existence at the very source of access to being, this knowledge of oneself (no longer in 
the form of the test of self-evidence, but in the form of the impossibility of doubting my 
existence as subject) made the ‘know yourself’ into a fundamental means of access to 
truth. Of course, there is a vast distance between the Socratic gnothi seauton and the 
Cartesian approach. However, you can see why, from the seventeenth century, starting 
from this step, the principle of gnothi seauton, as founding moment of the philosophical 
method was acceptable for a number of philosophical approaches or practices. But if the 
Cartesian approach thus requalified the gnothi seauton, for reasons that are fairly easy to 
isolate, at the same time—and I want to stress this—it played a major part in 
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pole, which has been neglected by Western culture: the epimeleia 
heautou, or care of the self. How Foucault specifies: ‘Epimeleia heautou 
is care of oneself, attending to oneself, being concerned about oneself, 
etcetera’ (2). 
What is this care of the self? In an illuminating passage, Foucault argues 
that to the three techniques identified by Habermas (production 
techniques, use of symbols or communication, domination) a fourth 
technique should be added, formed from the set of technologies of the 
self (Foucault 2001, 990). These technologies were abundant in the 
Greek world, and then disappeared from the Christian horizon. They are 
technologies whose purpose is to establish a truth about the subject that is 
not purely cognitive. These technologies, sometimes referred to as 
practices, naturally exist prior to the subject. But the subject that 
subjugates him/herself to them becomes part of a process that allows 
him/her to uncover new truths about him/herself. The technologies of the 
self are practices that involve learning outside of the cognitive sphere. 
The technologies themselves are forms of learning that do not imply only 
that one learns, but also that one internalises what s/he has learned. 
According to Foucault, within the Greek world they can be classified as: 
mathesis, dedicated to a more cognitive learning; meletè, a form of 
                                                                                                                       
discrediting the principle of care of the self and in excluding it from the field of modern 
philosophical thought’ (Foucault 2005, 14). 
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meditation; askesis, which is practiced in the form of the exercise 
(Foucault 2014a, 35). As summarised by Foucault, the goal of the 
technologies of the self is the intensity of relations with the self, the 
forms in which one is called to assume him/herself as an object of 
knowledge and investigation, in order to transform, correct, cleanse, 
build or save (Foucault 1988b). 
Once the care of the self has been identified as one of the capacities of 
the human being in ancient Greek culture, what is the motivation that 
necessitates a re-enactment of this forgotten concept? Foucault, in a very 
famous passage, identifies the reason for the recovery of the care of the 
self into modernity: ‘We can say that we enter the modern age (I mean, 
the history of truth enters its modern period) when it is assumed that what 
gives access to the truth, the condition for the subject's access to the 
truth, is knowledge (connaissance) and knowledge alone’ (Foucault 
2005, 17). What has been lost, with the neglecting of the care of the self, 
is an ethical possibility for the modern subject. The subject capable of 
truth postulated by modernity is a subject that has confined his/her ethical 
substance into oblivion, namely: freedom as the basic element of ethics. 
As summed up by Gros: ‘The practices of the self are programs of 
stylisation of the existence that make sense only within the horizon of 
freedom: a freedom, however, that is not considered as a fundamental 
nature but as a game of different practices’ (Gros 2008, 294 [my 
translation]). So the practices of the self are standardised series of 
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occurrences of the experience that the subject is asked to repeat. 
However, the subject devoted to the care of the self is not fixed in one or 
more practices, which end up completely stylising his/her existence. On 
the contrary, s/he practices his/her freedom within the differential game 
of practices, namely: s/he practices his/her freedom in a becoming in 
which s/he plays among the practices of the self, in a continuous change 
that is not a purpose itself but a chance for variation and escape from 
habits. Care of the self finds its essence in this game between differences 
based on abandonment. As Foucault sums up: ‘The practice of the self 
must allow one to get rid of all the bad habits of all the false opinions that 
can received by the crowd or by bad teachers, but also parents or 
entourage. Unlearning (de-discere) is one of the important points of the 
culture of the self’ (Foucault 2001, 1176 [my translation]) Foucault in 
these formulations is far beyond the Greek formulation of the concept, 
adding in his reflection some of the authors whom he had loved in the 
Sixties (Nietzsche, Blanchot, Bataille). The ethical substance of the 
subject in Foucault is an exercise of freedom based on the risky 
abandonment of habits that stifle any possibility of real existence. Care of 
the self is the practice of this exercise, based on a movement (in this case, 
non-dialectical) of de-subjectivation and re-subjectivation, in the 
transition from the old strenuous practices to the new re-subjectivising 
practices. As Fontana summarises well, self-care is the ‘detachment of 
oneself in the double movement of a preliminary de-subjectivation and 
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an 'ascetic' re-subjectivation, in a line of reading that is the necessary 
extension onto the subject of a thought that has constituted itself, from 
the start, in the form of the detaching of themselves’ (Fontana 2008, 43 
[my translation]). With a definitive expression (mot trenchant, as 
Deleuze has then defined it), Foucault designates this mode of life as se 
deprendre de soi-meme (Foucault 2001, 1362), and elsewhere s'arracher 
de soi meme, uproot oneself. 
However, the exercise of self-detaching is definitely dangerous. Foucault 
repeatedly comes to compare the Greek concept of care of the self to the 
posterior concept of limit-experience:  
The experience in Nietzsche, Blanchot, Bataille is designed 
to eradicate the subject from himself, to make that no longer 
the subject can be himself or to bring him to his annihilation 
or dissolution. It is an undertaking of subjectivity, the idea of 
a limit-experience that eradicates the subject from himself ... 
(Foucault 2001, 862)  
 
The limit-experience has the affective tone that Foucault defines several 
times elsewhere as moral de l'inconfort, ethics of the disquiet: that of a 
subject who pays his/her exercise of freedom with a sense of precarious 
existence. 
This subject—determined by the processes of subjectivation induced by 
the dispositives, who can take care of him/herself at the cost of its 
concern—is the user of the digital accountability, whom the next chapter 
takes into analysis.
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2 The Scene of Address 
 
This chapter intends to answer the question: why is the modern human so 
adept at speaking about him/herself on social networks? Giving an 
account of oneself on social media is not taken as the essence of 
modernity, but as a simple empirical fact that characterises current 
practices. When a platform like Facebook collects 1,400,000,000 active 
users, it is not necessary to add further analysis in this respect: the data 
appears self-evident. Every person who acts on Facebook does nothing 
other than continuously produce forms of accounting. 
Here it is considered that activities performed by users on social 
networks are absolute forms of accounting. Nevertheless, Han claims the 
opposite several times in his recent works. For example, in The 
Transparency Society he argues that narration always involves a 
selection, while on social networks one sees the account of the positive, 
of what it is, without the filter provided by the narration (Han 2014, 56 
[my translation]). In another text he explains that the contemporary 
representation of the self gives way to other forms: presence and co-
presentation (Han 2014, 31 [my translation]). These approaches both 
seem completely erroneous. In the light of what has been explained in the 
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previous chapter, the form of accounting on social media is rooted in an 
accounting that turns out to be an organising principle of the world. 
Han’s thesis would be acceptable if one merely finds repetition of the 
chaos of experience on social media, without forms of filtering and 
selection. On the contrary, the basis of this dissertation is that 
accountability is a process of subjectivation that implies a form of 
rationalisation and symbolic representation of experience.66 
The previous chapter has already demonstrated that, applying 
Foucauldian epistemology, a subject cannot exist outside of narratives 
that produce truth; and that these narratives are brought to light by the 
encounter between the subject and dispositives. Thus, this text refuses to 
understand the digital world as a possible space of absolute freedom—a 
space-limit of absolute freedom, the space typical of the Samuel 
Beckett’s characters who are definitely alone at the end of the world 
without the possibility of real dialogue. These subjects produce a pure 
empty talk without recipients: without the possibility of communication, 
without the presence of the other. Beckett’s characters pay for their 
foolish freedom at the price of radical solitude, the absence of the other. 
So Foucault keenly emphasises that the contemporary period is 
                                                 
66
 Arturo Mazzarella pertinently emphasises the issue of virtuality in relation to the 
experience: ‘Virtuality does not erase the ordinary reality, nor it replace it, but only 
analyzes it in terms of bundles of perceptual relationships that cross it (...); up to show 
each object, not as something given, but as the product of one of the many modes of 
possible perceptions. Up to show, in a nutshell, that reality—the way reality is 
recognised and interpreted—is always the result of a process of construction or rather, a 
view cropped from the chosen point of view’ (Mazzarella 2008, 51 [my translation]). 
The account is the outcome of this virtualisation. 
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characterised by the renunciation of two elements: silence and suicide, 
both of them denying the possibility of the existence of accounting 
(Foucault 2001, 1345). 
However, this is not the way that the modern human being lives. While 
Beckett’s characters do not account their stories to anyone, in 
accountability—whether digital or not—there is always someone to 
whom the account is addressed. Moreover, the average contemporary 
man or woman is not addicted to silence and suicide.67 This chapter aims 
to place the subject in a scene in which the address produces an account 
of him/herself, analysing its operative modality and then genealogically 
locating the emergence of the accounting the history. 
 
2.1 Was it you? 
In the contemporary era everyone is a small Pierre Riviére (Foucault 
1992), accustomed to accounting one’s existence. However, the 
fundamental question that arises here is: how can one say something 
about him/herself, and how to say it? For accountability cannot exist 
                                                 
67
 It seems appropriate to also mention here a subtle distinction identified by Slavoj 
Žižek. A genuine ethics can only emerge when there is a transition from “I” to the subject. 
“I” is like the characters one finds in Beckett, silent and inclined to disappearance. 
Subjects will become only when the “I” becomes the agent of an impersonal truth and, as 
seen above, this happens when the “I” is asked to give an account of himself (Žižek 2009, 
147-152). 
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without accounting practices, thus the absence of accounting would also 
be the absence of accountability. 
The starting point for this investigation is the reconstruction of the scene 
of address, with which the subject who tells his/her account and the 
recipient of the account are joined. The starting point of this 
reconstruction is the analysis made by Judith Butler in Giving an Account 
of Oneself (2005). This work puts forth the fact that the subject can say 
something about his/herself as the fundamental ethical problem—both 
with respect to the subject itself and his or her relation to the other. 
The first question that Butler raises regards the rules governing the 
establishment of the scene of address:  
We must ask, however, whether the ‘‘I’’ who must 
appropriate moral norms in a living way is not itself 
conditioned by norms, norms that establish the viability of 
the subject. It is one thing to say that a subject must be able to 
appropriate norms, but another to say that there must be 
norms that prepare a place within the ontological field for a 
subject. In the first instance, norms are there, at an exterior 
distance, and the task is to find a way of appropriating them, 
taking them on, establishing a living relation to them. The 
epistemological frame is presupposed in this encounter, one 
in which a subject encounters moral norms and must find his 
way with them. (2005, 9) 
 
The starting point for the reconstruction of the scene of address—in 
which the subject is constituted according to the process of the 
subjectivation of accountability—is that the foundation of the scene of 
address is an entity that acquires the ontological status of subject when he 
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meets some norms. There is neither a consequent time nor a 
consequential logic in this passage: it is an ontological question, for 
which the subject cannot be constituted in the absence of norms. Once 
this is acquired, the question as to what norms govern the scene of 
address remains open.68 With a theoretically keen operation, Butler says: 
‘We start to give an account only because we are interpellated as beings 
who are rendered accountable by a system of justice and punishment’ 
(Butler 2005, 10). The scene of address is thus constituted, according to 
Butler, when norms grounding it concern a system of justice and 
punishment. In this system, human beings are challenged to give account 
for themselves, and following this interpellation they constitute 
themselves as subjects. Butler derives this reconstruction of the scene of 
address from sections of Nietzsche’s masterpiece dedicated to the 
genealogy of morals (Nietzsche 2014). In fact, shortly afterwards the 
same American author quotes the German philosopher:  
So I start to give an account, if Nietzsche is right, because 
someone has asked me to, and that someone has power 
delegated from an established system of justice. I have been 
addressed, even perhaps had an act attributed to me, and a 
certain threat of punishment backs up this interrogation. And 
so, in fearful response, I offer myself as an ‘‘I’’ and try to 
reconstruct my deeds, showing that the deed attributed to me 
was or was not, in fact, among them. (Butler 2005, 11) 
 
                                                 
68
 Agamben would say that in this case, instead of the subject, one should speak of the 
liminal condition of living out of regime of dispositives (see the previous chapter). 
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One acquires additional elements here for the definition of the scene of 
address. First, the subject is subjectified through the production of an 
account when s/he is explicitly requested by someone to produce it. That 
someone is not the undifferentiated other, but s/he is part of a dispositive 
in which s/he can exert the power to interrogate. This dispositive 
administers the power of justice.69 The dispositive of justice works so 
that the questioner has the chance to question an action that I have taken, 
and to indicate the punishment that would result from the eventual 
violation with respect to this action. Faced with this interpellation, one is 
asked to introduce oneself as oneself, and to begin to tell one’s point of 
view about events.70 
Shortly afterwards Butler sums up the emergence of the subject in the 
scene of address:  
There may well be a desire to know and understand that is 
not fueled by the desire to punish, and a desire to explain and 
narrate that is not prompted by a terror of punishment. 
Nietzsche did well to understand that I begin my story of 
myself only in the face of a ‘‘you’’ who asks me to give an 
account. Only in the face of such a query or attribution from 
an other—‘‘Was it you?’’—do any of us start to narrate 
ourselves, or find that, for urgent reasons, we must become 
self-narrating beings. (2005, 11) 
 
                                                 
69
 Justice is not here to be understood in the modern legal sense, but as a general 
principle of sorting of the human community, according to the Platonic origin of the 
term. 
70
 In the original version of the scene of address the subject is invited to express his/her 
point of view about his/her position in the world. This request—the obligation to 
express a point of view—brings out both the subject and his account in the form of an 
explicit and shared point of view. 
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At this crucial point, Butler points out that it is not obvious that the 
impetus towards the account is born only out of needs related to the fear 
of punishment. The terror of punishment seems to be put here as a 
secondary factor if compared to what is considered as basic mechanism 
of the emergence of accounting: an “other”—who, regardless of the 
reason of justice, asks the I to give an account of him/herself. The 
question: Was it you? at this point overshadows the fact that one is inside 
a scene of address that was set up within a system of justice. An other 
who poses questions represents the new constituent elements of the 
account—there is an I questioned, and an account that the I gives in the 
face of an other questioning. However, this triad does not exhaustively 
constitute the basis of the scene of the address. We find its foundation in 
the moment in which the self receives an attribution of identity by the 
other that questions him/her. In that precise moment—the identification 
of an I by an other—the completeness of the scene of address is 
generated, for which the human being becomes a subject through the 
production of an account of him/herself. The ground of constitution as 
subjects would therefore be a process of accountability.71 
                                                 
71
 It deserves to be highlighted, despite the conceptual clarity of the reconstruction made 
by Butler, that three elements are neglected. The first is the need of the emergency of 
the account, the reason why I respond to an other questioning. The second concerns the 
way in which the account is shaped. Third, having made this distinction, it seems that 
the account itself becomes the raw material of some narrative form, thus putting a gap 
between a rather curious account of oneself out of the realm of the unspeakable, so that 
the account itself and the facts accounted would collapse, and a narrative form as verbal 
representation of the account itself. To all these elements an alternative explanation will 
be provided, based on a reconstruction of a different scene of address in the following 
chapters. 
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In a following step, Butler highlights some elements regarding the giving 
of an account of oneself: ‘Giving an account thus takes a narrative form, 
which not only depends upon the ability to relay a set of sequential 
events with plausible transitions but also draws upon narrative voice and 
authority, being directed toward an audience with the aim of persuasion’ 
(Butler 2005, 12). Here Butler seems to place quite a radical split 
between the form of storytelling and giving an account of oneself. In this 
dissertation, for reasons that have been explained above, this distinction 
is never taken into account, assuming that giving an account of oneself is 
always narrative. However, it is interesting to dwell on what, according 
to Butler, turns the account into narrative form. The first point is the 
connection between consequential events with plausible relationships of 
cause and effect: a narrative forms some effective and dramatic avenues, 
but that barely has to do with the narrations of existence that common 
subjects give daily. The self-attributed authority by the subject giving an 
account looks something like the authority of the orator, as if each 
accounting process that is produced is directed to a political scene or a 
courtroom. In fact it will subsequently be argued that the purpose for 
which one gives a narrative form to the account is persuasion. If 
persuasion is definitely a foundational element of the Western narrative 
(see for example its role in ancient rhetoric (Cicero 1954)), it is here 
postulated that the only acceptable form of narration of accountability is 
aimed at persuading the other about the correctness of one’s actions. The 
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way in which accountability is instead articulated here is different, since 
the emergence of giving an account of oneself is analysed according to 
another possible genealogy, the confession, which will be discussed later. 
Butler then outlines, following Nietzsche, the transformation of the 
account into a narration providing new elements: ‘the doer becomes the 
causal agent of the deed only through a retroactive attribution that seeks 
to comply with a moral ontology stipulated by a legal system, one that 
establishes accountability and punishable offenses by locating a relevant 
self as a causal source of suffering’ (Butler 2005, 14). One clearly notes 
the echo, derived from Nietzsche, of the interpretation as a foundation of 
the will to power. The basis of the narrative form would then reside in the 
legal system (in other words: the order given by the justice to the world), 
which is read as moral ontology that necessarily consists in norms. 
Deeds, unconnected in existence, would be related to the I according to a 
principle of retroactive attribution. This retroactive attribution should 
then operate to persuade the other. Nonetheless, in this analysis the 
concept of accounting disappears, being just an awkward intermediate 
between the factual and the narrative form. Accounting would exist here 
only as a nominal form, without a specific content, which emerges only 
as an outcome of the narration, without dimensions. 
Despite the complexity and relevance of Butler’s reconstruction, this text 
contends that, on the one hand, the split of the account from the narrative 
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leads to aporias; and, on the other hand, that the explanation of the 
response by the subject to the interpellation of the other is incomplete. 
First of all, there are forms of accounting that ignore the sanction, 
namely: the account is not necessarily generated to avoid a penalty. In the 
second place, it is not justified according to whether the subject is 
resistant or not to the request to give an account of his/herself. In more 
Foucauldian than Butlerian terms: why does the subject offer him/herself 
to that process of subjectivation that is called accountability? The answer 
given by Butler—because it is the moment when the subject is identified 
by another, and thus identifies him/herself as a subject—seems to fall 
short. The two next chapters will seek to answer these unresolved issues. 
 
2.2 Praxis and Poiesis 
The scene of address can be reduced to three elements: a subject, a 
questioning other and an account of oneself supplied by the subject. It 
remains unclear what the reasons are that compel the subject to give an 
account of himself to another questioner. 
One possible answer to this question is found within a theoretical horizon 
far away from that defined by Butler. To build it, the arguments exposed 
by the Italian philosopher Paolo Virno in the text A Grammar of the 
Multitude (2004) are useful. The argument Virno puts forth assumes that 
the political unity that enshrines human beings in the modern world is not 
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to be found in some form of state. This is because the prevalence of the 
Hobbesian Leviathan has been established in the modern era, and even 
with the prevalence of the political concept of the people, the multitude 
has been confined to the private sphere, in opposition to the public. Here, 
in the private sphere, the unity of the multitude is rooted in language.72 In 
summary, the public sphere relegates the multitude to the private sphere, 
determining it as the multitude; and the multitude finds its unity in the 
dimension of a common language. 
Virno then goes on to examine the human experience in light of this 
assumption, namely that language determines the unity of the multitude. 
In the philosophical tradition there is a tripartite division of human 
experience into three categories: work, intellect and action, which are 
formulated by Aristotle for the first time in Nicomachean Ethics. These 
categories were subsequently handed down via philosophical common 
                                                 
72
 There is not intention here to dwell on this premise. However, this lengthy quotation 
from Virno sums up the matter: ‘The multitude, which is the polar opposite of the 
people, takes on the slightly ghostly and mortifying features of the so-called private. 
Incidentally, even the public-private dyad itself, before becoming something 
indisputable, had been forged through tears and blood during a thousand theoretical and 
practical disputes; it is maintained, therefore, by a complex set of consequences. What 
could be more normal for us than to speak of public experience and of private 
experience? But this bifurcation was not always taken for granted. (…) “Private” 
signifies not only something personal, not only something which concerns the inner life 
of this person or that; private signifies, above all, deprived of: deprived of a voice, 
deprived of a public presence. In liberal thought, the multitude survives as a private 
dimension. The many are aphasic and far removed from the sphere of common affairs’ 
(2004, 23-24). And a little further: ‘Even the many need a form of unity, of being a One. 
But here is the point: this unity is no longer the State; rather, it is language, intellect, and 
the communal faculties of the human race. The One is no longer a promise, but a 
premise. Unity is no longer something (the State, the sovereign) towards which things 
converge, as in the case of the people; rather, it is taken for granted, as a background or 
a necessary precondition’ (2004, 25). 
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sense for centuries, until Hannah Arendt in contemporary era 
rearticulates these three categories in her masterpiece, The Human 
Condition (Arendt 2000). Summarising, Virno states:  
as numerous as the intersections were, Labor, Intellect, and 
Politics remained essentially distinct. For structural reasons. 
Labor is the organic exchange with nature, the production of 
new objects, a repetitive and foreseeable process. The pure 
intellect has a solitary and inconspicuous character: the 
meditation of the thinker escapes the notice of others; 
theoretical reflection mutes the world of appearances. 
Differently from Labor, political Action comes between 
social relations, not between natural materials; it has to do 
with the possible and the unforeseen; it does not obstruct, 
with ulterior motives, the context in which it operates; rather, 
it modifies this very context. Differently from the Intellect, 
political Action is public, consigned to exteriority, to 
contingency, to the buzzing of the “many;” it involves, to use 
the words of Hannah, “the presence of others” (Human 
Condition, Chap. V, “Action”). The concept of political 
Action can be deduced by opposition with respect to the other 
two spheres. (2004, 50) 
 
Arendt renews these categories to emphasise that the separation between 
labour and political action, between praxis and poiesis, that was distinct 
in ancient Greece is no longer clear. The end of this separation, the 
German philosopher claims, has taken place when poiesis has subsumed 
within it and imitated some features of praxis, or—to depart from Greek 
vocabulary: political action began to imitate dimension of labour. 
However, the thesis put forth by Virno is diametrically opposite. 
According to the Italian philosopher, labour has conformed to political 
action: 
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I maintain that things have gone in the opposite direction 
from what Arendt seems to believe: it is not that politics has 
conformed to labor; it is rather that labor has acquired the 
traditional features of political action. My reasoning is 
opposite and symmetrical with respect to that of Arendt. I 
maintain that it is in the world of contemporary labor that we 
find the "being in the presence of others," the relationship 
with the presence of others, the beginning of new processes, 
and the constitutive familiarity with contingency, the 
unforeseen and the possible. I maintain that post-Fordist 
labor, the productive labor of surplus, subordinate labor, 
brings into play the talents and the qualifications which, 
according to a secular tradition, had more to do with political 
action. (2005, 51) 
 
Leaving aside the theoretical aspects of this political and economic 
analysis, 73 what matters is the emphasis on the relational and 
communicative dimension of the working subject. Every subject in the 
post-Fordist context that characterises the present era is invited to 
exhibit—before the eyes of the others—not only the product s/he 
produces with his/her work, but also him/herself in the time of 
production. The worker then becomes a political actor on the stage of the 
productive environment; and the clear symptom of this change is the rise 
of the power of human resources departments within companies. As 
Virno keenly observes, reformulating Arendt, there are many similarities 
between political action and art: neither have a productive aim, both 
                                                 
73
 In the Italian language there is a long series of studies related to post-Fordism, a 
category that brings together mostly Leftist approaches for a critique to a presumed 
neoliberal drift. In its more neutral definition, post-Fordism is a principle of economic 
rationality that goes beyond the traditional Fordist mass production, characterised by the 
standardisation of the product and the dimension of production, to usher in complex 
production systems based on a flexible workforce, qualified and specialised, that 
guarantees the just-in-time production required by the company. 
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require an audience and both imply a kind of virtuosity in their execution. 
According to Virno, every political action is virtuosic. He comes to this 
conclusion after reviewing this step in Arendt:  
The performing arts [...] have indeed a strong affinity with 
politics. Performing artists-dancers, play-actors, musicians, 
and the like —need an audience to show their virtuosity, just 
as acting men need the presence of others before whom they 
can appear; both need a publicly organized space for their 
“work”, and both depend upon others for the performance 
itself. (Arendt, quoted in Virno 2004, 53-54) 
 
However, political action that permeates the working dimension—thus 
ushering in a figure of post-Fordist worker, a political player 
characterised by processes of subjectivation that were absent before—has 
a constitutive element. In the post-Fordist system, based on the 
qualification and specialisation of the worker, the multitude turns into 
individualised singularities, the result of a progressive differentiation. As 
seen previously with Butler in this case there is also a scene of address 
that determines the subjectivation of the human being. This scene of 
address, such as the one carried out previously, includes the account of 
itself as a constitutive element. As Virno argues, ‘In fact, while language 
belongs to everybody and to nobody, the passage from the pure and 
simple ability to say something to a particular and contingent utterance 
determines the space of an individual's notion of “my own”’ (2004, 77). 
Virno delineates this singular statement in a particular way, which 
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incorporates the concept of idle talk by Martin Heidegger.74 Common 
everyday speech has been introduced here as a defining moment in the 
process of the subjectivation of the human being. However, when 
considered in light of the concept of idle talk, it assumes a negative 
connotation. As Virno says:  
It seems to me that idle talk makes up the primary subject of 
the post-Fordist virtuosity discussed in the second day of our 
seminar. Virtuosos, as you will recall, are those who produce 
something which is not distinguishable, nor even separable, 
from the act of production itself. Virtuosos are simple 
locuters par excellence. But, now I would add to this 
definition the non-referenced speakers; that is, the speakers 
who, while speaking, reflect neither one nor another state of 
affairs, but determine new states of affairs by means of their 
very own words: those who, according to Heidegger, engage 
in idle talk. This idle talk is performative: words determine 
facts, events, states of affairs (Austin, How to Do Things with 
Words). Or, if you wish, it is in idle talk that it is possible to 
recognize the fundamental nature of performance: not “I bet.” 
or "I swear," or "I take this woman as my wife," but, above 
all, “I speak.” In the assertion “I speak,” I do something by 
saying these words; moreover, I declare what it is that I do 
                                                 
74
 Idle talk is detected by Heidegger as one of the fundamental structures of the being in 
the world. It is defined in a famous page from Being and Time: ‘Communication does 
not ‘impart’ the primary relation of being to the being spoken about, but being-with-
one-another takes place in talking with one another and in heeding what is spoken 
about. What is important to it is that one speaks. The being-said, the dictum, the 
pronouncement provide a guarantee for the genuineness and appropriateness of the 
discourse and the understanding belonging to it. And since this discoursing has lost the 
primary relation of being to the being talked about, or else never achieved it, it does not 
communicate in the mode of a primordial appropriation of this being, but communicates 
by gossiping and passing the word along. What is spoken about as such spreads in wider 
circles and takes on an authoritative character. Things are so because one says so. Idle 
talk is constituted in this gossiping and passing the word along, a process by which its 
initial lack of grounds to stand on increases to complete groundlessness. (…) The 
groundlessness of idle talk is no obstacle to its being public, but encourages it. Idle talk 
is the possibility of understanding everything without any previous appropriation of the 
matter. Idle talk already guards against the danger of getting stranded in such an 
appropriation. Idle talk, which everyone can snatch up, not only divests us of the task of 
genuine understanding, but develops an indifferent intelligibility for which nothing is 
closed off any longer.’ (Heidegger 1996, 168–169) 
 123 
 
while I do it. Contrary to what Heidegger presumes, not only 
is idle talk not a poor experience and one to be deprecated, 
but it directly concerns labor, and social production (2004, 
90) 
 
Thus Virno claims that talk is a fundamental dimension of post-Fordist 
production of language. A few pages later, he writes: ‘Thirty years ago, 
in many factories there were signs posted that commanded: “Silence, 
men at work!” Whoever was at work kept quiet. One began “chatting” 
only upon leaving the factory or the office. The principle breakthrough in 
post-Fordism is that it has placed language into the workplace’ (2004, 
90-91). Computers and digital networks have, for sure, a role in it. 
Undoubtedly Virno is describing modern forms of accountability, which 
indeed can also be found in digital accountability. If Butler left the 
question of why the subject replies to the other questioning unanswered, 
one finds in Virno a fairly comprehensive response. The I responds 
because the relevant characteristic of the post-Fordist man is the collapse 
of political action into labour. This collapse introduces a dimension of 
artistry in all individual existences, and it is revealed in the form of the 
virtuosity of language. This implies that the contemporary human being 
spontaneously speaks. His/her talk is not articulated, however, in the 
sense of the speech, but in the direction of the chattering which, as 
previously demonstrated, is the language that is articulated inasmuch 
language, without necessity of a referent. 
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The contemporary form of idle talk has at least four consequences, some 
of which are particularly relevant within the context of accountability. 
Firstly, idle talk does not have the need of a referent. Having no referent, 
idle talk does not need to be validated according to criteria of fact 
checking, but merely through social consensus. In the digital scene, 
accountability, the regime of truth faced by the idle talker, is the mere 
presence of the idle talk itself within the community, which in turn is 
generated by the digital dispositive. With consequences that will be 
analysed in the fourth chapter, the status of producer of regimes of truth 
concerning the contemporary processes of subjectivation is delegated to 
the digital dispositive. 
Secondly, the will of idle talk—for which language, as aptly noted by 
Virno, remains in the realm of the pre-individual—dismantles a 
fundamental principle of modern politics, the habeas corpus. Again, this 
reflection is not founded on the physical body and digital identity in 
dialectical terms, nor does it intend to appeal to the principles of the 
original (the subject’s body) and copy (its digital version). The I speaking 
on social networks is identified as a ghost, or an impersonal voice that 
talks the talk. The current legislation is very lazy in pursuing aggressive 
speech on the network (the current legislation would allow it without 
problems, without the need for adaptation), because the I speaking on 
social networks loses the form of expression of the individual, and it 
acquires the pre-individuality of common speech. In this sense it loses its 
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habeas corpus, not meant here as a physical body, but as a relation 
between a legal entity (digital or biological that may be) and the 
justification of its actions. For this reason, the principle of 
justification/sanction in the digital accountability takes different routes 
than those of conventional standards of accountability. 
The third moment concerns the contemporary practices of the self. In a 
world dominated by the linguistic dimension, operated by linguistic 
dispositives, and where the linguistic dimension of digital dispositives 
determine regimes of truth, the current practices of the self are inevitably 
associated with the dimension of language, specifically written language. 
Professional performances are determined by the current capacity of 
processing language, to the point that some current post-Fordist writers 
(for instance, Maurizio Lazzarato 1997) argue that what is being waged 
in the world today is not the time given by the worker to the company, 
but the potential of exploiting the worker’s human capital, including 
language.75 It is worthwhile to notice that idle talk is one among many 
technologies of the self based on language; however, it seems appropriate 
to clarify that the idle talk defined above is a precise technology of the 
self, that very often is considered one of the soft skills of the worker in 
the form of pompous “interpersonal skills”. 
                                                 
75
 According to this analysis, any possibility of distinction between work time and 
leisure time disappears completely, as the dimension of language permeates so much 
free time and what is practiced in the free time (reading books, watching movies) that 
the contemporary subject is always a person at work at any time of his/her life. 
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The fourth outcome concerns the relationship between the thinking 
subject and the speaking subject. If the experience of the outside is based 
on the dissociation between “I think” and “I speak”, with a possible 
disappearance of the speaking subject, the modern world, based on idle 
talk, seems to reverse the possibility of a thought of the outside. If 
everything is word, an outside no longer exists, so that it can be 
embraced by the thought out of the possibility of linguistic expression. 
The contemporary subject is a manufacturer of constant idle talk; this talk 
is not, however, an attempt to linguistically process thought that 
desperately tries to explore the outside, and then to create; but it stands as 
idle talk, or as virtuosic and sterile repetition of what exists. 
At the end of this chapter, the account in the form of the idle talk will 
have been interrogated and this survey will identify language as a 
fundamental element of the contemporary subject. It will also partially 
respond to the question posed at the end of previous chapter: why does 
the I reply to the other’s questioning? However, one point remains 
completely untapped, which regards the intentionality of the questioned 
human being. Without an understanding of this intentionality, one might 
not understand how the subject can answer the question. This 
understanding implies a shift of the initial question. Butler (following 
Nietzsche) founded her analysis of the scene of address—and 
consequently on accounting—on the question: Was it you? Nonetheless, 
the analysis operated in this dissertation has revealed some fallacies in 
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Butler’s reconstruction. Virno has demonstrated that the referent of idle 
talk is unnecessary, thus the link between accountability and sanction has 
been removed from the discourse. In order to fix these aporetic issues, 
the basic question of the scene of address will be revised in the following 
pages. The process of giving an account with shift from the question Was 
it you? to a different starting point: Who am I? The next pages aim to 
demonstrate that accountability, in all its contemporary forms, is rooted 
in this question, and that this question derives from the Christian 
confession. 
 
2.3 The Confessions of the Flesh 
The Confessions of the Flesh would have been the fourth volume of the 
series inaugurated by Foucault in 1976 with The History of Sexuality 
(Foucault 1990a). This text never saw the light of day due to the author’s 
premature death. In The Confessions of the Flesh, Foucault would have 
continued with the examination of the process of subjectivation that he 
had identified as the most relevant, namely: sexuality in the early 
Christian period.76 This section takes into account a course, held in 1979-
1980, that Foucault had called On the Government of the Living 
(Foucault 2014a). As often happened in courses given by the French 
                                                 
76
 Please note that the analysis of sexuality would have closed with the investigation of 
the concept in psychoanalysis. 
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philosopher at the Collège de France, the course ended up taking a 
different path that focused on the genealogy of confession in the 
Christian context. The pages that follow aim to illustrate the author’s 
arguments about the confession. 
Firstly, Foucault developed a methodological premise in which he 
intended to clearly identify the relationships between truth, power and 
knowledge. To do so, he introduced the concept of alethurgy: 
Alēthourgēs is the truthful. Consequently, forging the fictional 
word alēthourgia, alethurgy, from alēthourgēs, we could call 
“alethurgy” the manifestation of truth as the set of possible 
verbal or non-verbal procedures by which one brings to light 
what is laid down as true as opposed to false, hidden, 
inexpressible, unforeseeable, or forgotten, and say that there 
is no exercise of power without something like an alethurgy. 
(Foucault 2014a, 7)  
 
Alethurgy has a fundamental dimension of process, or rather of a set of 
processes. The purpose of these processes is to bring to light what is true, 
as opposed to what is false. Again, as mentioned previously, it is clear 
that the question of truth is the process of its construction, without any 
ontological foundation. And the truth is identified as a key moment in the 
construction of the subject, or as a necessary moment in which the 
subject is identified as such.77 
                                                 
77
 That is, the moment in which one can answer the question: Who are you?. Over the 
following course held at the Collège de France, entitled Subjectivité et Verite, in 1980-
1981 (Foucault 2014b), as yet unpublished in English, Foucault further elaborates upon 
the regime of truth, a notion that had not yet been fully developed at the time of the 
previous course. In the first lesson on January 7, 1981 this notion is expressed in a long 
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After establishing the notion of alethurgy, Foucault poses a clear 
portmanteau about the tools of analysis that he had used throughout the 
previous decade, namely the duality power-knowledge. From his text on 
Nietzsche’s genealogy, and later with the massive application of the same 
notion in the fundamental Discipline and Punish (1995), knowledge and 
power were the basic tools in the Foucauldian toolbox. But in this text, 
the superiority of the analysis of the regimes of truth on different systems 
is clearly spelled out. As Foucault definitively states:  
the second shift in relation to this notion of knowledge-power 
involves getting rid of this in order to try to develop the 
notion of government by the truth; getting rid of the notion of 
knowledge-power as we got rid of the notion of dominant 
ideology. (...) this notion of government, which seemed to me 
to be much more operational than the notion of power, 
“government” being understood, of course, not in the narrow 
and current sense of the supreme instance of executive and 
administrative decisions in State systems, but in the broad 
                                                                                                                       
passage that is reported almost entirely in the clarity of the terms in which it is 
formulated: ‘The problem 'subjectivity and truth' is, in the philosophical tradition, in 
wondering how and under what conditions I can know the truth, or even: how the 
knowledge, as experience made by a subject who knows, is possible? Or again: for 
which reason the one who makes this experience can certainly recognize that it is true 
knowledge? Let's say that the philosophical problem 'subjectivity and truth' can be 
characterised as follows: resolve the tension between these two propositions. (...) In this 
formulation of the philosophical question 'subjectivity and truth', you could put up a 
formula that I would call, in a very hasty way and for convenience, positivist, that 
would be the question in reverse: about the subject, is it possible to have a true 
knowledge, and under which conditions can you have a true knowledge of this subject? 
(...) What experience can the subject have of him/herself when s/he is put in the 
condition or the ability to recognize, about him/herself, anything considerable as true?’ 
(2014b, 12-13 [my translation]). And a little further: ‘The truth (...) is not defined by a 
certain content of knowledge that you might consider as universally valid, and it is not 
even defined by a formal and universal criterion. The truth is conceived primarily as a 
system of bonds, independently from the fact that, by this or that point of view, one can 
consider it true or not. (...) The important thing in this issue of truth, is that a number of 
things pass actually for true, and that the subject should or should not produce it by 
him/herself, or accept it, or subjugate him/herself to it’ (Foucault 2014b, 15 [my 
translation]). It is useful to recall the radicality of the regime of truth taken into account 
by Foucault in the previous period: the definition of crazy, sick, deviant. 
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sense, and old sense moreover, of mechanisms and 
procedures intended to conduct men, to direct their conduct, 
to conduct their conduct. (Foucault 2014a, 12) 
 
If in the four years previous to this course, governmentality was situated 
as a crucial territory to be investigated.78 The regimes of truth are now 
being proposed as the main tool for the analysis of this same area. Thus, 
at this time the French author is addressing the question of the subject as 
follows: 
a) The fundamental issue that drives all research carried out by Foucault 
is the subject. 
b) The subject is defined by and within a process, as the outcome of the 
ever-changing processes of subjectivation. 
c) Governmentality is the set of processes of subjectivation aimed at 
leading subjects. 
d) Governmentality includes the dimensions of knowledge and power, 
but above all it is based on regimes of truth that allow the management of 
subjects’ conduct. 
e) These regimes of truth are not ontological dimensions, but sets of 
obligations that manage the lives of subjects. 
                                                 
78
 Foucault proposes a possible categorisation of the economy of the truth, which would 
manifest itself in five aspects: scientific discourse, economics, distribution and 
consumption, the domain of political machines, and the form of the debate. (Foucault 
2001, 112-113) 
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f) The regimes of truth, to be effective, imply that the subject can account 
for him/herself, namely: give him/herself some qualifications. 
g) These qualifications are not spontaneous creations of the subject, but 
they exist prior to him/her within the regimes of truth present in 
governmental processes. 
h) This connection between governmentality, regimes of truth and 
processes of subjectivations establish the rules of the making of the 
subject, so that s/he can answer the question: Who are you? 
If this is the work plan of the French philosopher, the course of 1979-
1980 is concerned with identifying and analysing the emergence of a 
process of subjectivation tied to a specific regime of truth: the Christian 
confession. As Foucault announces,  
I would like to talk about another regime of truth: this is a 
regime defined by the obligation for individuals to have a 
continuous relationship to themselves of knowledge, their 
obligation to discover, deep within themselves, secrets that 
elude them, their obligation, finally, to manifest these secret 
and individual truths by acts that have specific, liberating 
effects that go well beyond the effects of knowledge. In other 
words, there is a whole regime of truth in Christianity that is 
not so much organized around the truth act as act of faith, but 
around the truth act as act of confession. (Foucault 2014a, 83-
84) 
 
The operation Foucault performs here is absolutely radical. The concept 
of regime of truth is part of the Foucauldian matrix, but in this course the 
regime of truth is verified and then made true when situated in specific 
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historical dimensions. Foucault identifies a basic system of truth in the 
construction of the Western contemporary human being, namely the 
Christian confession. One finds a powerful application of the concept of 
the regime of truth in the Christian confession. As explained above, the 
confession is an act of self-knowledge, which is not at all an act of faith. 
It follows that in the Christian religion the French author identifies a 
specific pole not included in the context of the belief in an afterlife 
(belief in the afterlife and in redemption), but he identifies something 
external to theological virtues. What Foucault identifies in Christianity is 
the birth of a process of subjectivation: the fact that the Western subject 
is obliged to tell the truth about him/herself: a truth that is not reached in 
moments of mystical devotion, but a truth of the subject about 
him/herself that is accessible only in the form of a self interrogation 
about his/her secrets. 
A crucial conversational passage illustrates how the truth of the subject 
emerges in Christian religion:  
when he says “it is true, therefore I submit,” he does not utter 
this “therefore” because it is part of the logic. It is not part of 
the logic, for it is not the truth of the proposition that, in fact, 
actually constrains him, it is not because it is logical, it is not 
because he is a logician, or rather it is insofar as he is doing* 
logic, for it is not his status or qualification as logician that 
means that he submits (he might well not be a professional 
logician and he would submit the same), but because he is 
doing logic, that is to say, because he constitutes himself, or 
has been invited to constitute himself as operator in a certain 
number of practices or as a partner in a certain type of game. 
(Foucault 2014a, 97-98) 
 133 
 
 
The nouns “logical” and the adjective “logic”, in this paragraph, shall be 
adopted in the philosophical sense, or in relation to the branch of 
philosophy that aims to distinguish the true from the false. Here Foucault 
repeatedly emphasises that the truth of the subject in the Christian 
confession does not have anything to do with this type of logic. The truth 
of the subject is not part of any plan of formal logic that determines the 
true and the false, as the subject who submits to confession has nothing 
to do with it.  
Nevertheless the Christian confesses, and in confessing s/he utters a truth 
about him/herself himself, a truth that determines his/her classification as 
a sinner. This happens because the Christian subject “does logic”, or 
works within a context of truth and falsehood, without “being logical”. 
This gap can arise when, by the confession, the Christian subject 
undergoes a regime of truth that exists before him/her in the form of 
obligation (the obligation determined by the confession). As Foucault 
briefly yet effectively argues: the confession ‘is the acceptance of a 
certain regime of truth’ (Foucault 2014a, 98). Analysing the texts from 
the first centuries of Christianity dedicated to the sacrament of 
confession, Foucault identifies a key moment for the contemporary era:  
The injunction, “tell me who you are,” which is fundamental in 
Western civilization, is what we see being formed in these and 
other texts of the same time, when the soul is told: Go to the 
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truth, but, on the way, don’t forget to tell me who you are, 
because if, on the way, you do not tell me who you are, you 
will never arrive at the truth. (Foucault 2014a, 146) 
 
Here Foucault determines “the fundamental injunction of Western 
civilization”, an injunction that did not appear in the Greek world.79 This 
injunction forces the subject to answer the question: Who are you? The 
reconstruction made by Foucault follows some clearly defined steps. 
Christianity divides the act of confession by the act of faith. The act of 
confession is an absolutely specific process of subjectivation. Its key 
moment is the subjugation offered by the subject to specific regimes of 
truth. These regimes of truth are meant to refer the subject to the 
obligation for which the subject must tell the truth about him/herself. The 
obligation to declare the truth about him/herself—a truth that the subject 
must explain after having sought it in his/her hidden dimensions—is the 
knowledge of the subject about him/herself. This knowledge is functional 
to salvation, so that confession opens the door to salvation, but opens the 
door only as long as the subject is telling the truth about him/herself. The 
Christian subject is, unless s/he is able to qualify him/herself, to answer 
                                                 
79
 The first lessons of the course of 1979-1980 are dedicated to the analysis of Oedipus 
Rex, in which the regimes of truth work differently from those operating in Christianity. 
A hermeneutics of the subject that is based on a hidden truth, detectable only with the 
confession, is stranger to the Greek-Roman world, and it appears historically with 
Christianity. 
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the question: Who are you?, undergoing regimes of truth determined by 
the obligation of the act of confession.80 
The dimension of the case for which the subject constructs the truth of 
him/herself within the becoming is clearly stated in the following 
passage:  
is this coupling of “truth-telling about oneself” whose 
function is to erase the evil and “transit of self” from the 
unknown to the known, giving oneself to oneself and in one’s 
own eyes a status of object to be known at the same time as 
one verbalizes the sins in order to erase them, getting oneself 
to exist as object of knowledge at the moment that, through 
verbalization, one provides oneself with the means to bring it 
about that the sin no longer exists or at any rate is erased, is 
forgivable. (Foucault 2014a, 225) 
Forgiveness is the goal of confession, and the fundamental culmination 
of the process of confession. Forgiveness allows the subject to put 
salvation on its cognitive plan. This binding occurs when the “truth-
telling about oneself” and “transit of self” from the unknown to the 
                                                 
80
 It is also interesting to put forth a passage that concerns the relationship between 
knowledge and salvation. Foucault clearly identifies that: ‘Christianity thought the 
relapse (rechute). It battled with the problem of how the subject, having arrived at the 
truth, could lose it, how, in this relationship, which is after all conceived of as a 
fundamentally irreversible relationship of knowledge, something can take place that is 
like falling back from knowledge to non-knowledge, from light to darkness, and from 
perfection to imperfection and sin’ (Foucault 2014a, 186). In Christianity there is 
therefore a split between knowledge and salvation: the conquest of knowledge about 
themselves in the act of confession is no guarantee of eternal salvation, but it is a 
temporary condition that the subject—for the call of the flesh?—may lose after the 
confession. Self-knowledge is considered something transient and, above all, reversible. 
The recognition of this aspect thus opens the way for an anthropology that identifies a 
force, which remains in the subject as condition of permanent exit from the knowledge, 
which turns out to be a condition always perfectible.  
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known are matched.81 If the Christian subject tells the truth about 
him/herself, this happened because s/he was able to pass himself from the 
unknown to the known. This transit however, as Foucault acutely notices, 
implies a split inside the subject, a split in which the subject is asked to 
identify him/herself as an object.82 It is a kind of hermeneutic circle: one 
can preach to oneself only when one constitutes oneself as the subject, 
and one exists as an object only if subjected to qualifications (in the case 
of confession, against the acts that classify the subject as sinner). 
However, if the Christian subject in the moment of confession operates a 
process of knowledge that leads him to “tell-the-truth-about-him/herself”, 
what kind of regime of truth is at work? Afterwards, Foucault again 
deepens the notion of regime of truth as a set of obligations, specifying a 
further dimension of the truth:  
In Christian examination, on the other hand, you can see that 
the question does not bear on the objective content of the 
idea, but on the material reality of the idea in the uncertainty 
of what I am, the uncertainty of what is taking place deep 
within myself, and while searching—for what? Whether my 
idea is true? Not at all. Whether I am right to hold this or that 
opinion? Not at all. What is in question is not the truth of my 
idea; it is the truth of myself who has an idea. It is not the 
question of the truth of what I think, but the question of the 
truth of I who thinks. (Foucault 2014a, 303) 
 
                                                 
81
 As Foucault points out: while discretio in Stoicism is applied to things, the Christian 
is asked to consider his/her ideas. 
82
 In this sense, the Christian confession stands as strong moment of de-subjectivation in 
the form of self-denial. 
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The analysis made by Foucault here is fundamental for the understanding 
of the status of contemporary human beings. The regime of truth of the 
Christian subject’s confession is not about what the subject thinks, or the 
idea that the subject may have with respect to this fact or that. The 
opinion of the subject is irrelevant in the Christian truth. The “tell-the-
truth” was seen previously as “becoming-true”. But what transits to the 
truth is not the content of knowledge possessed by the Christian subject. 
What is in transit to truth is the Christian him/herself. Foucault 
summarises that it’s not true what the Christian subject thinks; what is 
true is the Christian him/herself in the moment of confession. This 
conclusion is a balanced harmony between confession as a process of 
subjectivation and truth as subjugation of the Christian subject to some 
kind of governmentality. 
The conclusion is trenchant: if the Christian subject is saved when s/he 
subjectifies him/herself in the subjectivation process of the confession, 
this moment is genealogically the emergence of the modern subject that 
makes him/herself true in the regimes of truth imposed by 
governmentality. However, this emergency would be trivial if the 
confession would not have revealed an additional element, namely, that 
the subject tells the truth about him/herself in the confession. Taking the 
fundamental consequence of what has just been exposed: the 
contemporary Western human being, genealogically Christian, is true 
when s/he qualifies, preaches, objectifies him/herself, states the truth 
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about him/herself, gives an account of him/herself within any kind of 
governmental dispositive that reiterates the Christian confession by 
asking the question: Who are you?83 As Foucault masterfully 
summarises: ‘this obligation to tell the truth about oneself has never 
ceased in Christian culture, and probably in Western societies. We are 
obliged to speak of ourselves in order to tell the truth of ourselves’ 
(Foucault 2014a, 311). 
During the same period Foucault was working on the notion of pastoral 
power, which was identified as a form of power proper to Christianity. 
And a question that was left open in the analysis of the scene of address 
exposed by Butler was the absence of resilience by the subject. In other 
words: why does the subject obey? Foucault provides the answer in this 
passage: 
The Christian does not have the truth of the world above his 
head, with the exception of his own truth, the truth 
concerning himself. The Christian has the truth deep within 
himself and he is yoked to this deep secret, indefinitely bent 
over it and indefinitely constrained to show to the other the 
treasure that his work, thought, attention, conscience, and 
discourse ceaselessly draw out from it. And by this he shows 
that putting his own truth into discourse is not just an 
                                                 
83
 Interestingly, in the scene of address put forth by Foucault about the Christian 
confession the questioner does not hold weight. As Foucault says: ‘One can trust 
confession as an operator of discrimination, not so much because the person to whom I 
speak is trustworthy, but simply due to the fact of speaking to another person. The form 
itself of confession is a principle of discrimination, even more than the wisdom of the 
person to whom I speak’ (Foucault 2014, 304-305). It follows—and it is an important 
point for the rest of this dissertation—that the process of the subjectivation of 
confession should not imply any qualification about the role of the questioner; what is 
relevant is the act of accounting itself. 
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essential obligation; it is one of the basic forms of our 
obedience (Foucault 2014a, 312-313). 
 
The contemporary subject is obedient because its foundation is the 
Christian subject.  One of the Christian subject’s first forms of obedience 
emerges in the confession. And the Christian is subjected to the regime of 
truth of the confession as it is in the confession that the subject can 
account him/herself. If one confesses in order to be true, the same is true 
for the regimes of truth derived from the confession. In submission to the 
new governmentalities the subject finds his/her own truth. Since the 
confession requires that one be honest about him/herself, the next section 
will explore accountability as contemporary form of Christian 
confession. 
 
2.4 Digital Accountability as Confession 
This section aims to demonstrate that digital accountability 
genealogically finds its foundation in the Christian confession. It is not 
intended here to demonstrate that accountability and confession are the 
same: the more than 1500 years that have passed between the encoding 
of the Christian confession to the establishment of the contemporary 
accountability is a quite long period. What is meant here is that the 
typical formation of accountability shares numerous characteristics with 
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Christian confession. To establish this argument, what follows will 
outline accountability and Christian confession in parallel. 
First of all, accountability arises in the form of process, both in standard 
form and in digital accountability. Surely, Christian confession involves a 
procedural form, which is divided into the stages of: recognition as a 
sinner through knowledge of the self and of sins; the act of confession 
itself; the upheaval towards the source of salvation; and repentance. 
Secondly, it has been observed that a certain form of contract exists in 
accountability. This contract operates on two levels in digital 
accountability: one is the contract with respect to the platform and the 
other is the “social” contract between the user and the community to 
which he belongs. There is no doubt that even in Christian confession 
there is a kind of contract with respect to the community,84 which is 
called the flock according to the pastoral and theological power of the 
church. The contract assumes no written form, but consists of the ritual 
obligations that the Christian must undergo in order to remain within the 
flock. It is useful to remember that in Christianity, and especially in 
Catholicism and Orthodoxy, a fundamental constraint to stay in the flock 
is the submission to the sacraments. Only by virtue of the assumption of 
the holy sacraments, can the Christian profess his/her membership to the 
                                                 
84
 Not surprisingly, the Greek word for church is ekklesia, which is translated in the 
Christian context as community, in this case, the community of believers. The noun was 
borrowed from the popular assembly of the Ancient Athens. 
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church. Among the sacraments, not coincidentally, one finds the 
confession. Due to this, it is believed that the Christian church has been 
replaced by the community of users, and that the confession as a 
sacrament is instead replaced the social contract of belonging to a certain 
community.85 
Subsequently it had been taken into account the presence of a person 
acting (meaning active), which had been identified in digital 
accountability as the traditional user of social networks. Again, one can 
draw a parallel with the Christian confession, which focuses on the act of 
confession in which the sinner intends to redeem his/her sins. 
Fourth, the need for the user to give accounts in the accountability 
process was introduced. It was seen that in the traditional process of 
accountability, giving an account of himself/herself is an immanent 
necessity of accountability itself, without which accountability would not 
exist. It has also been observed that in digital accountability having and 
giving an account were two sides of the same coin, and that the fact of 
having an account consequently implied the giving an account. In the act 
of Christian confession one finds the same mandatory bond. The 
characterisation of the subject as a Christian can take place only with the 
act of confession, and the act of confession can be only grounded in the 
                                                 
85
 This contract may be distinguished in various manners. If some years ago, a great 
emphasis was placed on the issue of network etiquette, for example, it is interesting that 
now the rule, set to be within a community, effectively has become multifaceted, until it 
has taken on the contours of a subject of study (personal branding, for example). 
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Christianity of the subject. It has been seen above, however, that the act 
of confession consists of an act of “telling-the-truth” by the subject about 
him/herself, and that this “telling-the-truth” cannot ignore the form of the 
account (as opposed to the act of faith, which may not require a 
dimension of accounting). This results in the indissoluble bond, argued 
above, between the dimension of the account itself in the form of “tell-
the-truth” and the Christian confession.86 
This leads to the fifth item related to accountability, the account itself. It 
was shown that—as an etymological origin of the term—an account of 
oneself in both the forms of accounting and storytelling pertained to the 
same horizon of meaning, and that one should not put a portmanteau 
between verbal narration and a different symbolic narration that proceeds 
otherwise (for example, a symbolic narration based on numbers). It was 
then validated that the result of statistical inference made by the digital 
machine in accountability could be also considered as a form of narrative 
itself, one that emerges from the intentionality of the subject. As clearly 
                                                 
86
 Due to this reason I depart from Butler when she says: ‘Giving an account is thus also 
a kind of showing of oneself, a showing for the purpose of testing whether the account 
seems right, whether it is understandable by the other, who ‘receives’ the account 
through one set of norms or another’ (Butler 2005, 131). It is considered here, as 
repeatedly expressed, that the fundamental feature of accountability is the subject 
situated in the process, rather than the account operated by the subject. Butler indeed 
says in another moment: ‘The account is an act—situated within a larger practice of 
acts—that one performs for, to, even on an other, an allocutory deed, an acting for, and 
in the face of, the other and sometimes by virtue of the language provided by the other. 
This account does not have as its goal the establishment of a definitive narrative but 
constitutes a linguistic and social occasion for self-transformation’ (Butler 2005, 130). 
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argued by Foucault, one cannot make a confession without telling the 
truth, which can only take the form of the account itself. Just as in 
Christian confession, as mentioned above, one finds the pivotal moment 
of Western culture, in which the subject finds him/herself at the very 
moment in which he tells-the-truth to him/herself. And also the subject is 
true when his/her account has an external referent that makes the account 
real, but only because he is precisely that person who can tell-the-truth. It 
is not the accounting of the truth that offers the Christian subject 
salvation, but it is the truth of the accounting—the truth of the accounting 
subject—that saves the subject. 
And then—the sixth moment—the reference domain where the account 
itself is situated is identified in the mission statement of any digital 
platform. This mission is the remediation of Christianity’s salvation plan. 
The invitation to the Christian subject was: obey the act of confession 
and you will be saved. The invitation digital platforms offer the 
contemporary human being is: be consistent with the mission of the 
platform and you’ll find yourself. A picture on Instagram, a tweet, a 
Facebook post: these are all instruments by which the contemporary 
subject encounters the will of the platform. If the subject meets the will 
of the platform, the possibility of subjectivation—and objectivation in 
front of his/her eyes and the eyes of other—is offered through the 
account in digital accountability. If the process of self-accounting offered 
by the platform is guaranteed, the subject will then be in a position to 
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continuously produce accounts about him/herself. Thus, this continuous 
accounting constantly keeps the subject within a paradigm of confession, 
or a form in which the subject is continually invited to tell the truth about 
him/herself: a “tell-the-truth” that does not pertain to the contents of the 
account, but to the subject who manifests him/herself as a subject able to 
give an account of him/herself. This is the fundamental point that can be 
gleaned from a genealogy of Christian confession: the subject of social 
networks is a perpetual producer of accounts.  As this subject is 
perpetually accountable and confessable, he or she is thus permanently 
“saved”. 
In seventh place, is has been shown that accountability can only be based 
on the dimension of symbolisation, and that digital accountability can 
offer both an intentional symbolisation and an unintentional numerical 
symbolism, made by the strategic inferences operated by the platform. In 
this case, the legacy of confession in accountability is fully rediscovered, 
whether digital or not. Confession is always a symbolisation of the 
account in front of another. In confession, the Christian tells someone 
his/her sins. Confession is not an examination of conscience, to which it 
could be compared.87 While the examination of conscience presupposes a 
dialogue of the subject with himself, a dialogue seeking to determine 
                                                 
87
 This is something that the Greeks already had in mind, and in various forms. For 
instance the praemeditatio malorum operated by the Stoics, consisted of imagining all 
future evils, to accustom themselves to manage the emotions that would ensue once the 
evils they had come true; or the famous soliloquies Marcus Aurelius told to himself 
(1997). 
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what was good or bad during the day, or regarding a specific incident, the 
confession strictly requires that the subject exposes his/her arcana 
conscientiae in front of another person. The Christian confession is not a 
meditation. The ground of the Christian confession is the verbalisation, 
the dimension of telling rather than thinking. Only in the form of public 
speech the confession can take place. The account of oneself given in 
confession itself does not have the private form of self-examination, but 
it is public, and the fact that it’s public means that it needs a recipient.88 
The eighth moment concerns the presence of a recipient of the account in 
the scene of address. If the questioner plays a critical role in 
accountability, and usually s/he is directly interested in the account, and 
if in digital accountability the interlocutor is more nuanced and 
sometimes opaque, as expressed above in the confession, the recipient to 
whom the account is addressed is irrelevant: s/he can be wise and full of 
knowledge, as well as foolish and ignorant. What counts is the precise 
location that the questioner occupies in the process of confession: the 
mere fact that s/he offered a listening ear to the response of the subject 
makes true what the subject has said. Likewise in digital accountability 
the function of listening is fundamental: it is not relevant what the subject 
says, but the function of listening itself driven by what is being said. This 
listening makes true not so much what is said, but the telling subject 
                                                 
88
 The act of confessing sins can be made public, in front of an audience, within some 
Protestant churches.  
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Insofar as s/he tells telling.89 In digital accountability one finds his/her 
salvation on the basis that one has a recipient for their address. And it is 
no coincidence that social networks make it possible to quantify this 
function of listening, by counting the likes, retweets, shares, and all other 
available tools. In the spread of my account— quantitative in the case of 
digital accountability—one finds salvation, since s/he is guaranteed to be 
in a process of subjectivation fruitful for him/her. 
Thus, accountability implies an answer, which in digital accountability 
takes the form of feedback operated by the community. In Christian 
confession, there is clearly an answer in the dialogical dimension that 
assumes the act of confession itself, which does not consist in a soliloquy 
to the ear of the other, but includes a response from the confessor that 
facilitates the Christian subject in the knowledge of him/herself. The 
community operates similarly: the reply offers a fundamental moment of 
feedback, both affirming the truth of the act of accounting (the like), or 
asking for additional information as needed (the reply to the post), 
wherein the subject is invited to respond in turn. Other forms of response 
are given through the address of specific content on Facebook and 
Twitter (the interpellation to the recipient via the “@”), or the creation of 
trend topics (introduced by the hashtag “#”), where the semantic function 
is totally subordinate to the question of the revival of the discussion. This 
                                                 
89
 As Turkle notes: ‘We enjoy continual connection but rarely have each other's 
attention’ (Turkle 2012, 280). 
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revival is entirely consistent with the mechanisms of veridiction 
expressed above, for which the invitation to subjectivation is 
continuously stimulated. 
Finally, in accountability the moment of sanction is essential. However, it 
appears appropriate to focus on digital accountability’s sanction 
mechanism, in which the greatest penalty is the lockout. On a basic level, 
the blocking and deleting of an account can be due to two factors. The 
first is the convenience of content shared online. However, I don’t aim to 
dwell on this point here, as it will be seen in chapter four how moral 
issues are linked to the discourse of economic rationality. What matters 
here is rather the principle of deletion. It is forbidden to have more than 
one account tied to a physical body. But above all, being a psychical 
person must be proven in case of dispute (for example, if one is accused 
of being a bot). To understand this mechanism of exclusion, Butler is 
revealing:  
In a real sense, we do not survive without being addressed, 
which means that the scene of address can and should 
provide a sustaining condition for ethical deliberation, 
judgment, and conduct. In the same way, I would argue, the 
institutions of punishment and imprisonment have a 
responsibility to sustain the very lives that enter their 
domains, precisely because they have the power, in the name 
of ‘‘ethics,’’ to damage and destroy lives with impunity. If, as 
Spinoza maintained, one can desire to live life in the right 
way only if there is, already or at the same time, a desire to 
live, it would seem equally true that the scenario of 
punishment that seeks to transform the desire for life into a 
desire for death erodes the condition of ethics itself. (2005, 
49) 
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The sanction is ambivalent on Facebook. On one hand, it refers to 
control, but on the other hand its roots lie in disciplinary systems, in 
which the exclusion involved immediately results in de-subjectivation. 
Facebook applies an archaic attitude of power, for which deviance 
determines exclusion without possibility of re-subjectivation within the 
dispositive. It is the same scene of address to be denied. Faced with a 
continuing claim on the ethical platform, the platform itself denies any 
possible ethics to the user in the moment that the user him/herself can be 
removed. In this sense, one could even assimilate Facebook within the 
administrative system of death, rather than disciplinary systems of life. 
This issue will be taken up in the last chapter. Now that the genealogy of 
contemporary digital accountability has been established through an 
analysis of the Christian confession, the next chapter will analyse four 
possible forms of hermeneutics of the self: screaming, free, disembodied, 
coherent subjects. 
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3 The First Hermeneutics of the Subject 
 
In The Government of the Living (2014a), Michel Foucault defines 
exagoreusis as a specific procedure in the Christian world by which the 
subject has to give perpetual testimony of him/herself. Based on an 
account of oneself, exagoreusis is the self perpetually staging itself (301).  
Exagoreusis seems to anticipate contemporary practices on social 
networks, however neither exagoreusis nor accounting of oneself on 
social networks comprise the only practices through which the human 
being stages him/herself. As Foucault noted, literature is another great 
system of constraint by which the Westerners obliges daily life to assume 
a narrative discourse (reflection exposed in The Life of Infamous Men 
(2001, 252).90 ‘People have written about themselves in the same way for 
a thousand years, but not in the same modality’, Foucault states (2001, 
1227 [my translation]) in his consideration of the act of writing as one of 
the main techniques by which human being offers him/herself to the 
other and, in doing this, makes him/herself a subject.91 One form of 
                                                 
90
 Even the reflection of Kundera, dedicated to the theory of the novel, belongs to this 
area, for which the novel—a typical Western invention- is merely a form of storytelling 
of the neat experience (Kundera 2003). 
91
 As Foucault points out, in a very important step for the definition of the relationship 
between writing and visibility: ‘Writing is to show ourselves, make us visible, make our 
face visible to the other. (...) The letter manages a kind of face-to-face’(Foucault 2001, 
1245 [my translation]). By the act of writing, the human being shows him/herself, 
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writing that Foucault takes into account in this text is the hyponmemata, a 
technique of collecting thoughts that flourished in Ancient Greece. As 
Foucault describes them: 
In the technical sense, the hypomnemata could be account 
books, public registers, individual notebooks serving as 
memoranda. Their use as books of life, guides for conduct, 
seems to have become a current thing among a whole 
cultivated public. Into them one entered quotations, 
fragments of works, examples, and actions to which one had 
been witness or of which one had read the account, 
reflections or reasonings which one had heard or which had 
come to mind. They constituted a material memory of things 
read, heard, or thought, thus offering these as an accumulated 
treasure for rereading and later meditation. They also formed 
a raw material for the writing of more systematic treatises in 
which were given arguments and means by which to struggle 
against some defect (such as anger, envy, gossip, flattery) or 
to overcome some difficult circumstance (a mourning, an 
exile, downfall, disgrace). (Dreyfus 1983, 246) 
 
However hyponmenata, which Foucault outlines in rich detail, seem 
ambivalent regarding the discourse developed here. On one hand, they 
certainly work as a process of subjectivation, as a general act of writing. 
Foucault himself declares: ‘The writer is the synthesis of hypomnemata, 
insofar as subjectivation passes through the exercise of the personal 
writing’(2001, 1241 [my translation]).92 If in hypomnenata the regime of 
                                                                                                                       
changes from a state of invisibility to visibility within a dimension dialogue with the 
reader. 
92
 The definition of hypomnenata given above and a possible comparison to reposting 
and sharing content produced by others on social media seems interesting. Surely, even 
in sharing, the element of content aggregation retrospectively reflects upon the writer, 
namely: the work of selecting content to share indicates a particular regime of visibility 
for the one who posts it. And, accordingly, this selection allows the reader to establish a 
particular type of analysis of subjectivity that s/he faces. It is certainly interesting then 
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visibility prevails, and the subject returns continuously to him/herself, the 
French author suggests that perhaps one can find a more authentic and 
complex corresponding story of the self (Foucault 2001, 1245). 
Thus the relationship between writing and giving an account of oneself as 
an act of self-construction is a fundamental aspect of subjectivity, both 
historically and in the contemporary world. As Lanier astutely points out 
(2011), Unix systems, which are the basis of all modern computing, 
established a user typewriter among its various available options at the 
operating system’s inception. Thus, it stands to reason that writing (now 
flanked by iconism) has exploded in modern times to reach an era in 
which writing has never been so diffused (Ferraris 2011). 
Social networks certainly comprise the most diffused form of 
symbolising the world through writing today, at least if we consider the 
number of people involved in the process of constructing the narratives 
distributed though these platforms. Rovatti keenly observes: ‘Facebook is 
basically an account of oneself through others’ (Rovatti 2010, 155 [my 
translation]), mediated by algorithms.   ‘Through’ can be understood in 
                                                                                                                       
to take into account what is shared as strategic dimension of subjectivity; however, a 
basic element of the confession is missing in this process: the dimension of self-
discovery, which is the basis of accountability. In fact, as Foucault says in the same 
pages about hypomnemata: ‘The function of hypomnemata is not to unveil the not-said, 
but to gather the already-said, what can be understood and read, in a design that is just 
the constitution of the self’ (Foucault 2001, 1224 [my translation]). Hypomnemata are a 
constitution of the self that is already active under a regime of visibility, while the 
confession works out the visible manifestation of what is under the regime of 
invisibility, at least according to a more radical process of self-construction. 
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two ways here. First of all, the notion of a recipient for an account of the 
self is essential in a system like Facebook. The account of itself only 
exists on social media in the reception of the other. Secondly, it is equally 
important to consider that not all the content offered in the account 
originates from the self who does the accounting: the function of sharing 
is one of the possibilities that dominates the constitution of the account 
itself. Accentuating the inclusion of the other in the account of oneself on 
social networks shortly thereafter, Rovatti emphasised: ‘Facebook is a 
widely visible construction of subjectivity operated by the others’ (155 
[my translation]). However, unlike Rovatti, here it is considered that the 
social dimension of the construction of the self is not only the work made 
by others, but also that the subject is active in the construction of his/her 
own subjectivity through self-representation. In the following chapter, 
four possible figures will be introduced in order to analyse possible forms 
of the account of oneself on social networks, as well as to outline the 
subject in a way that is not reducible—as Rovatti claims—to an effect 
produced by others: the unscreaming subject, the free subject, the 
disembodied subject, the coherent subject. 
 
3.1 The Unscreaming Subject 
One of the most relevant phenomena on contemporary social networks is 
the facial representation enacted by their users, a phenomenon that has 
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primarily been referred to as the selfie in the years spent writing this 
dissertation.93 If the question of the face has a wide dimension in Western 
culture, for which the examination of this issue can be approached from a 
psychological, anthropological, artistic or even theological point of view, 
this chapter aims to analyse the representation of the face in the 
contemporary era according to a deconstruction based on the concept of 
faciality, investigated by Deleuze and Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987). 
Deleuze and Guattari emphasise the importance of faciality but in the 
form of deconstruction: ‘Yes, the face has a great future, but only if it is 
destroyed, dismantled. On the road to the asignifying and asubjective’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 171). The face acquires value only when it 
is dismantled through its destruction and its removal to bring out its 
asignifying and asubjective appearance; a deconstruction, therefore, 
leading to a horizon of meaning for which the face loses the status of 
representation of the subject, and every possible signification. Why do 
Deleuze and Guattari want to undertake this deconstruction of the face? 
In order to understand this operation, one should firstly consider the 
dualism that the authors identify in the face, which they describe as a 
white wall/black hole: 
                                                 
93
 The phenomenon is so vast and well known that neither description nor definition is 
required here. It covers almost all users of social networks, and it is one of the main 
forms of self-representation of the contemporary. 
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Signifiance is never without a white wall upon which it 
inscribes its signs and redundancies. Subjectification is never 
without a black hole in which it lodges its consciousness, 
passion, and redundancies. (…) Oddly enough, it is a face: 
the white wall/black hole system. A broad face with white 
cheeks, a chalk face with eyes cut in for a black hole. Clown 
head, white clown, moon-white mime, angel of death, Holy 
Shroud. The face is not an envelope exterior to the person 
who speaks, thinks, or feels. The form of the signifier in 
language, even its units, would remain indeterminate if the 
potential listener did not use the face of the speaker to guide 
his or her choices (“Hey, he seems angry ...”; “He couldn't 
say it...”; “You see my face when I'm talking to you ...”; 
“look at me carefully...”). (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 167) 
 
The polarity of the white wall/black hole thus reflects another polarity, 
which at first glance did not seem to have been posed as antithetical: 
meaning/subjectivity. The white wall is the place where the process of 
signification inscribes its signs, while the black hole is the place where 
subjectivity manifests itself. The face is the system that allows the 
joining of these two poles: white wall (meaning) versus black hole 
(subjectivity). In this dimension of representation, the face—as sharply 
indicated by the authors—is not an outer envelope that contains the 
interiority of the subject, but it is above all the form in which it presents 
itself to the other, a significant dimension that allows the other to make 
sense of what is offered in communicative exchange. And in a later 
passage on the articulation of the concept of faciality the authors go 
further: 
Faces are not basically individual; they define zones of 
frequency or probability, delimit a field that neutralizes in 
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advance any expressions or connections unamenable to the 
appropriate significations. Similarly, the form of subjectivity, 
whether consciousness or passion, would remain absolutely 
empty if faces did not form loci of resonance that select the 
sensed or mental reality and make it conform in advance to a 
dominant reality. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 168) 
 
The dimension of the face as a system is here articulated further. When 
the two authors state that faces are in fact not individual, they claim that a 
part determines the signification process for which the face remains 
comprehensible to the other. In other words: the face arises from a 
system of rules of signification that permits the intelligibility to the other. 
In this system of signification, everything is cut out that could not find a 
suitable mode of signification.94 The black hole of subjectivity is 
supposed to operate like the process of signification. Whether 
consciousness or passion, the interiority of subjectivity must fully adapt 
to the dominant reality that constitutes faciality. In a negative case, the 
emptiness of the face would determine the impossibility of expression. 
In a following step, then, an accurate description of how the machine of 
faciality works is offered: 
It is absurd to believe that language as such can convey a 
message. A language is always embedded in the faces that 
announce its statements and ballast them in relation to the 
signifiers in progress and subjects concerned. (…) When the 
faciality machine translates formed contents of whatever kind 
into a single substance of expression, it already subjugates 
                                                 
94
 It seems superfluous to consider that Deleuze was deeply aware of all the issues 
regarding faciality. One can just consider all the analytical study on the portraits of 
Bacon presented within the Deleuzian masterpiece The Logic of Sense (Deleuze 1989). 
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them to the exclusive form of signifying and subjective 
expression. It carries out the prior gridding that makes it 
possible for the signifying elements to become discernible, 
and for the subjective choices to be implemented. The 
faciality machine is not an annex to the signifier and the 
subject; rather, it is subjacent (connexe) to them and is their 
condition of possibility. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 179–
180) 
 
First of all, Deleuze and Guattari claim that it’s impossible to think that 
language as such can exist without being expressed by a face. The 
message exists only when it is inserted within faces. It is expressed by 
faces; and therefore, it exists at the time when it is enclosed within the 
system of the white wall/black hole, the network that connects meaning 
and subject. Secondly, content cannot exist except in the form of the 
substance of an expression, and the substance of this expression can only 
exist if produced by faciality, which here takes on the dimension of the 
machine. In short, faciality is the machine that produces individuals. The 
processes of the faciality machine comprise the communication grid that 
establishes the horizon of possibility for the content’s existence—content 
that can exist only if subjected to the domination of the faciality machine. 
This domination operates according to the usual two axes: the significant 
elements that make the message intelligible and the subject’s choices that 
allow this message to exist. Without a faciality machine, no meaning or 
subjectivity could be given.95 
                                                 
95
 Deleuze and Guattari’s definition of the faciality machine is definitely framed in 
terms of Foucault’s dispositive. In fact, one cannot consider the constitutions of the self 
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Considering that the pages were written in 1980, the two French authors 
were certainly considering the production of the private portrait, but their 
primary focus was the production of public portraits by the mass mediatic 
machine. In this context, Deleuze and Guattari notice the collapse of the 
mask in faciality:  
Even the mask assumes a new function here, the exact 
opposite of its old one. For there is no unitary function of the 
mask, except a negative one (in no case does the mask serve 
to dissimulate, to hide, even while showing or revealing). 
Either the mask assures the head’s belonging to the body, its 
becoming-animal, as was the case in primitive societies. Or, 
as is the case now, the mask assures the erection, the 
construction of the face, the facialization of the head and the 
body: the mask is now the face itself, the abstraction or 
operation of the face. The inhumanity of the face. Never does 
the face assume a prior signifier or subject. (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987, 180–181) 
 
In this long passage there are many conceptual connections. Although the 
authors note that the mask was born in primitive societies as an extension 
of the body in relation to its line of flight to the animal, Deleuze and 
Guattari claim, with radical insight, that the mask is no longer an 
extension of the body in the contemporary world, but rather itself the 
facialisation of the head and body. And as such it takes on the dimension, 
ambiguous and inhuman, of the abstraction of the face: a face that exists 
                                                                                                                       
in the form of subjectivity in the absence of the dispositive. On the other hand, it is 
interesting how Deleuze then develops a discourse about the meaning more complex 
than Foucault, who seems to overlook the semantics of dispositives. Following the 
legacy of aesthetic communication, one could affirm that the semantic of the dispositive 
are the signs of the practices generated by feedback loops that derive from inserting an 
existing subjectivity into it, refusing any hypothesis of creation ex nihilo. 
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only as a mask, as an abstraction of itself. The mask then takes on a new 
power status, in which the order at the origin of the primitive mask has 
completely reversed itself. As argued by Deleuze and Guattari:  
The order is totally different:  
> despotic and authoritarian concrete assemblage of 
power  
>  triggering of the abstract machine of faciality, white 
wall/black hole  
>  installation of the new semiotic of signifiance and 
subjectification on that holey surface.  
That is why we have been addressing just two problems 
exclusively: the relation of the face to the abstract machine 
that produces it, and the relation of the face to the 
assemblages of power that require that social production. The 
face is a politics. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 180–181) 
 
An authoritarian and despotic regime of power is defined here. And this 
regime of power triggers the production of the faciality machine, 
imposing its mechanisms of representations on systems like 
meaning/subjectivity, white wall/black hole, namely:  generating 
signifying codes that allow only a certain type of expression of 
subjectivity. Once the faciality machine becomes active, the 
contemporary subject must join these regimes. Consequently, at the 
conclusion of this discourse—being that the faciality regime is 
determined by a power that requires social production—the face cannot 
have any other dimension except politics. In other words, contemporary 
subjects produce their political dimension in the face, according to 
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assemblages of power that pre-exist them and abstract them from their 
corporeality. Faciality, which acts as an interface between systems of 
signification and subjectivity, is therefore pre-determined, and the 
contemporary subject can only be consistent with signifying codes that 
power imposes on him/her. 
If this type of analysis had been conducted by Michel Foucault, one 
probably would have had regimes of truth instead of power assemblies 
because, as previously stated, the regimes of truth set obligations to 
which the subject must adhere in order to fit into processes of 
subjectivation that make him/her socially acceptable. One can also say 
without a shadow of doubt that the faciality machine fully operates on 
social networks. Although the portrait’s transformation into the public 
portrait sparked Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis, there is nonetheless no 
doubt that the contemporary faciality machine generates public portraits 
in the form of contemporary selfies—or any other representation of 
faciality, for that matter. A face in front of a monument, a happy face, a 
face with a heart-shaped mouth, an ecstatic face: these are all results of 
the contemporary faciality machine, in which the process of 
subjectification are completely precoded through a system of 
signification (the white wall). If the modern portrait was born in the 
Italian Renaissance with the aim of expressing the interiority of an 
individual through exterior signs, then the present portrait has lost its link 
with contemporary art, and, in doing so, also the connection with the 
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possibility of inaugurating new faciality machines. It does nothing but 
perpetuate a system of signification that generates preconceived 
subjectivities, in which the black hole is not a proper form, but rather is 
subjugated to assume a predetermined shape. In this sense, social 
networks powerfully operate as a political machine, since the assembly of 
power is the constitutive element that determines the faciality machine, 
which generates the white wall. The subject does not produce original 
content on Facebook or Instagram when posting his/her selfie on these 
platforms. On the contrary, Facebook and Instagram determine the 
content that the subject posts—in a moment in which the black hole is 
empty and silent. The face should thus be destroyed—because the face is 
the contemporary expression of assemblies of power, or as Foucault 
would say: of regimes of truth that are completely abstracted from the 
black hole of the subject. 
How then to get out of this situation of radical subjugation and 
abstraction, which inhibits any process of subjectivity? Deleuze and 
Guattari pose the question to themselves, garnering a surprising response: 
How do you get out of the black hole? How do you break 
through the wall? How do you dismantle the face? Whatever 
genius there may be in the French novel, that is not its affair. 
It is too concerned with measuring the wall, or even with 
building it, with plumbing the depths of black holes and 
composing faces. The French novel is profoundly pessimistic 
and idealistic, “critical of life rather than creative of life.” It 
stuffs its characters down the hole and bounces them off the 
wall. It can only conceive of organized voyages, and of 
salvation only through art, a still Catholic salvation, in other 
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words, salvation through eternity. It spends its time plotting 
points instead of drawing lines, active lines of flight or of 
positive deterritorialization. The Anglo-American novel is 
totally different. “To get away. To get away, out!... To cross a 
horizon ...” From Hardy to Lawrence, from Melville to 
Miller, the same cry rings out: Go across, get out, break 
through, make a beeline, don't get stuck on a point. (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1987, 186–187) 
 
Their response can be found then in the escape from these schemes of 
faciality. The next section, therefore, addresses the issue of freedom of 
the subject. 
 
3.2 The Free Subject 
If the previous section analysed faciality as mode to deconstruct the 
iconic representation of the subject, this section addresses the question of 
the subject’s freedom—or rather, it intends to criticise the figure of the 
free subject on social networks.  
Foucault says that there are three distinct elements that constitute the 
basis of his analysis: knowledge, based on the mechanism of veridiction; 
power, which manages governmental systems; and the practices of the 
self, with which the subject subjectifies him/herself (Foucault 2012, 1-
19). This chapter aims to analyse a particular practice of self, to which 
Foucault devotes the last two courses held at the Collège de France: the 
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parrhesia, or free-spokenness.96 Why does Foucault identify parrhesia as 
a fundamental element of analysis in his last texts? Parrhesia connotes a 
single moment in which knowledge, powers, games of truth and 
processes overlap: an instant that Foucault termed parrhesiastic. The 
concept played an important role in the philosopher’s final texts because 
in parrhesia Foucault had identified a possibility for freedom. The 
purpose of this chapter is to first define parrhesia and then to analyse the 
possibility of its existence on social networks to, finally, locate the 
relationship between parrhesia and digital accountability. 
To introduce parrhesia, one must remember what Foucault’s claims 
regarding ascetic practices:  
This is a work of the self on the self, an elaboration of the self 
by the self, a progressive transformation of the self by the self 
for which one takes responsibility in a long labor of ascesis 
(askesis). Eros and askesis are, I think, the two major forms in 
Western spirituality for conceptualizing the modalities by 
which the subject must be transformed in order finally to 
become capable of truth. (Foucault 2005, 16)  
 
Foucault declares that there is a mode of the subject called tell-the-truth; 
and that this mode can comprise a mode of being for the subject through 
a practical exercise (askesis). Tell-the-truth can be a powerful process of 
subjectivation, which surely concerns the fundamental questions of 
accountability: Who am I? (for a true account of him/herself) and Was it 
                                                 
96
 The first use of the word parrhesia is within The Hermeneutics of the Subject (2005), 
However, this notion is not widely analysed in this course, although it is the heart of the 
two following courses. 
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you?. The latter question, as illustrated in the chapter about the scene of 
address, invites the subject to take care of and responsibility for the 
relationship between himself/herself  and his/her surroundings. Tell-the-
truth and accountability, real or digital, are therefore closely linked to one 
another. 
According to Foucault, the one who practices parrhesia is neither the 
prophet, nor the wise, nor the technical (Foucault 2012, 27). Taking into 
account John Austin’s theory of performative utterances (Austin 1975), 
Foucault raises an important distinction between the parrhesiastic act and 
the performative utterance. As Foucault says:  
there is a major and crucial difference. In a performative 
utterance, the given elements of the situation are such that 
when the utterance is made, the effect that follows is known 
and ordered in advance, it is codified, and this is precisely 
what constitutes the performative character of the utterance. 
In parrhesia, on the other hand, whatever the usual, familiar, 
and quasi-institutionalized character of the situation in which 
it is effectuated, what makes it parrhesia is that the 
introduction, the irruption of the true discourse determines an 
open situation, or rather opens the situation and makes 
possible effects which are, precisely, not known. Parrhesia 
does not produce a codified effect; it opens up an unspecified 
risk. And this unspecified risk is obviously a function of the 
elements of the situation. (Foucault 2011, 62) 
 
Parrhesia therefore implies the assumption of a risk. This risk is given by 
the fact that the dispositive within which the utterance takes place does 
not provide for the possibility expressing that particular utterance. The 
performative utterance is written from the set of the possible speakable 
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outsets within the dispositive. The parrhesiastic statement is rather a 
rupture with the possibilities offered by the dispositive. While 
consequences can be established a priori in the performative utterance, 
parrhesia opens an entirely new situation—which Foucault claims is 
risky. The risk that derives from parrhesia is twofold: on the one hand it’s 
harmful to the dispositive itself, as parrhesia is an emergency that the 
dispositive had not contemplated. Secondly, the risk is for the parrhesiast, 
who pronounces a statement not included in the script of the dispositive, 
thus exposing him/herself to unknown consequences.97 Despite 
parrhesia’s manifold risks, it nonetheless maintains a double bond with 
the truth. As Foucault clearly illustrates, parrhesia  
is always a sort of formulation of the truth at two levels. A 
first level is that of the statement of the truth itself (at this 
point, as in the performative, one says the thing, and that’s 
that). The second level of the parrhesiastic act, the 
parrhesiastic enunciation is the affirmation that in fact one 
genuinely thinks, judges, and considers the truth one is saying 
to be genuinely true. I tell the truth, and I truly think that it is 
true, and I truly think that I am telling the truth when I say it. 
This doubling or intensification of the statement of the truth 
by the statement of the truth of the fact that I think this truth 
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 ‘What defines the parrhesiastic statement, what precisely makes the statement of its 
truth in the form of parrhesia something absolutely unique among other forms of 
utterance and other formulations of the truth, is that parrhesia opens up a risk. Although 
it states the truth, there is no parrhesia in the progressive steps of a demonstration taking 
place in neutral conditions, because the person who states the truth in this way does not 
take any risk. The statement of the truth does not open up any risk if you envisage it 
only as an element in a demonstrative procedure. (…)In a sense, therefore, it is the 
opposite of the performative, in which the enunciation of something brings about and 
gives rise to a completely determined event as a function of the general code and 
institutional field in which the utterance is made. Here, on the contrary, it is a truth-
telling, an irruptive truth-telling that creates a fracture and opens up the risk: a 
possibility, a field of dangers, or at any rate, an undefined eventuality’ (Foucault 2011, 
63). 
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and that, thinking it, I say it, is what is essential to the 
parrhesiastic act. (Foucault 2011, 64) 
 
A second essential feature of parrhesia concerns that which is said, which 
is also present in the performative utterance. One need merely say 
something and it holds true by the fact of being uttered. The essential 
element of parrhesia, which is accompanied by risk, is the connection 
between what one says and what one thinks. Foucault’s analysis neither 
aims to reflect upon the power of the lying word, nor the attitude of the 
truth-telling or lying subject. Foucault treats the parrhesiastic statement 
here, in which the parrhesiast makes a commitment to him/herself. This 
commitment results in the parrhesiast’s exposure to risk, which he or she 
assumes by virtue of the covenant taken with him/herself. In summary: 
the parrhesiast believes what s/he thinks is true; s/he tells the truth s/he 
thinks; it follows that s/he is exposed to a risk; This risk is the seal of the 
connection between the truth and the subject who tells this truth. As 
summarised by Foucault:  
The parrhesiast, the person who uses parrhesia, is the truthful 
man (l’homme véridique), that is to say, the person who has 
the courage to risk telling the truth, and who risks this truth-
telling in a pact with himself, inasmuch as he is, precisely, the 
enunciator of the truth. He is the truth-teller (le véridique). 
(Foucault 2011, 66)98 
                                                 
98
 Foucault finds a genealogy for this notion of parrhesia in Nietzschean discourse: ‘it 
seems to me that Nietzschean veridicity (véridicité) is a way of putting to work this 
notion whose distant origin is found in the notion of parrhesia (truth-telling) as a risk for 
the person who states it, a risk accepted by the person who states it’ (Foucault 2011, 
66). Veridicity is recovered by the Nietzschean subject in the interpretation deriving 
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Again, Foucault returns to the difference between parrhesia and the 
pragmatics of discourse, which should not be confused. Unlike the 
pragmatics of discourse, the relationship between subject and statement 
is reversed within parrhesia:  
‘With parrhesia we see the appearance of a whole family of 
completely different facts of discourse which are almost the 
reverse, the mirror projection of what we call the pragmatics 
of discourse. In fact, parrhesia involves a whole series of facts 
of discourse in which it is not the real situation of the person 
speaking which affects or modifies the value of the statement’. 
(Foucault 2011, 68) 
 
In the pragmatics of communication, the status of the enunciating subject 
influences the sentence. The same sentence pronounced by different 
people in different contexts would take on a different value of truth. 
Attributed to the subject by the dispositive in place, the role of the 
enunciating subject in the network absolutely predominates in the 
pragmatics of communication. The opposite happens in parrhesia. The 
truth of the statement establishes the truth of the enunciator. In the 
parrhesiastic act, the role occupied in the dispositive by the enunciating 
subject has no function. The emergence of the truth of a given statement 
generates the veracity of the enunciating subject, who—as mentioned 
above—is exposed to a risk because it alters the homeostasis of the 
                                                                                                                       
from the will to power, the capacity of the Üebermensch to deliver his/her truth to the 
others, assuming the risks bonded to this truth.  
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apparatus. As summarised by Foucault: ‘taking things in their most 
general and neutral form, quite simply mean that the person who said 
something has actually said it, and by a more or less explicit act binds 
himself to the fact that he said it’ (Foucault 2011, 68). 
So what is the goal of parrhesia? The goal of parrhesia is eminently 
ethical, in several ways. Firstly, the purpose of parrhesia is a 
modification of ethos that takes place in order for a statement of truth to 
emerge that has the immediate effect of destabilising the dispositive in 
which it is inscribed (Foucault 2012, 57-62). In the parrhesiastic act, the 
dispositive that inscribes parrhesia suffers an imbalance that may lead to 
its rupture. Plato speaking in front of Dionysus or Diogenes in front of 
Alexander are two well-known parrhesiastic episodes offered by 
antiquity. In both cases, the dispositive that ruled the pragmatics of 
communication—in this case the relationship between sovereign and 
subject—is shaken to its core, as the parrhesiastic act implies that neither 
of the two roles can condition the truth of the enunciation. Secondly, 
parrhesia is a process of subjectivation that, as Foucault points out: ‘is 
therefore a certain way of speaking. More precisely, it is a way of telling 
the truth’ (Foucault 2011, 66). Parrhesia is proposed as a right to talk to 
others to guide them and also as an obligation to talk about him/herself to 
save him/herself (Foucault 2011, 339-347). In this case, salvation has 
nothing to do with Christianity and the paradigm of confession: in 
parrhesiastic salvation, the subject finds itself in relation to his/her truth. 
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The subject finds him/herself saved insofar as s/he is truthful. And this 
truth is not neutral, but it also carries a political effect. Parrhesia is in fact 
an act of government. How can this happen? Parrhesia is risky for the 
dispositive in which it occurs, because it undermines the network of 
knowledge-power sanctioned by the same dispositive. Parrhesia is an 
emergency of the truth, a new fact that brings to light the possibility of 
the existence of a different and new dispositive. The tell-the-truth of 
Plato and Diogenes brings the possibility of a different dispositive to 
light that no longer makes the relationship sovereign-subject function, at 
least not for the moment. Parrhesia is a radical form of self-care, in which 
the relationship with others is deeply affected by the breakdown of the 
dispositive. 
Foucault says: ‘it is a way of telling the truth that lays one open to a risk 
by the very fact that one tells the truth’ (Foucault 2011, 66). Therefore at 
the end of parrhesia there is freedom, the substance of ethos. Parrhesia is 
the particular process of subjectivity that radically involves the freedom 
of the subject. How is the subject made free by the parrhesiastic act? One 
obtains freedom through the power to overthrow the dispositive. Rovatti 
summarises the Foucauldian notion of freedom 
Freedom means: the practice to go out of ourselves, the 
alteration of our condition of subjects stuck in the identitary 
dispositives; the enlargement of the horizons of habit, but also 
a certain kind of surplus of the self; the assumption of a risk of 
exposure, without safety net. (Rovatti 2008, 222 [my 
translation])   
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 Parrhesia can be found in all of these elements. The parrhesia is in fact a 
real exit from the self, as the truth of the statement makes the truth of the 
subject, and not vice versa. Secondly, as seen above, parrhesia is an 
instrument that undermines the identity generated by dispositives, in the 
sense of networks of relationships that establish what the subject is. By 
breaking the dispositive, parrhesia triggers ipso facto a process of de-
subjectivation, for which the subject must no longer be defined by the 
identitary dispositives that the same process undermines. Third, there can 
be no parrhesia without risk of exposure, with a safety net. As noted by 
Foucault in a quotation above, parrhesia opens an entirely new situation 
that implies the absence of a safety net—in the form of a dispositive 
previously established—that can guarantee the parrhesiast the absence of 
risk. Parrhesia operates as exposure to an entirely new situation: 
‘Parrhesia would function proleptically within an aesthetics of existence 
to modify existing relations of power and to imaginatively construct 
moral selves on social configurations’ (Simpson 2012, 100). 
Is parrhesia possible on social networks? The answer is no. There are 
some attempts to propose a “free” way to behave on social networks, so 
as to be free agents. For example, Lanier proposes a list of possible 
curious escape strategies from the domination of the dispositives in order 
to have room for freedom on social media: do not post anonymously; use 
a personal voice as much as possible instead of collective systems such 
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as wikis; create an original website from the coding, instead of using 
templates created by others; post and blog something only after careful 
reflection, and not be led by the immediacy of thought (Lanier 2011). 
However, this list of good intentions does not address the extent of the 
power of networks. Lanier definitely proposes a series of performative 
actions, but they function only within predetermined dispositives. With 
these kinds of how-to-be-free, one merely replaces a system of strong 
truth (that of the most commonly used platforms: WordPress, Wikipedia, 
Facebook, etc.) with other, perhaps less common, regimes of truth.99 The 
notion of parrhesia as explained above surely does not function in the 
manner defined by Lanier. Parrhesia implies the questioning of the 
dispositive itself. The parrhesiastic statement imposes a truth that goes 
against the dimension of existing knowledge and power. One does not 
achieve the status of free subject through the opportunity to be more 
“creative”. Creativity has nothing to do with freedom. Since freedom, 
insofar as it is the basis of any possible ethics, is a practice that involves 
a political risk by the questioning of the dispositive, every practice that 
does not question the dispositive—and then at the same time causes a 
radical reversal of the subject—cannot be established as free. 
                                                 
99
 It is remarkable that these lists suggest a conception of freedom that is very close to 
the freedom of press, which, however, has little to do with the ontological dimension of 
freedom that one is dealing with here. Freedom suggested by Lanier is simply a 
remediation in the digital world of the democratic principles of freedom of press 
operating in mass communication. 
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In this sense, accountability cannot possibly be parrhesiastic. Parrhesia 
questions the same scene of address, in which the roles of the questioner 
and the respondent are predefined. And not a single one of the 
characteristics outlined in the definition of accountability is consistent 
with the parrhesiastic practice. Parrhesia can be given only out of 
accountability, which essentially rejects the parrhesiastic practice. In fact, 
following the aforementioned categorisation of accountability in chapter 
one, it can be noted: 
a) Both share a dimension of process. 
b) The contract present in accountability is sometimes binding; but, even 
if there is also a “contract” in parrhesia, the truth-telling as such acts 
outside of any contract. 
c) Both share an active subject. 
d) A key difference is that in accountability the subject is bound to give 
an account of his/her work, while in parrhesia the subject spontaneously 
chooses to tell his/her own truth. 
e) The account in the parrhesiastic act must not adhere to any specific 
format, having the shape of the truth-telling, while in the accountability 
the account should be isomorph with the discursive formation of 
reference. 
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f) The domain of reference within which accountability is made is 
distorted by parrhesia. 
g) Both instruments share verbal expression. 
h) They both share a recipient. 
i) But in the accountability the recipient has the role of verifying the 
account, according to an adequatio of the truth of the account with 
external elements of comparison. In parrhesia instead a new truth is 
brought to the stage, a truth that cannot—in his capacity of urgency—be 
compared to anything. 
j) Sanction is included in accountability, while parrhesia functions 
inversely: parrhesia intends to topple the regimes of truth and 
knowledge-power relations that require sanction, in a manner that they 
are not included within the penalised dispositive. 
 Thus in digital accountability the subject faces a system of dispositives 
to work for them, not to subvert them. The risk is even lower in the 
digital community because the subject can enjoy a safety net through the 
absence of the body.100 While the parrhesiastic exercise of Plato or 
Diogenes, according to tradition, completely lacked a safety net and put 
the body of the subject at risk, the body of the subject is far away in 
                                                 
100
 Since the publication of History of Madness, a connection is established between 
Foucault’s production and Deleuze’s and Guattari’s. For instance, the notion of 
parrhesia could be read within the context of schizo-politics. About reciprocal 
influences between the French writers in the field of politics, see Penfield (2014). 
 173 
 
digital accountability, hidden by the mediation of the screen and the 
keyboard. Not even an iconic accountability could be comparable to 
parrhesia, as only the representation of the body is manifested, instead of 
the body itself.  
But the radical difference between parrhesia and digital accountability is 
found in the concept of emergency that appears in parrhesia. As stated 
above, parrhesia is the emergence of a truth, the truth of the subject, 
which aims to undermine the regime of truth of the dispositive where the 
parrhesia is placed. But the media act as powerful producers of 
homologation of the otherness. All dispositives share this activity of 
homologation, which first intends to keep them safe and, for this reason, 
is resistant to environmental perturbations. But the media operate in a 
symbolic sphere that also relates to semantics and are thus powerful 
factors of homologation, in which a key element is the reduction of the 
otherness to sameness (Kirchmayr 2010, 96). The emergence of a 
parrhesiastic moment, a disruption that calls into question the existence 
of the medium itself, is not reducible to homologation. For this, the 
media operate to the exclusion of the uncanny subject by deleting his/her 
account. One who does not abide by the terms of service is excluded 
from the community. Paradoxically enough, the result is that the only 
parrhesiastic accountability possible on social networks is the elimination 
of the condition for which accountability is possible: the existence of the 
account. 
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In conclusion, it may be outlined that the accountable subject cannot be 
free. Surely social networks can ensure man’s emergence from the 
obscurity of the crowd (Kirchmayr, 2010, 94). Indices of charisma 
(O’Neil 2010, 49) operating within free networks scales (Barabasi 2014) 
can measure the subject’s will to power and his/her rank within the 
network, and can also make someone accountable, but definitely not a 
free subject. When the possibility of becoming-other offered by the 
digital world was sensed, the possibility of being free has assumed the 
mode of disembodiment, which the next section discusses in detail. 
 
3.3 The Disembodied Subject 
The third figure that the first hermeneutics of the subject aims to criticise 
is the disembodied subject. Katherine Hayles’ understanding of the 
reconstruction of the history of cybernetics, as outlined in How we 
Became Posthuman (Hayles 1999), will prove fundamental to the notion 
of disembodiment expressed in the pages that follow.  
The starting point is Norbert Wiener’s book Cybernetics or Control and 
Communication in the Animal and Machine (1948). In this text Wiener 
provides the first popular definition of cybernetics: ‘Cybernetics is the 
scientific study of control and communication in the animal and the 
machine’. Wiener advances the future organisation of society based on a 
new matter: information. Cybernetics is applied to the analysis of 
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systems involved in a closed loop signal with the environment. In this 
loop, an action by the system causes some change in its environment. 
The environment reacts, and that change is fed to the system via 
information. This enables the system to change its behaviour: an 
operation commonly called feedback. When the system reacts to the 
feedback with a new action, a feedback loop is created. In this kind of 
system, entropy is a threat that must be fought. According to this 
definition of cybernetics, which also applies to animals, humans are 
primarily information-processing entities who are essentially similar to 
intelligent machines. 
Shannon was the first to propose a complete overview of information 
theory in the seminal text The Mathematical Theory of Communication 
(Shannon and Weaver 1975). This key reference in cybernetic theory 
defined information as a pattern, because, firstly, it was difficult to 
measure meaning and its effects. Secondly, abstracting information from 
a material base meant that information could become unaffected by 
changes of the context. Finally, information can be formalised as a 
mathematical function, ‘Shannon was able to develop theorems, powerful 
in their generality, that hold true regardless of the medium in which the 
information is instantiated’ (Hayles 1999, 19). According to Hayles, this 
definition operated by Shannon ‘of a possible decontextualized 
construction of information, has important ideological implications, 
including an Anglo-American ethnocentrism that regards digital 
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information as more important than more context-bound analog 
information’ (19). 
Homeostasis comprises a central concept of the period that we refer to as 
the first wave of cybernetics, which took place between 1945 and 1960. 
Traditionally, homeostasis had been understood as the ability of living 
organisms to maintain steady states when they buffeted by fickle 
environments. Cybernetics extends this concept to machines. Like 
animals, machines can maintain homeostasis using feedback loops that 
had long been exploited to increase to the stability of mechanical 
systems. The conjunction between homeostasis and information occurs 
when the feedback loop is seen as a flow of information. Cybernetics was 
born when nineteenth-century control theory merged with the nascent 
theory of information. In cybernetic theory control and information are 
closely associated to ensure homeostasis. In other words, the system must 
be preserved. Homeostasis is the state in which the system is preserved 
and its operating mechanisms are based on feedback loops that can be 
translated into information. It follows that information becomes the main 
tool to ensure control of the system. 
In the second wave of cybernetics, from 1960 to 1980, the focus shifts 
from homeostasis to reflexivity: ‘Reflexivity entered cybernetics 
primarily through discussions about the observer’ (Hayles 1999, 9). 
While ‘first-wave cybernetics followed traditional scientific protocols in 
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its placement of observers outside of the system they observe’ (9), the 
objectivist view propelled by the reflexivity of second wave cybernetics 
sees information flowing from the system to the observers, but feedback 
can also loop through the observers, drawing them in to become part of 
the system being observed. The second wave reached its mature phase 
with the publication of Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela’s 
Autopoiesis and Cognition: the Realization of the Living (1980): 
‘Building on Maturana’s work on reflexivity in sensory processing and 
Varela’s examination of the dynamics of autonomous biological systems, 
the two authors expanded the reflexive turn into a fully articulated 
epistemology that sees the world as a set of informationally closed 
systems’ (Hayles 1999, 10). Organisms respond to their environment in 
ways determined by their internal self-organisation. Their one and only 
goal is to continually produce and reproduce the organisation that defines 
them as systems. Thus the centre of interest for autopoiesis shifts from 
the cybernetics of the observed system to the cybernetics of the 
observer.101 
The third wave of cybernetics has been taking place since the 1980s. 
Reflexivity is replaced by virtuality. In virtuality one has the cultural 
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 In the famous opening pages of Autopoiesis and Cognition: the Realization of the 
Living, Maturana and Varela stated: ‘3.It is an attribute of the observer to be able to 
interact independently with the observed entity and with its relations; for him both are 
units of interaction (entities). (…) 4. For the observer an entity is an entity when he can 
describe it. (…) Accordingly, the observer can describe an entity only if there is at least 
one other entity from which he can distinguish it and with which he can observe it to 
interact or relate’ (Maturana and Varela 1980, 8). 
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perception that information patterns interpenetrate material objects, and 
‘the definition plays off the duality at the heart of the condition of 
virtuality—materiality on the one hand, and information on the other’ 
Hayles 1999, 14). The perception of virtuality facilitates the development 
of virtual technologies that reinforce perception: ‘Hence the definition’s 
strategic quality, strategic because it seeks to connect virtual technologies 
with the sense that flows of information interpenetrate all material 
objects, from DNA code to the global reach of the World Wide Web 
(14).  
We ultimately find in cybernetics that information is distributed in the 
material world.102 One hears behind cybernetics a strong ontology that 
implies both the material (the hardware), and information (the software), 
as if the vision of the cybernetic remedies an old dualism already present 
in Plato, Aristotle and Descartes, to mention only a few.103 The 
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 Till the disturbing theories advanced by Raymond Kurzweil (1999) or Hans Moravec  
(1998), that information can be detached from any material substrate (including human 
brain) to be stored on a selected different medium. It would be easy to confine their 
vision to a dystopian science fiction; but, as Barbrook has keenly pointed out, the dream 
of science fiction is not innocent: ‘Contemporary reality is the beta version of a science 
fiction dream: the imaginary future’ (Barbrook 2007, 9). 
103
 One could of course also analyse the duality of matter-information from another 
point of view, viewing it as an invasion of bodies in the networked world. See, for 
example, Caronia: ‘We could say that to the processes of replication of the body and of 
the invasion of the body, virtual technologies are beginning to support a third process, 
the dissemination of the body in the networks and virtual spaces, immaterial, of digital 
machines. And the disseminated body is intended to alter and threaten a basic relation, 
which had held more or less unchanged for tens of thousands of years, the relationship 
between body and identity’ (Caronia 1996, 101 [my translation]). This is not the place 
to explore all the implications that this discourse provides. Surely there is much naivete 
in accepting an ontology dual-material information. On the other hand, however, there 
is no doubt that the digital artefact operates in a dizzying manner in the human world. 
As Caronia also notes: ‘Various reflections on the media landscape are thus found in the 
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disembodied subject is therefore at the end of this path. In a general 
cultural sense, the disembodied subject is the one who can live the pure 
virtuality of information, without the need for anchoring to a material 
substrate. In the gap between the virtuality of information and the 
heaviness of the subject, the disembodied subject thinks s/he inhabits 
infinite spaces of freedom, which are created by the virtual ontology of 
the information in which the disembodied subject lives. 
As acutely identified by Ascott, the disembodied entity exemplifies a 
perpetual will to power. Based on a confusion between a possible 
liberation from matter and a liberation from all dispositives, the 
disembodied subject explores virtuality to test his/hers will to power: ‘To 
continue in Foucault’s Nietzschean vein, networking can be seen as an 
issue of the “will to truth”, since its form, spreading over the whole 
planet, invisible in a sense, promises to evade those systems set-up for 
the control and delimitation of discourse’ (Ascott and Shanken 2007, 
191).104 The disembodied subject would therefore be defined according 
                                                                                                                       
same years, within the popular narrative (or at least in its certain zones eccentric), to 
seize a point of crisis, an articulation of the imaginary, in the figure of the interior of the 
body (and especially of the nervous system) that is exchanged and mingles with the 
outside, with the reality perceived by our senses. It is all too obvious that Dick and 
Ballard want to build a metaphor, perhaps a bit insistent, almost “literalized” (...) of the 
relationship of exchange that the human being establishes with the world, of all the 
mental representations that s/he makes and modifications that imposes on it by its action 
on the environment. And they tell us that this exchange relationship is jamming, that 
there is perhaps a process of flooding, that they are not responsible for this hypertrophy 
of the imagination, great writers, but a reality whose criteria for defining and building 
are changing, perhaps too fast’ (Caronia 2012, 13-14 [my translation]). 
104
 Some other premises of the digital world would find the same foundation: 
‘Networking (...) leads to the amplification of thought, enrichment of the imagination, 
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to almost divine prerogatives: spread across the planet, invisible and 
avoiding systems for controlling and limiting speech. 
However, each one of these prerogatives is false. First, the spread of the 
subject across the entire planet is an illusion. It is certainly true that a 
page on the network is visible from all over the world, yet in strict 
computer terms it is a bit string that resides on a server in a specific place 
in the world. This alleged spread across the planet only takes place when 
the page is actually required all over the world at once. Since spreading 
across the planet is only a possible logical feature, its real existence is not 
so obvious. Second, disembodied does not mean invisible. Of course, 
there may be a form of untraceability that is not subject to panopticism, 
but panopticism is in the name of visibility as Bentham had already 
conceived it. Even if not physically visible, other forms of panopticism 
easily tap movement on the network. Even in the limit-condition of the 
exclusion of any type of materiality (for instance, the materiality of the 
body), however, the flow of information travels on the electronic matter 
that constitutes the substrate of the medial bits. It is thus impossible to 
imagine any form of escape from control. It is true that there are digital 
spaces that lie outside of control (for example, the darknets accessible via 
Tor). However, in the first place, all spaces are here intended to be 
territorialised by the control exerted by dispositives. Secondly, 
                                                                                                                       
both broader and deeper memory, and the extension of human senses’ (Ascott and 
Shanken 2007, 222). 
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anonymity is the price one has to pay to access these areas—and 
anonymity is not the urgency of the disembodied subject, whose desire is 
not the negation of identity, but the possibility to freely explore it. Lastly, 
one cannot understand how anyone could act outside of the boundary of 
discourse. Since it is impossible to act outside of dispositives, and each 
dispositive connects with a particular discursive formation, it follows that 
the abolition of the boundaries of discourse functions as a removal of 
language itself. Secondly, since everything is part of the digital matrix 
and language, one does not understand how to function without language, 
if not via elimination of the interface itself. 
As summarised by Ascott, the disembodied entity emerges from a human 
desire, too human, to exit oneself: ‘Computer networking, in short, 
responds to our deep psychological desire for transcendence—to reach 
the immaterial, the spiritual—the wish to be out of body, out of mind, to 
exceed the limitations of time and space, a kind of biotechnological 
technology’ (Ascott and Shanken 2007, 223). 
But this escape from limitations can be intimately correlated with the 
dimension of the body. The avatarism led by the virtuality of digital 
technology is merely the remediation of an old practice, for which the 
body is the utopian place par excellence. As Foucault argues:  
In any case, one thing is certain: that the human body is the 
principal actor in all utopias. After all, isn’t one of the oldest 
utopias about which men have told themselves stories the 
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dream of an immense and inordinate body that could devour 
space and master the world? This is the old utopia of giants 
that one finds as the heart of so many legends in Europe, in 
Africa, in Oceania, in Asia—this old legend that for so long 
fed the Western imagination, from Prometheus to Gulliver. 
The body is also a great utopian actor when it comes to 
masks, makeup and tattoos. To wear a mask, to put on 
makeup, to tattoo oneself, is not exactly (as one might 
imagine) to acquire an other body, only a bit more beautiful, 
better decorated, more easily recognizable. To tattoo oneself, 
to put on a makeup or a mask, is probably something else: It 
is to place the body in communication with secret powers and 
invisible forces. The mask, the tattooed sign, the face-paint 
lay upon the body an entire language, an entire language that 
is ciphered, secret, sacred, which calls upon this body the 
violence of the God, the silent power of the Sacred, or the 
liveliness of Desire. The mask, the tattoo, the make-up: They 
place the body into an other space. They usher it into a place 
that does not take place in the world directly. They make of 
this body a fragment of imaginary space, which will 
communicate with the universe of divinities, or with the 
universe of the other, where one will be taken by the gods, or 
taken by the person one has just seduced. (Foucault 2006, 
231-232) 
 
Even in avatarism one can find the matter of the mask, the sign and 
make-up. But, as shown by Foucault, this utopia of the avatar is already a 
utopia of the body, which extends back to the origin of the Homo 
sapiens. The promise of escape the avatar offers simultaneously 
remediates the promise of escape that the signification made on the body 
offered in the past. In both cases, there is the magic that allows getting in 
touch with invisible forces: irrational dimensions of the body and of the 
avatar, seeking a magical and unattainable utopia. 
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3.4 The Coherent Subject 
A final hypothesis aims to deconstruct the coherent subject: a subject 
who offers a coherent account of him/herself. The coherent account can 
be understood as the subject’s willingness to give an account (or 
representation) of him/herself perfectly consistent in all its 
manifestations. The coherent account is one of the mantras of improbable 
contemporary disciplines such as personal branding, for which visibility 
and consistent representation of itself can be synonymous. To validate 
the coherent account’s possibility of existing, it’s necessary to postulate a 
completely substantialised subject, hypostatised and objectified. This 
subject is—as said many times in this argument—impossible to theorise 
because the processes of subjectivation always happens in a dimension of 
chaotic becoming. Furthermore, the coherent account seems to be a bond 
that is at once arbitrary and bound to the substantialised subject, thus 
going against any possibility of change and, therefore, of freedom. 
A more detailed analysis will be proposed in the pages that follow to 
demonstrate the impossibility of coherent accounting, for it is first 
necessary to return to the scene of address described by Butler. The first 
argument Butler put forward concerns the fictional nature of any 
narrative:  
Fictional narration in general requires no referent to work as 
narrative, and we might say that the irrecoverability and 
foreclosure of the referent is the very condition of possibility 
for an account of myself, if that account is to take narrative 
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form. The irrecoverability of an original referent does not 
destroy narrative; it produces it ‘‘in a fictional direction,’’ as 
Lacan would say. So to be more precise, I would have to say 
that I can tell the story of my origin and I can even tell it 
again and again, in several ways. But the story of my origin I 
tell is not one for which I am accountable, and it cannot 
establish my accountability. At least, let’s hope not, since, 
over wine usually, I tell it in various ways, and the accounts 
are not always consistent with one another. (Butler 2005, 37)  
 
This kind of accounting does not need any kind of referent. Indeed, it is 
the foreclosure of the referent, the condition of possibility of the 
accounting. Then one should consider that the scene of address is a 
physical one. This physical scene is present both in the Butler’s case (the 
hypothesis that accountability has given birth to the question: Was it you? 
before which the subject is asked to be accountable) and in the 
assumption of Christian confession made by this dissertation, for which 
the subject has to answer the question Who am I? And then, as claimed 
by Butler:  
There is a bodily referent here, a condition of me that I can 
point to, but that I cannot narrate precisely, even though there 
are no doubt stories about where my body went and what it 
did and did not do. The stories do not capture the body to 
which they refer. Even the history of this body is not fully 
narratable. To be a body is, in some sense, to be deprived of 
having a full recollection of one’s life. There is a history to 
my body of which I can have no recollection. (Butler 2005, 
38)  
 
This short passage deserves a thorough analysis. In the moment in which 
the subject enters the scene of address, there is undoubtedly the presence 
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of a bodily referent. This body is something that can be shown (here and 
now, this is obvious), but according to Butler it cannot be precisely 
accounted. So the scene of address requires a speaking subject, and the 
speaking subject requires a body, his/her own. However, the relationship 
between the account given by the subject and the subject’s body is an 
ambiguous relationship, partial and necessary at the same time. 
Following Jacques Lacan, Butler reaffirms the gap between the identity 
and the body when she says that the account cannot capture the body, due 
to the foreclosure of the body. It results that one cannot give a definite 
account about the body itself, thus dropping the subject from the body. 
Although Butler’s discourse effectively claims that the body, subject and 
account are a problematic connection, in nonetheless lacks clarity in its 
explanation of this link; the very concept of foreclosure of the referent as 
a condition of possibility for the existence of the account is furthermore 
quite perplexing. Therefore, to resolve these problems—due to the 
uncertain connection between body, subject and account—the following 
pages will explore this connection through the lens offered by the 
phenomenological tradition, namely from Husserl’s text The Crisis of 
European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction 
to Phenomenological Philosophy (Husserl 1970). 
Husserl begins by distinguishing between two possible meanings of the 
word body, which he differentiates in the text through two different 
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German words: Körper (meaning a body in the geometric or physical 
sense) and Leib (referring to the body of a person or animal). Leib should 
be understood as “living body” (Leib is related to Leben), while Körper 
is considered as “physical body” (from a note of the translator, in Husserl 
1970, 50). Husserl makes a fundamental distinction through the use of 
these two terms. On the one hand the Körper is the pure biological 
physiological-fact,105 and as such it can be subjected to the analysis of 
biophysical sciences, and thus be subjected to a scientific accounting 
based on physiological, medical, chemical and physical parameters. This 
accounting, however, does not exhaust the body. Indeed, it allows it to 
isolate a dimension of the body, the scientific one, so to speak, that has 
its mode of narration rooted within scientific discourse. Furthermore the 
distinction between Körper and Leib also has another result: to isolate 
scientific discourse itself. Through making this distinction, Husserl not 
only isolates Körper but also the scientific discourse that involves the 
Körper.106 
                                                 
105
 ‘The biophysical sciences, those which at first concentrate, in a one-sided fashion, 
purely on what pertains to the physical body, still find it necessary to begin by grasping 
the concrete entities descriptively, analyzing and classifying them intuitively; but the 
physicalistic view of nature makes it obvious that a further-developed physics would in 
the end “explain” all these concrete entities in a physicalistically rational way. Thus the 
flourishing of the biophysical descriptive sciences, especially in view of their occasional 
use of knowledge taken from physics, is considered a success of the scientific method, 
always interpreted in the sense of physics’(Husserl 1970, 63). 
106
 It’s worth remembering that the ultimate goal of The Crisis of European Sciences 
and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy 
is to reduce the pervasiveness of science, and in the end to prove the ethical superiority 
of pre-categorical (the world of life) as opposed to categorical (the world of science), 
whose reversal in favour of science, according to the author, had led to the downfall of 
Europe. 
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Before the domain of reason and its necessary consequence, scientific 
discourse, Husserl claims the need to return to sensibility, a sensibility 
that nevertheless has to find a new relationship with the body.107 As 
Husserl says:  
Thus sensibility, the ego’s active functioning of the living 
body or the bodily organs, belongs in a fundamental, essential 
way to all experience of bodies. It proceeds in consciousness 
not as a mere series of body—appearances, as if these in 
themselves, through themselves alone and their coalescences, 
were appearance of bodies; rather, they are such in 
consciousness only in combination with the kinaesthetically 
functioning living body  [Leiblichkeit], the ego functioning 
here in a peculiar sort of activity and habituality.  (Husserl 
1970, 106–107)  
 
Sensitivity is thus a series of appearances of other bodies that manifest in 
consciousness, as if it were possible to distinguish a blank canvas 
(consciousness) on which the appearances of other bodies are inscribed 
(phenomena) according to obscure mechanisms. Rather, the presence of 
bodies in consciousness comes from the close relationship between the 
sensitivity that intentionally opens the body to the world and the body 
                                                 
107
 To a critical analysis was also conducted the empiricism and its greatest author, 
David Hume, which still is one of the noble representatives of phenomenology. Hume 
had correctly placed the premise (the superiority of sensitivity), but he had taken the 
wrong consequences (that every story was fictitious). As Husserl says: ‘Hume had 
shown that we naively read causality into this world and think that we grasp necessary 
succession in intuition.  The same is true of everything that makes the body of the 
everyday surrounding world into an identical thing with identical properties, relations, 
etc. (and Hume had in fact worked this out in detail in the Treatise, which was unknown 
to Kant). Data and complexes of data come and go, but the thing, presumed to be simply 
experienced sensibly, is not something sensible which persists through this alteration. 
The sensationalist thus declares it to be a fiction’ (Husserl 1970, 93).  The same 
empirical approach seems to also be found in Butler. 
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itself as a living body that operates in the world. In this way Husserl 
opens the possibility of phenomenology:  
Thus, purely in terms of perception, physical body and living  
body [Körper und Leib] are essentially different; living body,  
that is, [understood] as the only one which is actually given 
[to  me as such] in perception: my own living body. How the 
consciousness  originates through which my living body 
nevertheless  acquires the ontic validity of one physical body 
among others,  and how, on the other hand, certain physical 
bodies in my  perceptual field come to count as living bodies, 
living bodies of  “alien” ego-subjects. (Husserl 1970, 107)  
 
In the phenomenological foundation the ego is first and foremost a body 
open to the world that, as a living body, enters into a cognitive relation 
with other beings in the world. Based on the intentionality of these 
cognitive relationships, which simultaneously comprises maximum 
realism and maximum idealism, the possibility emerges for a mode of 
describing the world that is not scientific (the dimension that reduces the 
body to Körper), but rather phenomenological. This phenomenological 
description grounds its constitution in the pre-categorical world of the 
body, before the intervention of the rationalising domain of logic. 
According to Husserl, it is indeed the existence of the pre-categorical (or 
the bodies being in the world) that gives the possibility of existence of 
scientific description, which is an abstraction of the second level from 
pre-categorical.108 
                                                 
108
 Naturally the prevalence of the body is not exclusive within phenomenology. Even 
Foucault underlines the importance of the role of the body in constituting subjects, and 
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As Husserl says, one can make a true, sensitive and evidence-based 
discourse that isn’t based on scientific abstraction:  
Even though the human living body is counted among the 
physical bodies, it is still “living”—“my physical body”, 
which I “move,” in and  through which I “hold sway”, which 
I “animate”. If one fails to  consider these matters—which 
soon become quite extensive— thoroughly, and actually 
without prejudice, one has not grasped  at all what is of a 
soul's own essence as such (the word “soul” being understood 
here not at all metaphysically but rather in the  sense of the 
original givenness of the psychic in the life-world);  and thus 
one has also failed to grasp the genuine ultimate  substrate for 
a science of “souls”. (Husserl 1970, 212) 
 
One can draw conclusions about the gaps in Butler’s analysis from this 
Husserlian discourse. First of all, Husserl offers a dual account of the 
body. The first account concerns the Körper, and it is subjected to the 
domain of scientific discourse. Through it, an objective and scientific 
account of the body, based purely on bio-physiological elements, can be 
provided. However, the second kind of account seems to be the 
interesting one: the account of the body and the account through the 
body. The body, in the Husserlian sense of the Leib, is a remnant of the 
infinite horizon of sense. It enjoys this condition because the kinaesthetic 
activity of the body in the world of life is a continuous generator of new 
experiences. These experiences take place in terms of pre-categorical 
sensitivity before being transferred in the form of a rationalising 
                                                                                                                       
his reflection about the care of the self involves deeply the dimension of the body, for 
instance in the words meleton and gymnesthai that appears several time in the 
Foucauldian production (Foucault 2005, 381). 
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scientific discourse (that is nonetheless unnecessary). These experiences 
can give birth to a scientific description: the account in the 
phenomenological sense. However, as mentioned above, the body is an 
infinite horizon of sense, and it is in two directions. First, since the body 
as Leib is part of the pre-categorical world, it essentially offers a 
fundamental remnant of that which can always be analysed through a 
phenomenological description. In other words, the body and the world of 
sensations offer, by virtue of their pre-categorical status, the continual 
possibility of being deepened by phenomenological description. 
Secondly, the body is alive in the world as a kinaesthetic body always 
open to new experiences. This aspect subjects the body to a regime of 
becoming for which the phenomenological description will always be 
partial. However, this is not the incompleteness that Butler mentions, 
quoted above, which results in the fictionality of the accounting. It is a 
bias that is based on the fact that the evidence offered by the body will 
always be contingent, limited and perfectible. When the subject accounts 
his/herself, s/he operates not according to a kind of fictionality, but 
according to evidence derived from a horizon of infinite sense. The body 
always retains an opaque and increasable dimension, which nevertheless 
can be made evident and accounted as true. 
The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: 
An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy has made a great 
impact since Husserl’s death in 1938. The text influenced many authors, 
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most prominently Maurice Merleau-Ponty who introduced a new concept 
of perception with his analysis of the subject’s primordial contact with 
the world. According to Merleau-Ponty, perception is mediation operated 
by the body, always active, which involves the body in the world before 
it is symbolically represented: ‘My field of perception is constantly filled 
with a play of colours, noises and fleeting tactile sensations which I 
cannot relate precisely to the context of my clearly perceived world, yet 
which I nevertheless immediately “place” in the world, without ever 
confusing them with my daydreams’ (Merleau-Ponty 2013).  It follows 
that perception is always a form of action, and with it intentionality, 
which should not be confined to consciousness (as theorised by Husserl) 
as it also affects the body.: ‘Consciousness is being-towards-the-thing 
through the intermediary of the body’ (138-9). Furthermore, 
consciousness does not concern language, because the body has its own 
world and includes it without the need of the objectifying function 
operated by language. Merleau-Ponty opens up the possibility of a pre-
symbolising understanding of the world. This way of understanding the 
world is explained by the analysis of the figure of Cézanne: 
Merleau-Ponty considers Cézanne the paradigmatic example 
of a phenomenologist working with paint rather than words. 
Cézanne’s struggle to express what exists while remaining 
faithful to the phenomena was no different from that of the 
phenomenological philosopher. Both tried to overcome the 
traditional dichotomy between, on the one hand, the 
intellectualist’s prioritizing of the mind as, for instance, in 
classical line drawings with linear perspective, and, on the 
other, the empiricist’s privileging of the senses, as with the 
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impressionists’ obsessive attention to the eye’s reception of 
light and color. What Merleau-Ponty recognizes in Cézanne 
is a similar fascination with the realm where the self and the 
world fuse in an embodied encounter. When he quotes 
Cézanne as saying: “the landscape thinks itself in me, and I 
am its consciousness,” it is easy to see how this resonates 
with his own emphasis on the unity of the subject and the 
object. (Gaut and McIver Lopes 2011, 169) 
 
Merleau-Ponty opens even the possibility of an account of oneself that is 
independent from verbalisation, and may take other forms. The iconic 
offers an extension of the possibilities of phenomenological description, 
which are rooted in the body out of the necessity of verbal language. One 
can see here the possibility of a purely iconic accountability. This mode 
of accountability has already been seen at work in the digital world, 
through all forms of self-expressions that proceed outside of verbal 
language. As with verbal description, iconic accountability also retains 
the horizon of infinite sense offered by the body, according to the plans 
explained above, as a condition of possibility of the existence of a visual 
accountability. The inexhaustibility of perception guarantees the 
constitutive opacity of visual storytelling. If there cannot be 
subjectivation without discourse, the assumption for the existence of 
discourse is the presence of an opaque body, which can become an 
account through dispositives. 
Once the issue of the body’s opacity as a horizon of infinite sense that 
one draws upon in the accounting of his/herself has been established, it 
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must be emphasised that the scene of address requires the here and now 
of a “you”, which begs the question of to whom the account is addressed:  
At this point the story that I tell, one that may even have a 
certain necessity, cannot assume that its referent adequately 
takes narrative form, since the exposure I seek to narrate is 
also the precondition of that narration, a facticity, as it were, 
that cannot yield to narrative form. And if I tell the story to a 
‘‘you’’, that other is implied not only as an internal feature of 
the narrative but also as an irreducibly exterior condition and 
trajectory of the mode of address. (Butler 2005, 38) 
 
In this case, the impossibility of a coherent accounting is invalidated 
because giving an account of oneself always presupposes a here and now 
of the scene of address, which in turn presupposes a microphysical 
dimension of power. Whatever the roles of the I and the questioner are, 
the scene is always addressed as a dispositive, which therefore calls out 
the dimension of power-knowledge and specific regimes of truth. Given 
this singularity of the scene of address, the constitutive incompleteness of 
every account of oneself follows:  
My account of myself is partial, haunted by that for which I 
can devise no definitive story. I cannot explain exactly why I 
have emerged in this way, and my efforts at narrative 
reconstruction are always undergoing revision. There is that 
in me and of me for which I can give no account (Butler 
2005, 40).  
 
Firstly, there is the constitutive incompleteness of the self—that cannot 
under any circumstances lead to a definitive account of oneself. Why is a 
definite account of oneself not possible? According to Butler, for a 
 194 
 
variety of reasons: because the emergency of the self is sometimes 
inexplicable; because the narrative reconstruction of the self is always 
under continuous review; because there are elements of the self for which 
no account can be provided. However, the fact that one cannot be 
completely consistent in accounting him/herself does not mean that one 
is not accountable. As Butler says:  
But does this mean that I am not, in the moral sense, 
accountable for who I am and for what I do? If I find that, 
despite my best efforts, a certain opacity persists and I cannot 
make myself fully accountable to you, is this ethical failure? 
Or is it a failure that gives rise to another ethical disposition 
in the place of a full and satisfying notion of narrative 
accountability? Is there in this affirmation of partial 
transparency a possibility for acknowledging a relationality 
that binds me more deeply to language and to you than I 
previously knew? And is the relationality that conditions and 
blinds this ‘‘self ’’ not, precisely, an indispensable resource 
for ethics? (Butler 2005, 40)  
 
This dense passage pertinently explains why the constitutive opacity of 
the self, which always results in an incomplete account, is a fundamental 
condition for accountability. If the self were not substantially opaque, it 
would follow that it would ab initio and definitely be always 
accountable, because it is always and already translated into discursive 
regimes. This pure intelligibility of the body would mean a pure 
accountability, and a pure accountability would result in a regime of 
truth, fixed and permanent. Through it the world would be translatable, 
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purely and simply, made completely and permanently accountable and, 
therefore, completely subjugated.  
A condition that looks like the one narrated by Aldous Huxley in Brave 
New World, in which in a perfectly organised and completely visible 
world, opacity cannot have place (Huxley 2010). 
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4 The Second Hermeneutics of the Subject 
 
When outlining his definition of the state of minority in the work An 
Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment? (2010), Immanuel Kant 
provides rather curious examples: a book, a spiritual director and a doctor 
who prescribes a diet (narrated in Foucault 2011, 37). Foucault himself 
surmises that there is extensive literature about the arts de se conduire 
(Foucault 2014a, 29) in the contemporary world. Today, the requests 
advanced by dispositives have exponentially increased and the daily life 
of any person living in the Western world is heavily bombarded by 
messages that suggest modes of behaviour. If every dispositive offers a 
script to be followed, at least in how it influences behaviour, current 
dispositives generate a high prescriptive regime. 
These prescriptions do not only arise in a performative mode (“you 
must”), but are also shaped through forms of narrative that emerge from 
the digital world’s capacity for data collection—data that is thus 
narrativised according to algorithmic systems. All new media objects, 
whether they are created from scratch or converted from analogic media 
sources, are composed of digital code and are numerical representations, 
thus all new media objects can be described formally (mathematically) 
and can also be subjected to algorithmic manipulation. It follows that all 
the media objects are programmable. 
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While the previous chapter investigated the first hermeneutics of the 
subject through the typologies of the unscreaming subject, the free 
subject, the disembodied subject and coherent subject, this chapter 
expands its scope to address a different form of narration of the subject, 
which will subsequently be called the second hermeneutics of the subject. 
This chapter will focus on the forms of self-narration in which the subject 
does not play a performative role, but rather are propelled by the 
feedback the digital machine produces in response to input by the 
subject. In this chapter, then, the relationship of the subject and 
dispositives shifts from what people do with digital dispositives to what 
media dispositives return to subjects.  
The chapter will commence with a description of Big Data, followed by a 
critique of Big Data departing from the notion of the database. A 
genealogy of Big Data will close the chapter, suggesting, following the 
related Foucaludian concept, that Big Data is a consequence of the 
discourse of the master.   
 
4.1 Big Data 
Big data is not a strictly scientific or technological definition, but rather a 
label that identifies a typically contemporary issue. Despite this, one can 
nonetheless seek to define the object. Big Data will be understood here as 
an informatics shift in retrieving, storing and processing data, for which 
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the traditional analytical approaches no longer suffice and the only useful 
means of interrogation are statistical inference. 
A key feature of Big Data is their volume.109 Although it doesn’t have a 
specific size ascribed to it, the sheer magnitude of Big Data reaches a 
number of bits never seen before. McAfee and Brynjolfsson state:  
As of 2012, about 2.5 exabytes of data are created each day, 
and that number is doubling every 40 months or so. More 
data cross the Internet every second than were stored in the 
entire Internet just 20 years ago. This gives companies an 
opportunity to work with many petabytes of data in a single 
data set—and not just from the Internet. For instance, it is 
estimated that Walmart collects more than 2.5 petabytes of 
data every hour from its customer transactions. A petabyte is 
one quadrillion bytes, or the equivalent of about 20 million 
filing cabinets’ worth of text. An exabyte is 1,000 times that 
amount, or one billion gigabytes (2012, 62).110 
 
Another feature of Big Data is the variety of data stored. It has a 
heterogeneous origin, and therefore one of the issues associated with it is 
how to build an appropriate taxonomy capable of adequately weighing 
different data.111 Big Data is not only a system of retrieving and storing 
                                                 
109
 From: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_data. 
110
 An Exabyte corresponds to 1018 bytes. Some other references have been found that 
argue that Big Data should be measured in zettabytes, or 1021 bytes. 
111
 A relevant example concerning the heterogeneity of the sources of Big Data is 
reported here: ‘Mobile phones, online shopping, social networks, electronic 
communication, GPS, and instrumented machinery all produce torrents of data as a by-
product of their ordinary operations. Each of us is now a walking data generator. The 
data available are often unstructured— not organized in a database—and unwieldy, but 
there’s a huge amount of signal in the noise, simply waiting to be released. Analytics 
brought rigorous techniques to decision making; big data is at once simpler and more 
powerful. As Google’s director of research, Peter Norvig, puts it: “We don’t have better 
algorithms. We just have more data”’ (McAfee and  Brynjolfsson 2012, 63). 
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data, but also of processing data. Speed is key here and measures both the 
generation and processing of data. Big Data is extremely volatile and 
variable, therefore one must employ a great deal of discretion when 
deciding what data to collect and how to store and process it. A 
characteristic effect of statistical inference is the analysis made upon bad 
data, namely: the correspondence between phenomena that are absolutely 
heterogeneous and unrelated. Data’s veracity must also be considered 
with regard to Big Data, meaning the possibility that data is correct and 
entertains a relationship defined with the material substrate from which it 
derives. An interference in the environment, in this case, may lead to 
retrieving bad data; in the system of Big Data it is therefore necessary 
that the “truth” of the data is evident. A final aspect concerning Big Data 
is the overall complexity of the system. If data exists in amounts never 
seen before—and moreover all of it is heterogeneous—it necessarily 
follows that the system related to it is required to be complex, to 
correctly represent the information that Big Data is believed to convey.112 
Big Data comprises huge amounts of data that are collected, stored and 
processed through digital technologies in order to obtain new insight 
about the state of the world. It is therefore natural that Big Data is a 
                                                 
112
 As boyd and Crawford note: ‘Big Data is notable not because of its size, but because 
of its relationality to other data. Due to efforts to aggregate and mine data, Big Data is 
fundamentally networked. Its value comes from the patterns that can be derived by 
making connections between pieces of data, about an individual, about individuals in 
relation to others, about groups of people, or simply about the structure of information 
itself’ (boyd and Crawford 2011, 2). 
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privileged territory for management. As IBM, a leader in the field of 
information technology, states:  
Big Data is changing the way people within organisations 
work together. It is creating a culture in which business and 
IT leaders must join forces to realise value from all data. 
Insights from Big Data can enable all employees to make 
better decisions—deepening customer engagement, 
optimising operations, preventing threats and fraud, and 
capitalising on new sources of revenue. (IBM Big Data—
What Is Big Data—United States).  
 
IBM’s statement makes the purpose of Big Data quite clear: it essentially 
comprises the provision of appropriate insight to make informed 
managerial decisions.113 Big Data is therefore not a neutral phenomenon, 
but is instead born with a precise goal: the territorialisation of data 
through increasingly complexifying informatic systems in order for data 
to be used for business. Big Data’s territory is, alongside with warfare 
                                                 
113
 As mentioned elsewhere, with a formula that correlates Big Data and management 
very clearly: ‘’You can’t manage what you don’t measure’. There’s much wisdom in 
that saying, which has been attributed to both W. Edwards Deming and Peter Drucker, 
and it explains why the recent explosion of digital data is so important. Simply put, 
because of Big Data, managers can measure, and hence know, radically more about 
their businesses, and directly translate that knowledge into improved decision making 
and performance’ (McAfee and Brynjolfsson 2012, 62). And, in a following passage, 
the power of Big Data in influencing the culture of management is further underlined: 
‘Executives interested in leading a big data transition can start with two simple 
techniques. First, they can get in the habit of asking, “What do the data say?” when 
faced with an important decision and following up with more-specific questions such as 
“Where did the data come from?,” “What kinds of analyses were conducted?,” and 
“How confident are we in the results?” (People will get the message quickly if 
executives develop this discipline.) Second, they can allow themselves to be overruled 
by the data; few things are more powerful for changing a decision-making culture than 
seeing a senior executive concede when data have disproved a hunch’ (66). 
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and healthcare, business,114 which the previously quoted paragraph 
underscores in its compelling illustration of the categorical divisions IBM 
makes within fields where Big Data can provide managers tools to make 
decisions. The breadth and quality of the data enables companies to 
better prevent fraud and threats, identify new opportunities for generating 
revenue and to optimise information. However, the first category can 
easily be associated with the discourse that this dissertation carries out: 
the deepening of customer engagement. From the outset, the customer’s 
engagement with business comprises a structural element of Big Data, 
thus functioning as a tool to foster the customer’s accountability to the 
business.  
Critical comments about Big Data have been raised for several years 
now, especially in relation to its emphasis on computer science and 
management with respect to this phenomenon. boyd and Crawford 
underline one of the first critical points regarding Big Data, which is 
epistemological in nature:  
                                                 
114
 Palantir (http://www.palantir.com/) is one of the biggest players in the world of Big 
Data. This is the exhaustive description of the company, provided by the financial 
platform Bloomberg, that well illustrates the huge range of human activities that Big 
Data can cover: “Palantir Technologies Inc. develops and builds data fusion platforms 
for public institutions, commercial enterprises, and non-profit organizations worldwide. 
The company offers Palantir Gotham, a platform that integrates, manages, secures, and 
analyzes enterprise data; and Palantir Metropolis, a platform that integrates, enriches, 
models, and analyzes quantitative data. It provides solutions in the areas of anti-fraud, 
capital market, case management, crisis response, cyber security, defense, disaster 
preparedness, disease response, healthcare delivery, insider threat, insurance analytics, 
intelligence, law enforcement, legal intelligence, pharmaceutical research and 
development, and custom aspects” (from: 
http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=43580005 
[italics are mine]). 
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Big Data tempts some researchers to believe that they can see 
everything at a 30,000-foot view. It is the kind of data that 
encourages the practice of apophenia: seeing patterns where 
none actually exist, simply because massive quantities of data 
can offer connections that radiate in all directions. Due to this, 
it is crucial to begin asking questions about the analytic 
assumptions, methodological frameworks, and underlying 
biases embedded in the Big Data phenomenon (2011, 2).  
 
The phenomenon of Big Data is known to generate reports that randomly 
correlate data curves from different sources, as if there is some sort 
interdependence between them, when, in reality, they are entirely 
independent. As emphasised by boyd and Crawford, the need for 
velocity—a  key feature of Big Data, as seen above—can lead to a 
misguided analysis based on unfounded assumptions, an inconsistent 
reference methodology and the discovery of non-existent influences.115 
However, if an epistemological risk is present in Big Data, the 
ideological risk is even greater. As boyd and Crawford outline:  
Speaking in praise of what he terms ‘The Petabyte Age’, Chris 
Anderson, Editor-in-Chief of Wired, writes: “This is a world 
where massive amounts of data and applied mathematics 
replace every other tool that might be brought to bear. Out 
with every theory of human behavior, from linguistics to 
sociology. Forget taxonomy, ontology and psychology. Who 
knows why people do what they do? The point is they do it, 
                                                 
115
 Big Data is also leading to a revision of the connection between algorithm and 
database. The standard hierarchic database seems to be obsolete at the moment of the 
writing of this dissertation (2015), so that new ways of managing data are nowadays 
explored. One of them is called “elastic databases”. The algorithm itself generates this 
kind of database, which is arranged in flexible clusters. No specific academic reference 
can be provided thus far about this topic; the above paragraph was derived from a 
private conversation with prof. Guido Tattoni, Head of the Department of Applied Arts 
at NABA Nuova Accademia di Belle Arti Milano, which took place on October 2015. 
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and we can track and measure it with unprecedented fidelity. 
With enough data, the numbers speak for themselves” (2011, 
4). 
 
Much of the narrative about Big Data is based reneging on the 
assumption that the number is a carrier of meaning in itself. While the 
question of whether the number has a semantic meaning or not can be 
debated, there is no doubt that the countability of things is a next step, 
rather than any other semantics. Unlike Anderson, this dissertation does 
not consider the possibility that numbers speak for themselves or convey 
an independent meaning. As boyd and Crawford subsequently argue:  
Do numbers speak for themselves? The answer, we think, is a 
resounding “no”. Significantly, Anderson’s sweeping 
dismissal of all other theories and disciplines is a tell: it 
reveals an arrogant undercurrent in many Big Data debates 
where all other forms of analysis can be sidelined by 
production lines of numbers, privileged as having a direct line 
to raw knowledge (4). 
 
boyd and Crawford go to the heart of the problem in the passage quoted 
above:116 Big Data (and in general, much of the informational approach) 
                                                 
116
 boyd and Crawford continue in two following paragraphs: ‘Big Data offers the 
humanistic disciplines a new way to claim the status of quantitative science and 
objective method. It makes many more social spaces quantifiable. In reality, working 
with Big Data is still subjective, and what it quantifies does not necessarily have a 
closer claim on objective truth—particularly when considering messages from social 
media sites. But there remains a mistaken belief that qualitative researchers are in the 
business of interpreting stories and quantitative researchers are in the business of 
producing facts. In this way, Big Data risks reinscribing established divisions in the 
long running debates about scientific method’ (4). They continue, ‘in the case of social 
media data, there is a “data cleaning” process: making decisions about what attributes 
and variables will be counted, and which will be ignored. This process is inherently 
subjective. As Bollier explains, as a large mass of raw information, Big Data is not self-
explanatory. And yet the specific methodologies for interpreting the data are open to all 
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considers itself to be a transcript of the quantitative world, and as such 
objective. That is, the narrative made of the numbers of Big Data would 
constitute the objective modelling of the raw matter of the world. On the 
contrary, like all narratives of the human world, Big Data is always 
relative. First, as shown by Foucault and repeatedly explained in the 
earlier parts of this dissertation, Big Data is epistemic. In other words, it 
belongs to the current epistemology of the contemporary era. If the data 
that is collected depends on a specific location, this data is still dependent 
on a cartography of the world related to that location, which precedes the 
collection of the data (Farinelli 2009). If the data relates to a 
physiological element such as blood pressure, a description of the human 
being that includes blood pressure must be previously given.117 In 
addition to this issue, the description provided by Big Data is based on 
notions such as information (which has its unit in numerical data coded 
                                                                                                                       
sorts of philosophical debate. Can the data represent an “objective truth” or is any 
interpretation necessarily biased by some subjective filter or the way that data is 
“cleaned”’? (5). 
117
 The notion of a robust encyclopaedia seems to be an integral element in the 
reflections about Big Data. This encyclopaedia that would be written objectively by 
measures; or, in other words, a neo-Cartesian conception of the world, that the world 
would be infinitely stable and reliable, so that a definite description of it, and then an 
encyclopedia that would be valid forever, can be provided. Since Big Data (usually) 
work, one is in front of the collapse of the semantics of the information into the 
pragmatic, for which the information is such that in the moment in which it works. The 
only variable in this encyclopedia would be the perpetuation of data mining. On the one 
hand, one would see a reflection of the process of ‘technical dominion of the world as a 
fulfillment of the identification of the being of things with the certainty that the I has 
about it’ (Vattimo 1996, 90 [my translation]). Secondly, it ignores completely any 
notion of weak thought, whose encyclopaedic model assumes that the rules are geared 
to the context and semantics incorporates the pragmatic (Vattimo and Rovatti 2010). 
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in bits) that, as demonstrated by Hayles, has been created within the last 
sixty years. Secondly, the data does not emerge from the raw matter of 
the world, but is collected by the person who develops and plants special 
tools within it. As investigated by the German director Wim Wenders in 
his film Lisbon Story (1994), it is impossible to talk about the world as it 
is. The narrative does not arise directly from the world, but it comes from 
a human relationship with the world. To ensure that there is data, it is 
necessary that there is a source that emits it. This source was first created, 
and then located by the human being. By these two operations—a 
technological creation that generates the data and a physical location that 
orientates it—it is impossible to think a pure point of view aimed at 
collecting data. Each piece of data is never itself absolute, but it pertains 
to the historical relativity of the human labour that built it. Like the 
human being, who is a historical construction dependent on the processes 
of subjectivation, data is a historical construction operated by the human 
being. Therefore boyd and Crawford definitively considers Big Data as 
subjective, meaning in this case a result deriving from a historical 
relativity, according to at least three factors: regarding the retrieving of 
the data, according to the fact that it is the human being that, in the here 
and now, has made a device that allows the generation of the data; in 
terms of the ontological status of the data, as its absoluteness is not a 
deed, and thus instead always depends on the methodological and 
epistemological frame of reference in which it is placed; and finally, in 
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terms of the epistemology of the data, which is erroneously considered to 
carry a neutral semantics, when in fact the same semantics is generated 
from an interpretation grounded and operated according to the human 
questioning. 
To further deepen the critique of Big Data, it is useful to review the 
theory of the database proposed in Manovich’s The Language of New 
Media (2001). Big Data is definitely part of the world of new media that 
Manovich defines: 
Eventually, in the middle of the twentieth century, a modern 
digital computer is developed to perform calculations on 
numerical data more efficiently. In parallel, we witness the 
rise of modern media technologies which allow the storage of 
images, image sequences, sounds and text using different 
material forms: a photographic plate, a film stock, a 
gramophone record, etc. The synthesis of these two histories: 
The translation of all existing media into numerical data 
accessible for computers. The result is new media: graphics, 
moving images, sounds, shapes, spaces and text which 
become computable, i.e. simply another set of computer data 
(Manovich 2001, 41). 
 
The first moment, digitisation, consists of two steps: sampling and 
quantification. In sampling, data is sampled, most often at regular 
intervals, such as the grid of pixels used to represent a digital image 
(Manovich 2001, 49). Sampling turns continuous data into discrete data, 
in other words, data that occurs in distinct units: people, pages of a book 
or pixels. It follows that, in the second step, each sample is quantified. 
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If the numerical automation coding of media is accompanied by a 
modular structure of media objects, the combination of these two 
elements allow the automation of many operations involved in media 
creation, manipulation and access. Thus, human intentionality can be 
removed from the creative process, at least in part. Within Big Data, this 
phenomenon is evident when the statistical inference made by the 
machine generates the pattern, the reading of which is entrusted to the 
machine itself. For example, this is the case of the comparison between 
curves, which the machine identifies and suggests for the human 
interpretation even if the two phenomena are completely disconnected 
from each other. This combination generates a high-level automation of 
media, implying that a computer understands, ‘to a certain degree, the 
meanings embedded in the objects being generated, i.e. their semantics’ 
(Manovich 2001, 53). 
The issue of information retrieval can be added to this scenario. By the 
end of the 20th century, the problem was no longer how to create a new 
media object like an image, but rather how to find an object that already 
exists somewhere. This led to the next stage in media evolution: the need 
for new technologies to store, organise and efficiently access these media 
materials. The database is the label under which these new technologies 
are categorised: ‘In computer science the database is defined as a 
structured collection of data’ (Manovich 2001, 194). Data is stored in a 
database in such a manner that a computer can quickly search and 
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retrieve it; therefore it is anything ‘but a simple collection of items’ 
(194). But the database, originally a computer technology to organise and 
access data, is ‘becoming a new cultural form of its own’ (64).118  
The critique Manovich advances about new media and databases 
illustrates that the objectivist ideology governing Big Data has no reason 
to exist. First, virtualisation is at work when switching from an analogic 
material world to a discrete digital world in the data retrieval process. If 
Manovich uses the word virtualisation, it seems more appropriate here to 
speak of a human being’s interpretation. In the second place, the data 
structure and the database that follow are not isomorphic to reality, as if 
they are directly derived from it. Indeed, they are interpretations which, 
according to the notion of semiotic paradigm, aggregate the individual 
items in a set. Third, the algorithm produces a narrative about data. If, as 
Manovich demonstrates, the algorithm comprises the narrative dimension 
of new media, it follows that a query to the database, based on 
                                                 
118
 Of course the issue of taxonomy in databases is ancient. It is this famous passage 
Foucault at the beginning of The Order of Things that problematises the issue of 
taxonomy of databases in a brilliant way: ‘This book first arose out of a passage in 
Borges, out of the laughter that shattered, as I read the passage, all the familiar 
landmarks of my thought—our thought, the thought that bears the stamp of our age and 
our geography—breaking up all the ordered surfaces and all the planes with which we 
are accustomed to tame the wild profusion of existing things, and continuing long 
afterwards to disturb and threaten with collapse our age-old distinction between the 
Same and the Other. This passage quotes a ‘certain Chinese encyclopaedia’ in which it 
is written that ‘animals are divided into: (a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, 
(c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the 
present classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine camelhair 
brush, (l) et cetera, (m) having just broken the water pitcher, (n) that from a long way 
off look like flies’. In the wonderment of this taxonomy, the thing we apprehend in one 
great leap, the thing that, by means of the fable, is demonstrated as the exotic charm of 
another system of thought, is the limitation of our own, the stark impossibility of 
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algorithms, has a narrative component. The meaning of the Latin word 
computare is retrieved here in its full sense, which, as discussed in this 
dissertation’s introduction, originally meant to give order to the world. 
Computation is an interpretation of the world in order to give an order to 
it. But while the objectivist perspective affirms that the order belongs to 
the world, here it is clearly emphasised that each order comes from a 
particular interpretation. Again, any assumption regarding the objectivity 
of Big Data is, according to several levels of analysis, completely 
unfounded.119 
                                                 
119
 To this discourse based on epistemological and ontological issues, one should add 
also ethical and political critique. boyd and Crawford quote Manovich when they say: 
‘As Lev Manovich (2011) points out, “only social media companies have access to 
really large social data—especially transactional data. An anthropologist working for 
Facebook or a sociologist working for Google will have access to data that the rest of 
the scholarly community will not’. Some companies restrict access to their data entirely; 
others sell the privilege of access for a high fee; and others offer small data sets to 
university-based researchers. This produces considerable unevenness in the system: 
those with money—or those inside the company—can produce a different type of 
research than those outside’ (2011, 12). Therefore the risk of the presence of large trusts 
is always incumbent on the Big Data field, in the form of huge concentrations of data in 
the hands of few entities that are thus able to monopolise any kind of use of these data. 
For instance, as Lovink observed, the advertisement and the related economic issue is 
essential to encourage the production of big data, so that the personalisation of 
advertising based on information retrieving becomes essential (Lovink 2010, 24). 
However, advertising is perhaps the epiphenomenon that drives a more complex world 
that definitely finds in the advertisement the mechanism of generation of revenues, but 
which has a complex epistemic structure. The Google case is exemplary in this regard: 
‘The most powerful and protean of These Internet gatekeepers is, of course, Google. 
With control of 63 percent of the world’s Internet searches, as well as ownership of 
YouTube, Google has enormous influence over who can find an audience on the Web 
around the world’ (Rosen 2008). The discourse is about huge concentrations of 
information, and about equally powerful systems of control of it. It is curious that the 
problem of the generation of trust is still not felt in this regard, as if the ethical and 
political loopholes are identified in this regard. For example, like in the following 
passage, the actions of Google are justified as a new factor in a complex system of 
balance of power. What is forgotten is that Google is a private company whose purpose 
is to generate profit: ‘As the law professor Tim Wu told me, in order to trust Google, 
you have to be something of a monarchist, willing to trust the near-sovereign discretion 
of Wong and her colleagues. That’s especially true in light of the Global Network 
Initiative, the set of voluntary principles for protecting free expression and privacy 
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Following this critical review of Big Data, this chapter will argue that it 
represents, in these times, a second form of digital storytelling of the self, 
alongside what human beings normally offer in the accounting of 
themselves on digital platforms, as analysed in the previous chapter. This 
second form of accountability of oneself takes the name of second 
hermeneutics of the subject. The word hermeneutics is adopted in its 
specific meaning. It is therefore contended that digital machines, mainly 
through the mechanism of Big Data, are able to provide accounts of the 
subject regardless of his/her intentionality. While in the first 
hermeneutics the subject operates intentionally to provide an account of 
him/herself, the intentionality of the subject is lost in the second 
hermeneutics of the subject. A machine operates the account in this case, 
which begins with data. Since the second hermeneutics of the subject 
already assumes a form of accounting of oneself, it follows that a digital 
form of accountability is also at work in this case.  
The first parameter necessary to define this second hermeneutics of the 
subject is found in the subject’s simple presence in a physical space and 
time. A simple and diffused device like the mobile phone allows a 
                                                                                                                       
endorsed last month by leading Internet companies like Google and leading human 
rights and online-advocacy groups like the Center for Democracy and Technology. 
Google and other companies say that they hope by acting collectively, they can be more 
effective in resisting censorship requests from repressive governments and, when that 
isn’t possible, create a trail of accountability’(Rosen 2008; see also Zuboff 2014). 
Nevertheless, the connection between the big players of data and politics (mostly in 
terms of intelligence) is a territory still under investigation and to shed light on (see for 
reference Ahmed 2015). 
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subject’s movement in space to be traced by an ordinary GPS network. 
Several kinds of software exist to monitor a subject’s movement. In some 
cases, the subject openly displays the mapping of his/her movement on 
social media (for instance, linking Nike+ to Facebook),120 which 
comprises the first level of the second hermeneutics of the subject: to 
build an account, in any form, of the movements made by the subject.121 
However, the representation of the subject’s mere presence in a space is 
only one figure that the second hermeneutics of the subject may assume. 
A fairly recent notion, which builds a taxonomy of the outputs deriving 
                                                 
120
 For example, through software that allows locating mobile phones in a physical 
space, which can give a summary of a person’s movements over a defined period (a 
day, month, year). Another example is the software that monitors running, which returns 
to the subject the quantitative features of performance (distance, average speed, etc.). 
121
 The representation of the mere presence in a physical space can become a particular 
form of accountability, which is called the accountability of presence. As clearly 
identified in the following passage: ‘A more useful way to think about this, perhaps, is 
in terms of the various accountabilities of particular people’s presence and absence in 
specific places and at specific times, and accountabilities associated with particular 
ways of understanding space and presence. People are accountable to each other for 
their presence in—or absence from—specific places in a range of ways, whether that be 
one’s participation at a business meeting, causal time spent with friends, or the effort to 
avoid a school zone, and the very fact of those accountabilities is what marks one’s 
membership in, and recognition of, social categories. The very fact that an orientation 
towards a school or playground is something for which one might be accountable is one 
element of what it means to be a member of a social group. Even one’s recognition of 
particular distinctions as boundaries to which one should be attentive is, itself, a means 
of marking social status. Information exchange is one way to deal with these forms of 
accountability, but the exchange of information is not the point; socially accountable 
participation is. Indeed, the essence of these accountabilities is their contextual nature. 
The issue is not where one might be, and when; it is to whom one might be accountable 
for one’s presence, to whom, under what circumstances, and how one might be called to 
account. And further, it has to be noticed that the very questions of “when” (that is, 
what kinds of temporalities are relevant, from times of day to times when others are 
present) and “where” (that is, sites as defined by factors as disparate as geographical 
location or the presence of others) are equally relational’ (Troshynski, Lee, and Dourish 
2008, 494). It seems clear the derivation of this accountability of presence from the 
forms of spatial organisation of regimentation, a form of contemporary panopticism of 
today, where the visibility of the subject is constituted by its movements in space. 
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from the second hermeneutics of the subject, is the quantified self.122 The 
quantified self can be summarised as follows:  
The quantified self (QS) is any individual engaged in the self-
tracking of any kind of biological, physical, behavioral, or 
environmental information. There is a proactive stance toward 
obtaining information and acting on it. A variety of areas may 
be tracked and analyzed, for example, weight, energy level, 
mood, time usage, sleep quality, health, cognitive 
performance, athletics, and learning strategies (Swan 2013, 
85). 
 
It is worth noting that the intentionality of the subject regarding the 
operation of self-tracking is emphasised in this introduction on the 
quantified self, which is a form of individual engagement. Moreover, the 
quantified self is a proactive attitude towards personal existence. At a 
first level of reading, the quantified self arises as a mode of existence 
based on a process of accountability regarding the understanding of 
oneself. The quantified self is the account of the subject about 
him/herself in mathematical terms, concurrent with a discursive 
formation that emerges in the modern world. Some parameters according 
to which the self can be quantified are presented here: 
                                                 
122
 The Quantified Self has an official website (http://quantifiedself.com/), that 
represents the company founded by Gary Wolf and Kevin Kelly, ‘that serves the 
Quantified Self user community worldwide by producing international meetings, 
conferences and expositions, community forums, web content and services, and a guide 
to self-tracking tools’. The mission of the website states: ‘Our mission is to support new 
discoveries about ourselves and our communities that are grounded in accurate 
observation and enlivened by a spirit of friendship’ (from: 
http://quantifiedself.com/about/). 
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Physical activities: miles, steps, calories, repetitions, sets, 
METs (metabolic equivalents) 
Diet: calories consumed, carbs, fat, protein, specific 
ingredients, glycaemic index, satiety, portions, supplement 
doses, tastiness, cost, location 
Psychological states and traits: mood, happiness, irritation, 
emotions, anxiety, self-esteem, depression, confidence 
Mental and cognitive states and traits: IQ, alertness, focus, 
selective/sustained/divided attention, reaction, memory, 
verbal fluency, patience, creativity, reasoning, psychomotor 
vigilance 
Environmental variables: location, architecture, weather, 
noise, pollution, clutter, light, season 
Situational variables: context, situation, gratification of 
situation, time of day, day of week 
Social variables: influence, trust, charisma, karma, current 
role/status in the group or social network (Swan 2013, 86). 
 
The heterogeneity of this list is quite surprising. Physical activities refer 
to the subject’s spatiality, or his/her occupation of a given space and 
movements within a process of accountability. Tracking and restricting 
the diet according to certain parameters pertains to a dominant medical 
discourse, in which the quantification of the physiochemical metabolic 
system comprises an essential element of wellness. The description of 
psychological states, based on the symbolic quantification of emotions, 
on the other hand, elicits a different discourse. Scientific measurement is 
abandoned in this case, asking the subject him/herself to randomly 
quantify his or her moods. One can clearly see the epistemological 
weakness of this passage, in which the scientific evidence of the number 
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is linked, by analogy, to the personal non-evident perception of oneself. 
An analogy within the process is thus generated, so that the (personal) 
quantification of emotions is accompanied by the (objectifying) 
quantification of the physiochemical parameters or geolocation of the 
subject. This overlapping between different epistemologies generates a 
distorting effect, for which the understanding of the self can also be 
quantified. Other aspects of Swan’s list also repeat this same 
overlapping. Pollution is an environmental consideration that belongs to 
the hard sciences; in cognitive states one finds that IQ, which is derived 
from a form of pseudo-cognitive epistemology, is combined with 
creativity, whatever this polysemic, smoky and dubious term means; and 
finally, nearly indefinable factors such as charisma comprise a social 
variable linked to a sociological analysis of the position of the subject to 
the social groups s/he belongs to. 
Thus, the quantified self is a mode of accounting oneself based on an 
inflexible will to quantify what exists, which is grounded in a mix of 
different epistemologies, some of them spurious and in no way reliable. 
The quantified self is the will to extend the measurability to parameters 
that, relying on current epistemologies, are not measurable in 
themselves.123 While the goal is to quantify as much as possible, the 
                                                 
123
 Some statements from a conference about the quantified self are here reported:  
‘Data is the new oil; The lean hardware movement becomes the lean heartware 
movement; Information wants to be linked (…); Quantified emotion and data sensation 
through haptics; Display of numerical data and graphs are the interface; Quantifying is 
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method seeks to link the data. Unfortunately, all of the epistemological 
apparatuses that should be applied to such a vast project are definitively 
ignored and the apparatus of power-knowledge that is undermined in this 
process is completely concealed. This relationship will be explored in the 
following section, dedicated to the Discourse of the Master. 
 
4.2 The Discourse of the Master 
Every form of accounting of the self in which measurability is involved 
has a precise genealogy. Foucault argued this point at the beginning of 
his canonical course, The Hermeneutics of the Subject (2005), which 
addressed the genealogy of the Western subject. The French philosopher 
identified two specific processes of subjectivation that characterised the 
ancient Greek and Latin world: the gnothi seauton (know yourself) and 
the epimeleia heautou (the care of the self). The contemporary Western 
world has been offered the gnothi seauton as the fundamental process of 
subjectivation, at the expense of the care of the self. Why is the Western 
subject asked to know him/herself? 
Foucault identifies the birth of this dominating process in the Western 
world at a precise historic-epistemological moment, which he outlined as 
the Cartesian moment. This moment is obviously associated to the 
                                                                                                                       
the intermediary step; Exosenses (haptics, wearable electronic senses) is really what we 
want; Perpetual data explosion’ (in Swan 2013, 87). 
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French philosopher René Descartes, but it is a synecdoche for the 
conception of a human being who was born in the second half of the 17th 
century. As Foucault says:  
the Cartesian moment philosophically requalified the gnothi 
seauton (know yourself). Actually, and here things are very 
simple, the Cartesian approach, which can be read quite 
explicitly in the Meditations placed self-evidence (l’évidence) 
at the origin, the point of departure of the philosophical 
approach—self-evidence as it appears, that is to say as it is 
given, as it is actually given to consciousness without any 
possible doubt (Foucault 2005, 14). 
In his masterworks, Descartes (Descartes 1999; 2000) argues that 
evidence is a precondition of any true knowledge. The truth of 
knowledge can only be given in the evidence to consciousness. Only this 
kind of absolute evidence allows the removal of any doubt in the process 
of thinking. The first evidence, theorised by Descartes, is the “I”. Indeed, 
before embarking on any type of cognitive process and avoiding any kind 
of doubt, the subject must have evidence of him/herself in consciousness. 
With Descartes, then, consciousness, truth and evidence are related. 
Foucault then continues:  
The Cartesian approach [therefore] refers to knowledge of the 
self, as a form of consciousness at least. What’s more, by 
putting the self-evidence of the subject’s own existence at the 
very source of access to being, this knowledge on oneself (no 
longer in the form of the test of sell-evidence, but in the form 
of the impossibility of doubting my existence as subject) made 
the “know yourself” into a fundamental means of access to 
truth (Foucault 2005, 14).  
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In this passage, Foucault emphasises the gap that Descartes introduced, 
which will be a fundamental point of investigation for later philosophy 
(Kant and Husserl above all). In Descartes, truth of the being and 
evidence of the subject to him/herself is the same thing, or rather, only a 
subject crystal clear about him/herself may be capable of truth. In this 
manner, Descartes grounded the domain of cognition on other aspects of 
human existence: only knowledge can guarantee access to the truth (and 
not affection, materiality or any other element reduced by Descartes to 
almost to raw material). The Cartesian moment is thus the key node of 
Western culture in which truth, being and knowledge are intimately 
related. 
Of course, Foucault is shrewd enough to point out the following:  
  there is a vast distance between the Socratic gnothi seauton 
and the Cartesian approach. However, you can see why, from 
the seventeenth century, starting from this step, the principle 
of gnothi seauton as founding moment of the philosophical 
method was acceptable for a number of philosophical 
approaches or practices. But if the Cartesian approach thus 
requalified the gnothi seauton, for reasons that are fairly easy 
to isolate, at the same time—and I want to stress this—it 
played a major part in discrediting the principle of care of the 
self and in excluding it from the field of modern philosophical 
thought. (Foucault 2005, 14). 
 
The philosophy of the 17th century, and especially its champion 
Descartes, was then able to return completely the Greek gnothi seauton in 
a new epistemology, in which truth of being, truth of knowledge and 
truth of the subject are made to collapse. The only knowledge is given to 
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establish what is true, or simply “is”. However this shift of the Western 
culture to the horizon of knowledge has led to a loss, namely the ancient 
Greek paradigm of the care of the self, to which Foucault devotes 
numerous analyses and his final work (Foucault 1988). 
But why is Foucault so interested in the Cartesian moment, and at the 
turn of the Western world towards knowledge at the expense of the care 
of the self? One reason is that he identifies the correlation of power-
knowledge that has led to the modern forms of subjugation in the 
Cartesian standpoint. To understand this form of subjugation, it becomes 
necessary to consider the process of subjectivation that has instead been 
overlooked: the care of the self. To understand contemporary 
subjectivity, grounded in a certain conception of the truth based on the 
domain of knowledge, one should therefore go back to the Greek 
paradigm of the care of the self because it proposes a different 
relationship between the truth and the subject. 
Within the care of the self, Foucault identifies the concept of spirituality, 
which is defined as follows:  
I think we could call “spirituality” the search, practice, and 
experience through which the subject carries out the 
necessary transformations on himself in order to have access 
to the truth. We will call “spirituality” then the set of these 
researches, practices, and experiences, which may be 
purifications, ascetic exercises, renunciations, conversions of 
looking, modifications of existence, etc., which are, not for 
knowledge but for the subject, for the subject’s very being, 
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the price to be paid for access to the truth. (Foucault 2005, 
15). 
 
The spirituality Foucault mentioned has no ties to the general meaning 
attributed to this term. It is instead a series of practices, also 
heterogeneous among themselves, by which the subject takes care of 
him/herself. These practices do not constitutively include knowledge: 
that is, they do not have knowledge as subject, but the subject itself. The 
spirituality that Foucault talks about is therefore a set of processes that 
relate to the existence. 
But what matters for the purpose of this discussion is the relationship 
between spirituality, truth and subject. As Foucault clearly states:  
Spirituality postulates that the truth is never given to the 
subject by right. Spirituality postulates that the subject as 
such does not have right of access to the truth and is not 
capable of having access to the truth. It postulates that the 
truth is not given to the subject by a simple act of knowledge 
(connaissance), which would be founded and justified simply 
by the fact that he is the subject and because he possesses this 
or that structure of subjectivity. It postulates that for the 
subject to have right of access to the truth he must be 
changed, transformed, shifted, and become, to some extent 
and up to a certain point, other than himself. The truth is only 
given to the subject at a price that brings the subject’s being 
into play. For as he is, the subject is not capable of truth. 
(Foucault 2005, 15) 
 
Through the notion of spirituality one is at the antipodes of the Cartesian 
moment. Descartes postulated that the subject is substantially capable of 
truth, once doubts are eliminated and he or she has reached evidence. The 
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premise of this approach is that there is an objective truth, which is 
immutable and knowable (especially through the use of a suitable 
method). A point of view regarding truth is unique. Once a subject has 
arrived there, the truth remains with the subject, who acquires his/her 
being through this truth. The metaphysical background that underlies 
spirituality, on the other hand, is the opposite. The subject does not reach 
the truth through an act of knowledge related to evidence. Instead, it is 
necessary for the subject to move away from him/herself, through a set of 
practices, in order to reach the truth. However, this truth is always 
variable, depending on the conversions that the subject is able to 
implement. The subject then does not need to acquire a substantial 
viewpoint based on evidence for the acquisition of truth. The truth is 
offered only in the continuous conversion of the subject. This conversion 
is not an act of knowledge, but rather an upheaval that continuously sets 
practices anew, the result of which is a continuous exploration of 
otherness. It is the exploration of otherness through practices that 
constitutes the truth. Why? Because only in the exploration of the 
otherness implicit in these practices can the subject experiment with the 
exit of identitary dispositives. Within them, the subject can only find a 
truth imposed by identitary dispositives. The truth of the subject is 
instead available through practices. But what kind of truth does the 
subject attain through spirituality? As Foucault argues:  
 221 
 
spirituality postulates that once access to the truth has really 
been opened up, it produces effects that are, of course, the 
consequence of the spiritual approach taken in order to 
achieve this, but which at the same time are something quite 
different and much more: effects which I will call “rebound” 
(“de retour”), effects of the truth on the subject. For 
spirituality, the truth is not just what is given to the subject, 
as reward for the act of knowledge as it were, and to fulfill 
the act of knowledge. The truth enlightens the subject; the 
truth gives beatitude to the subject; the truth gives the subject 
tranquillity of the soul. (Foucault 2005, 16). 
 
Although the author later leaves this viewpoint behind, this moment in 
Foucauldian production is nonetheless interesting. Foucault’s analysis 
aims to illuminate the effects of the return of the truth, because these 
justify the cognitive process. The truth—unlike the Cartesian moment—
is not a goal in itself. Truth, conceived as the goal of spirituality, has the 
subject itself as its purpose. Through truth this subject is able to find the 
peace and bliss. Spirituality inverts the relationship between truth and 
subject: truth doesn’t make the subject legitimate, but the same subject—
his/her happiness, peace of mind—makes the truth right. 
If this is the goal of the truth, it is useful to recall that the truth is not 
attained through a cognitive act, but through the practices that the subject 
establishes with respect to him/herself. And practices, as noted, are not 
knowledge. Foucault perfectly summarises, that modern man—and then 
the contemporary man—are born in the Cartesian moment. However, the 
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French philosopher argues that practices do not have a place in this 
moment:  
leaping over several centuries, we can say that we enter the 
modern age (I mean, the history of truth enters its modern 
period) when it is assumed that what gives access to the truth, 
the condition for the subject’s access to the truth, is 
knowledge (connaissance) and knowledge alone. It seems to 
me that what I have called the “Cartesian moment” takes on 
its position and meaning at this point, without in any way my 
wanting to say that it is a question of Descartes, that he was 
its inventor or that he was the first to do this. I think the 
modern age of the history of truth begins when knowledge 
itself and knowledge alone gives access to the truth. That is 
to say, it is when the philosopher (or the scientist, or simply 
someone who seeks the truth) can recognize the truth and 
have access to it m himself and solely through his activity of 
knowing, without anything else being demanded of him and 
without him having to change or alter his being as subject 
(Foucault 2005, 17). 
 
The result of this approach to truth, that modern man and the 
contemporary made their own, is that the real human being is the man of 
knowledge. And this single dimension—knowledge—counts for the 
construction of the true man. Knowledge is the only process of 
subjectivation that legitimises man. By this approach, the world of 
practices is eliminated, which by contrast does not give access to 
knowledge. If only knowledge saves the human being—in an existential 
sense—one does not need to practise anything else.  
But of course this approach also has drawbacks. A world based purely on 
mathesis—the Greek word that identifies the type of knowledge 
discussed here—immediately implies two effects. First of all, it generates 
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processes of subjectivation that do not allow an understanding of the 
human being as a whole: an understanding that, while not exploiting the 
practices, it rules out any kind of truth that is derived from these. On the 
other hand, being based on mathesis, the account is only about the one 
who in the discourse of mathesis can be enclosed. The human being who 
comes from the Cartesian moment is understandable—and thus made 
true—only in its quantifiable and mathematical features. All human 
characteristics that are not classifiable according to this aspect are not 
worthy of being taken into account.124 And, secondly, the relatedness 
with others is defined in purely abstract, quantifiable terms. The 
fundamental question regarding relationships with others shifts from how 
to live with others to how much to live with others. “Much” needs to be 
quantifiable, made in numbers. In Greek terms, the discourse of 
mathemata does not contain synousia (being together), or even 
necessarily syzen (living together). An approach to life based on mathesis 
lacks the dimension of syn, of sharing one’s own experience with others. 
The syn is missing here because this sharing should be reduced to 
abstraction in order to be measured and quantified. Thus, the subject is 
no longer “complete” in front of the other, but a more abstract and 
quantified self, who finds his/her legitimacy quantified because s/he 
know him/herself according to mathesis. 
                                                 
124
 As Foucault points out, for instance mathesis and simulation (rationalisation and 
simplification) can’t deal with the management of pleasures. Pleasures require a 
different attitude, based on the askesis, that is within the realm of the spirituality 
(Foucault 1990b). 
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Not only Foucault, but also Husserl identified this fundamental Cartesian 
shift of the modern man in his monumental Crisis, which both authors 
claim was fatal.125 As Husserl says:  
What characterizes objectivism is that it moves upon the 
ground of the world which is pregiven, taken for granted 
through experience, seeks the “objective truth” of this world, 
seeks what, in this world, is unconditionally valid for every 
rational being, what it is in itself. It is the task of episteme, 
ratio, or philosophy to carry this out universally. Through 
these one arrives at what ultimately is; beyond this, no further 
questions would have a rational sense (Husserl 1970, 68-69). 
 
According to Husserl, therefore, the objectification of the world 
introduced by the Cartesian rationalism had a significant result: only that 
which can be categorised according to scientific truth is valid and 
legitimate—because scientific truth identifies what is valid for everyone. 
Anything that falls outside of this realm therefore would not rationally 
make sense. Here “rational” is to be understood in relation to its opposite: 
irrational. According to this approach to the world, what is not scientific 
knowledge is irrational and—according to a cause-effect relationship 
totally unfounded—meaningless. 
                                                 
125
 Descartes is the interlocutor of Husserl in the whole first part of the Crisis, as 
underlined by this paragraph: ‘That Descartes, however, persists in pure objectivism in 
spite of its subjective grounding was possible only through the fact that the mens, which 
at first stood by itself in the epoche and functioned as the absolute ground of 
knowledge, grounding the objective sciences (or, universally speaking, philosophy), 
appeared at the same time to be grounded along with everything else as a legitimate 
subject matter within the sciences, i.e., in psychology’ (Husserl 1970, 81). 
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In another passage, Husserl himself provides a clear and detailed 
explanation of the process that led to the mathematisation of the world:  
Implied in the mathematization of nature, as the idea and the 
task were understood, was the supposition of the coexistence 
of the infinite totality of its bodies in space-time as 
mathematically rational; though natural science, as inductive, 
could have only inductive access to interconnections which, 
in themselves, are mathematical. In any case, natural science 
possessed the highest rationality because it was guided by 
pure mathematics and achieved, through inductions, 
mathematical results. Should this not become the model of all 
genuine knowledge? Should knowledge, if it is to attain the 
status of a genuine science which goes beyond nature, not 
follow the example of natural science or,  even better, that of 
pure mathematics, insofar as we have, perhaps,  in other 
spheres of knowledge, the “innate” faculty of apodictic self-
evidence through axioms and deductions? It is no wonder that 
we already find the idea of a universal mathematics in 
Descartes. Of course the weight of the theoretical and 
practical successes [of science], beginning immediately with 
Galileo, had its effect. Thus the world and, correlatively, 
philosophy, take on a completely new appearance. The world 
must, in itself, be a rational world, in the new sense of 
rationality taken from mathematics, or mathematized nature; 
correspondingly, philosophy, the universal science of the 
world, must be built up as a unified rational theory more 
geometrico (61). 
 
Husserl keenly illustrates why the mathematical model (abstract and 
relational) established itself as the true model: mathematics is applicable 
to the entire natural world and, above all, it gets results. These results are 
obtained through the application of scientific method to nature. If 
mathematics leads to a generalising abstraction, and allows obtaining 
results, it follows that mathematics deserves to be applied as much as 
possible, to become the absolute king in the realm of knowledge. Thus 
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philosophy in the first place should embrace mathematics. Since this 
contamination comes the Cartesian method, as Husserl defines it: a 
rational theory more geometrico. 
The conclusion of this process of mathematasing abstraction that operates 
in knowledge has led to what is called here the discourse of the master 
(Rovatti 2010, 217), in which knowledge (and within knowledge the 
quantified abstraction operated by mathematics) overcomes the world of 
practices, generating a subject whose life is enclosed and substantialised 
in quantifiable identitary dispositives. Although he does not adopt the 
expression discourse of the master, Husserl provides an effective 
description:  
In a bold, even extravagant, elevation of the meaning of 
universality, begun by Descartes, this new philosophy seeks 
nothing less than to encompass, in the unity of a theoretical 
system, all meaningful questions in a rigorous scientific 
manner, with an apodictically intelligible methodology, in an 
unending but rationally ordered progress of inquiry (Husserl 
1970, 8-9). 
 
The discourse of the master reduces every meaningful discourse to the 
substantialised subject of the scientific method. Since the scientific 
method is based on mathematics, the sense is reduced to that which is 
quantifiable. It follows that what is not quantifiable is irrational. 
However, this is not an irrationality that deserves to be explored, but 
rather an irrationality that indicates absence of sense. With the discourse 
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of the master, sense is only what is quantifiable. What cannot be 
subjected to the quantifying reason is therefore meaningless.126 
Thus, in this process of reducing meaning to what is quantifiable, what 
results is a new way to conceive of the subject. The discourse of the 
master has dominated throughout modernity, reducing the subject to a 
subject based on knowledge, forgetting the entire world of practices. And 
if knowledge is merely grounded in figures, the only feature that restores 
the truth of the subject is its quantifiability, thus its computability. If this 
logic extends to the polarisation of true/false, then all that lies beyond a 
subject’s computability is therefore false. The ego is only the dimension 
of the quantified self. It is worth noting that this applies not only to an 
economic dimension, but rather is a more complex process of 
quantification that governs—as shown above in the example of the 
quantified self— many aspects of the human being: ‘accounting numbers 
are not only involved in the “making up” of economic entities 
(corporations, profit centres, strategic business units, hospitals, 
universities); they also help construct the type of persons or identities that 
inhabit these entities’ (Mennicken and Miller 2012, 8). 
It is noted above that mathematics undoubtedly generate results. This is 
certainly true, and one could therefore assert that mathesis can even bring 
                                                 
126
 It’s worthy taking into account the development of the Husserlian philosophy. At the 
beginning of the 20th century, Husserl tried to match philosophy and science, but the 
result was a consciousness populated by cold data; the lebenswelt was the way by which 
experience and consciousness were linked again in a pre-logic field. 
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about results in the subject. In this case, one definitely positive aspect of 
mathesis about the subject can be highlighted. What would then be the 
danger of a process of subjectivation based upon pure mathesis? 
Foucault’s response would be clear: even mathesis is a specific regime of 
truth, and as such it is never neutral. Mathesis conceals a very specific 
dimension of knowledge and, above all, of power. With its power to 
obtain results, mathesis arises as a functional, operational and useful 
regime of truth; as such, it comes to establish itself as the law. But, as 
Foucault says:  
The spiritual exercise on representations involves the free 
movement of representation and work on this free movement. 
Intellectual method will consist, rather, in providing 
ourselves with a voluntary and systematic definition of the 
law of succession of representations, and only accepting them 
in the mind if there is a sufficiently strong, constraining, and 
necessary link between them for us to be conveyed, logically, 
without doubt or hesitation, from the first to the second. The 
Cartesian progression belongs to the realm of intellectual 
method. (Foucault 2005, 293-294) 
 
The one who practices mathesis as main process of subjectivation does 
nothing but comply with the law and then, with the trenchant formula 
indicated above, with the discourse of the master. Before the freedom 
offered by spirituality, which allows the subject to de-subjectify 
him/herself (and thus to escape dispositives to operate a conversion to 
others, and therefore in this conversion to find new spaces of freedom), 
mathesis is always a unifying and normalising discourse of the master 
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who arrogates the power of modernity, outside of which is the privation 
of sense. Foucault’s entire genealogy, undertaken as a method to 
deconstruct the modern human being, has exactly this goal. Genealogy in 
this sense serves as a way to free historical knowledge from a unitary 
theoretical discourse (Foucault 2001, 167). The unitary discourse born 
with the Cartesian moment has founded the modern subject, subjected to 
the discourse of the master.  
The genealogy of the discourse of the master has shown its historicity, in 
order to liberate and bring to light a different understanding of the human 
being (spirituality) that is opposed to this unitary knowledge. Again one 
could argue: what could the problem of a unitary knowledge be when it 
brings results? Foucault never tires of repeating that such a powerful 
regime of truth is inevitably bound with an equally dominant regime of 
power; and at the same time it excludes other regimes of truth, other 
possible processes of subjectivation. 
In this respect, Foucault distinguishes at several points an important 
lexical difference between savoir and connaissance (Foucault 2001, 
876). While connaissance (knowledge) is a method based on intellectual 
mathesis, savoir is the understanding of the one who is addicted to 
practices, and therefore exercises his/her freedom in the exercise of 
differentiating practices in front of the monolithic nature of the discourse 
of the master. Parrhesia is the main spiritual practice, because it allows 
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contrasting the regimes of truth generated by the lords of reality in the 
form of the discourse of the master.  
The discourse of the master is fully operational in modernity. The second 
hermeneutics of the subject is nothing but the result of the contemporary 
discourse of the master. The account of oneself that digital machines 
return to the subject is essentially the algoritmisation of the discourse of 
the master through the form of the information systems of Big Data. In 
the following chapter, however, the discourse of the master will be 
situated within the process of digital accountability, in order to reveal the 
specificity of the new panopticon that everyone lives within nowadays. 
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5 The New Panopticon 
 
As the first chapter has illustrated, social media statistics are so 
staggering that we can only fathom them through analogy. As stated by 
the founder and CEO of Facebook, Mark Zuckerberg, on August 24, 
2015 the platform had a billion active users on the same day for the first 
time in history (Oreskovic 2015). If Hegel considered newspapers to be 
the morning prayer of the 19th Century, Facebook seems to have taken 
up this role in the 21st. For most of the Western world, social media 
comprises a grounding element in the banality of everyday life. Within 
this context, banality is to be understood according to the meaning 
Nietzsche has ascribed to the term: that which is so ordinary that it is not 
immediately visible and thus remains concealed.  
Social media intersects with the quantified self (QS), namely the subject 
who self-tracks all types of biological information, whether 
physiological, behavioural or environmental. But the QS is only an 
intermediate step in the construction of the future self. Kevin Kelly, a 
leading enthusiast of the contemporary digital world, defines the future 
self as follows: ‘This future self is one that is spatially expanded, with a 
broad suite of exosenses—the exoself’ (Swan 2013, 95). The notion of 
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exoself seems like a contemporary version of a McLuhanist intuition that 
appeared nearly fifty years ago, in terms of reification of media as human 
prosthetic apparatus, which has already had brilliant theoretical 
developments.127 However, it is the view and the application of the 
exoself within the contemporary context that is relevant for our purposes 
here, as reported in the following exhaustive citation: 
[The] self as a concept is a trope that has only arisen recently 
in the scope of human history, perhaps evolving in lockstep 
with the sizeable and complex cultures of modernity. The 
concept of the self continues to shift as individuals react to 
changes in culture and technology. QS activities are a new 
means of enabling the constant creation of the self. Further, 
there is now the notion of the extended connected self in the 
sense that individuals are projecting their data outward onto 
the world (e.g., mobile phones and other devices 
continuously pinging location and other data) while data from 
the world is projected back onto the individual (e.g., network 
nodes notice movement and communicate personalized 
information). Mobile phones, wearable computing, and other 
technology tools are tracking devices used both by humans 
and the ubiquitous data climate. Data quantification and self-
tracking enable capabilities that are not possible with 
ordinary senses. (Swan 2013, 95) 
 
On the side of social media, Mark Zuckerberg comments upon the one 
billion users reached on August 24th 2015 thusly: ‘a more open and 
connected world is a better world. It brings stronger relationships with 
those you love, a stronger economy with more opportunities, and a 
stronger society that reflects all of our values’ (Oreskovic 2015). Kevin 
Kelly predicts a better future generated by subjects who donate their 
                                                 
127
 For instance, Caronia 1996. 
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quantified self to networks. In both cases, whether social media or the 
quantified self, the contemporary subject pledges him/herself to the 
digital machine, in the form of numerical parameters, images, texts or 
any other form of expression. 
Less enthusiastic about what is happening with respect to the two 
statements mentioned above, this dissertation offers a genealogical 
reconstruction of digital accountability, namely the process of 
subjectivation proper to contemporary subjects compelled to distribute 
themselves across networks. The purpose of this chapter is to show the 
power and pervasiveness of digital accountability, so as to delineate a 
new kind of society, defined the society of accountability, which includes 
and follows the societies of the past centuries, namely the disciplinary 
society and the society of control.  
Accountability has been defined as the process of subjectivation that 
defines a subject in the moment that s/he is asked to give an account 
about him/herself and his/her actions. Then, broadening the sense of 
accountability, digital accountability has been defined as the process of 
subjectivation for which “having an account” and “giving an account” 
are two sides of the same coin. If within standard accountability a 
traditional system compels the subject to give an account, in digital 
accountability giving an account is strictly immanent to the process. In 
other words, when one opens an account and enters into a process of 
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digital accountability, there is an implicit acceptance that the process of 
accounting will take place. The account that one provides is in fact an 
account of the self, which preserves the original aspect of its origin in the 
world of computare, where the sense of order concerns both the 
experience made by the self and the world experienced. 
At this point, the critical synthesis proposed here is based on the idea that 
digital accountability finds its genealogy in the historical confluence of 
two processes fundamental to the Western world: the discourse of the 
master and pastoral power. 
As shown in the previous chapter, the discourse of the master is, 
according to Rovatti, ‘built on the absolute priority of knowledge on 
practices’ (Rovatti 2008, 217). Both terms are borrowed from the 
research Foucault advanced in the years preceding his death, and exposed 
in the courses he held at the Collége de France, particularly The 
Hermeneutics of the Subject (2005). The French philosopher had 
identified in this course two specific processes of subjectivation that 
characterised the ancient Greek and Latin world: the Gnothi seauton 
(know yourself) and the epimeleia heautou (the care of the self). The 
contemporary Western world is grounded exclusively on the fundamental 
process of subjectivation of the gnothi seauton, at the expense of the care 
of the self. The Western subject is, first of all, asked to know. 
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The consequence of this approach to the truth, that modern and 
contemporary human beings have followed, is that the only real human 
being is the knowledgeable human being. And this single dimension—
knowledge—contributes towards the establishment of the true human 
being. Knowledge is the only process of subjectivation that legitimises 
the human being. This approach erases practices, which by contrast do 
not give access to knowledge. And, in a different philosophical paradigm, 
Husserl came to the same conclusions. The man derived from the 
Cartesian moment is understandable only in his quantifiable and 
mathematical features. All human characteristics that are not classifiable 
according to this feature are not worthy of being taken into consideration. 
It follows that the relationship with others is delineated in purely abstract, 
quantifiable terms. In front of the other there is no longer a whole 
subject, but only the abstract quantified representation of it. A quantified 
self, who finds its legitimacy inasmuch quantified. 
The discourse of the master, then, imposes this substantialised view of 
the subject, based on a “scientific” representation of the human insofar as 
he or she is quantifiable. This view postulates on one hand that 
quantification is the only system of truth possible in the current 
environment, with all the political and ethical issues that may result, and 
on the other hand, that the system of quantification constitutes the only 
epistemological background where both quantified self and social media 
can find a place. First of all, social media are forms of data mining aimed 
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at the generation of data subsequently stored in new computing systems, 
known today under the name Big Data. Through processes of statistical 
inference, the information that users post, tweet or upload is interpreted 
in order to identify behavioural patterns: patterns that are quantified and, 
consequently, more easily governable. Amazon, Google, Twitter, 
Facebook are primarily immense reservoirs of data, available to any 
search for any purpose. 
Although the text has provided an epistemological framework for digital 
accountability by this point, a major issue nonetheless remains 
unresolved: why does the user of the digital machine voluntarily offer 
him/herself to be quantified, to become accountable. The answer 
proposed here is an alternative to the reconstruction of Butler’s genesis of 
accounting (2005). Following Nietzsche, Butler builds the scene of 
address from the question: Was it you? It was shown here that the 
reconstruction of giving an account of the self Butler provides was not 
enough to argue the reasons for digital accountability, in which the 
subject gives an account of him/herself without the need of being pre-
summoned, and that a change of the scene of address from which the 
accounting comes was needed. Therefore, according to the notion of 
pastoral power developed by Foucault, it is no longer a matter of an 
interrogator asking for an account in a legal or political framework, but 
rather that of a shepherd who asks a member of the flock: Who are you? 
The French writer presented the reconstruction of the accounting process 
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from the definition of pastoral power in his lecture “Omnes et 
Singulatim”: Toward a Critique of Political Reason (in Foucault 2002b, 
298-325), which legitimises contemporary practices of digital 
accountability operating in the epistemological context of the discourse 
of the master. The discourse Foucault provides about pastoral power 
moves from the analysis of the connection between the state and the 
individual in terms of power: 
I’d like to suggest in these two lectures the possibility of 
analyzing another kind of transformation in such power 
relationships. This transformation is, perhaps, less celebrated. 
But I think that it is also important, mainly for modern 
societies. Apparently, this evolution seems antagonistic to the 
evolution toward a centralized state. What I mean in fact is 
the development of power techniques oriented toward 
individuals and intended to rule them in a continuous and 
permanent way. If the state is the political form of a 
centralized and centralizing power, let us call pastorship the 
individualizing power. (Foucault 2002b, 300) 
 
Foucault is interested in understanding how power can govern human 
beings as individuals, namely how a universal construction such as the 
power of the State can be allocated to each individual in its singularity. 
Since power is one side (the other is knowledge), always operating in the 
processes of subjectivation, the answer to this question (the connection 
between a universal power and its application to singularities) can shed 
light on the way in which power can govern singular entities, and, in 
doing so, can trigger specific governmental processes of subjectivation: 
omnes et singulatim, all together and singularly. In this sense, the 
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discovery of a universal power that works on singularities is the 
discovery of the individualising power, the specific power that produces 
individualities.  
Pastoral power is this individualising power. It was unknown to the 
Greek and Latin world, and represents an innovation provided by 
Christianity. Foucault outlined the first feature of pastoral power as the 
necessity of the shepherd, the element that gives birth to the flock. While 
in the Greek world the lawgiver disappears after his political action, the 
presence of the shepherd must be constant and continuous for pastoral 
power to be exercised: 
what the shepherd gathers together is dispersed individuals. 
They gather together on hearing his voice: “I’ll whistle and 
will gather them together.” Conversely, the shepherd only has 
to disappear for the flock to be scattered. In other words, the 
shepherd’s immediate presence and direct action cause the 
flock to exist. Once the good Greek lawgiver, like Solon, has 
resolved any conflicts, what he leaves behind him is a strong 
city with laws enabling it to endure without him. (302) 
 
If the presence of the shepherd must endure, what is his mission? The 
mission of the shepherd is the salvation of the flock—a salvation, 
however, that is provided differently than in the Greek world. While the 
deity provides the conditions for the salvation of the population in the 
Greek world, the shepherd must take a continuous, daily care of the 
flock, which is not an abstract set of items, but rather a set of singular 
 239 
 
individuals. Thus the shepherd has to take a singular, daily care of each 
individual in order to save him/her.128 As Foucault states:  
He pays attention to them all and scans each one of them. 
He’s got to know his flock as a whole, and in detail. Not only 
must he know where good pastures are, the seasons’ laws, and 
the order of things; he must also know each one’s particular 
needs. (…) The shepherd’s power implies individual attention 
paid to each member of the flock (302-303). 
 
The specificity of the meaning of “paying attention” must be outlined. 
How does the shepherd pay attention to and take care of each individual? 
First of all, the shepherd should be able to give an account of each sheep, 
of its actions, and what happens to it (308). But it is important to outline 
again that this account is always singular, and it is based on a singular 
knowledge of the singular sheep. Being the knowledge singular, it 
follows that it individualises. Foucault says: 
Christian pastorship implies a peculiar type of knowledge 
between the pastor and each of his sheep. This knowledge is 
particular. It individualizes. It isn’t enough to know the state 
of the flock. That of each sheep must also be known. The 
theme existed long before there was Christian pastorship, but 
                                                 
128
 ‘The shepherd’s role is to ensure the salvation of his flock. The Greeks also that the 
deity saved the city; they never stopped declaring that the competent leader is a 
helmsman warding his ship away from the rocks. But the way the shepherd saves his 
flock is quite different. It’s not only a matter of saving them all, all together, when 
danger comes nigh. It’s a matter of constant, individualized, and final kindness. 
Constant kindness, for the shepherd ensures his flock’s food; every day he attends to 
their thirst and hunger. The Greek god was asked to provide a fruitful land and abundant 
crops. He wasn’t asked to foster a flock day by day. And individualized kindness, too, 
for the shepherd sees that all the sheep, each and every one of them, is fed and saved. 
Later Hebrew literature, especially, laid the emphasis on such individually kindly 
power: a rabbinical commentary on Exodus explains why Yahweh chose Moses to 
shepherd his people: he had left his flock to go and search for one lost sheep. Last and 
not least, it’s final kindness. The shepherd has a target for his flock. It must either be led 
to good grazing ground or brought back to the fold’ (Foucault 2002b, 302). 
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it was considerably amplified in three different ways. The 
shepherd must be informed as to the material needs of each 
member of the flock and provide for them when necessary. 
He must know what is going on, what each of them does— 
his public sins. Last but not least, he must know what goes on 
in the soul of each one, that is, his secret sins, and his 
progress on the road to sanctity. (309-310) 
 
Thus, in pastoral power, the power is exercised by the shepherd, who is 
indispensable to the existence of the flock, which is never governed by 
the shepherd as a whole because the shepherd knows each one of his 
sheep. By knowing each one individually, the shepherd governs them by 
a form of individualising power that is the trigger of specific processes of 
subjectivation, by which each sheep is a member of the flock but, at the 
same time, always a singular subject.129 
The summary of pastoral power offered above could easily be swapped 
with the fourth chapter, one need merely replace shepherd with digital 
dispositive and flock with user. The digital dispositive does not quantify 
the community of users as a whole, but on the contrary tries to generate 
the most accurate profiling of the individual user. The individual user 
must have his/her needs met in order to satisfy the need just-in-time, 
                                                 
129
 Along the development of the lecture, Foucault illustrates the functioning of pastoral 
power in modern States. He shows, for instance, how in some treatises of the 17th 
century pastoral power assumes different names, maintaining its core regardless. For 
instance, this is the definition of police in Turquet: ‘The police includes everything. But 
from an extremely particular point of view. Men and things are envisioned as to their 
relationships: men’s coexistence on a territory; their relationships as to property; what 
they produce; what is exchanged on the market. It also considers how they live, the 
diseases and accidents that can befall them. What the police sees to is a live, active, 
productive man. Turquet employs a remarkable expression: “The police’s true object is 
man”’ (319). 
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according to good post-Fordist practices. There are algorithms so 
sophisticated (those of the best e-commerce platforms, such as Amazon, 
eBay or Yoox) that they can provide suggestions for purchase that even 
activate a desire about which the user was not aware, but that becomes 
necessary and urgent at the moment the suggestion is displayed. Not only 
the user’s physical location on the planet is known (which as seen above 
is called accountability of presence), but also what s/he eats, who s/he 
meets and politically supports, what kinds of books and music s/he 
prefers, and so on. The digital dispositive is able to process even a 
ghostly figure of the user, unknown to the user him/herself, which can be 
derived from processing identity logs the user generates on the Internet: 
an account that is sometimes out of step with the knowledge that the user 
has of him/herself, a user who tends to suppress most of his/her 
navigation in favour of what s/he considers important. 
But framing the scene of address in pastoral power, and identifying in it 
the genesis of digital accountability, still does not explain the question of 
the user’s engagement in digital accountability. In other words, the 
transition from the question of the pastoral power: Who are you? to the 
question rooted on the perfect engagement: Who am I? is still not clear. 
Echoing Foucault’s reflections on the theme of confession, exposed here 
in the second chapter, it appears that the Christian in the moment of 
confession is subjected to a process of knowledge that led him to “tell-
the-truth-of-him/herself”. Which regime of truth is at work in this 
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context? Foucault’s analysis of Christian confession has identified a 
Copernican revolution in the analysis of the relationship between subject 
and truth. The subject does not account truth in the confession, but rather 
s/he makes him/herself true. A similar process is present within the 
exercise of the pastoral power: ‘In order to ensure this individual 
knowledge, Christianity appropriated two essential instruments at work 
in the Hellenistic world—self-examination and the guidance of 
conscience. It took them over, but not without altering them 
considerably’ (310). However, Christian confession is an even more 
refined instrument as it makes the subject’s opinion irrelevant. It is not 
the content of knowledge that becomes true; it is the Christian 
him/herself. As explained in the second chapter: it is not true what the 
Christian thinks; the Christian his or herself is true in the moment s/he 
speaks about him/herself in the moment of the confession.  
This conclusion is a calibrated harmony between confession as a process 
of truth and subjectivity as the submission of the Christian subject to 
some type of governmentality. The consequence is trenchant: if the 
Christian subject is saved when s/he subjectifies in the process of 
subjectivation of confession, this moment is genealogically the 
emergence of the modern subject, who materialises him/herself in the 
regimes of truth imposed by governmentality. However, this emergency 
would be a classic Foucauldian analytical tool, independent of the case of 
confession, if within the confession an additional element is not found: 
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namely that the subject in the confession tells the truth of him/herself. 
The fundamental consequence of what has just been exposed is that the 
contemporary Western human being, genealogically Christian, is true 
when s/he qualifies, preaches, objectifies and accounts him/herself—
when s/he says the truth into the governmental dispositives that repair 
Christian confession. In digital accountability the Christian confession 
finds its paroxysmal state, so that the necessity of the question: Who are 
you? no longer makes sense, having been replaced by a subject that is 
fully involved, committed and engaged in accounting him/herself as a 
form of self-fulfilment. Who am I? is the fundamental question of the 
subject quantified in networks, as he or she is devoted to digital 
accountability in order to fulfil the need to reiterate the truth about 
him/herself. 
But what is the plan of salvation within which the subject establishes the 
truth of itself? Or, in other words, what is the scenario in which the 
subject finds the truth about itself? To answer these questions, one still 
has to resort to Foucault's Discipline & Punish (1995). Even in this case, 
in fact, the birth of disciplinary systems is the origin of the plan of 
contemporary salvation. The purpose of this research is to prove that the 
current plan of salvation is first quantifiable, but secondly it is argued 
that this quantification is not random but responds to a specific system of 
power-knowledge: the norm. 
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The power of the norm is illustrated in a chapter of Discipline and Punish 
entitled 'The means of correct training'. First, Foucault aims to explain 
that the norm does not reside in a legal system, but ‘it enjoys a kind of 
judicial privilege with its own laws, its specific offences, its particular 
forms of judgement. The disciplines established an 'infra-penality'; they 
partitioned an area that the laws had left empty; they defined and 
repressed a mass of behaviour that the relative indifference of the great 
systems of punishment had allowed to escape’ (177-178). Since the law 
and its punitive systems are not able to cover any kind of infraction and 
deviance, it becomes necessary in disciplinary systems that a further 
means of coercion act on the behaviours of each individual. So this 
further disciplinary device concerns behaviours, but without classifying 
them according to the guilty / not-guilty dichotomy, punishable / non-
punishable. Rather, ‘the definition of behaviour and performance on the 
basis of the two opposed values of good and evil; instead of the simple 
division of the prohibition, as practised in penal justice, we have a 
distribution between a positive pole and a negative pole; all behaviour 
falls in the field between good and bad marks, good and bad points’ 
(180). Thus, in disciplinary systems human actions begin to be placed 
within immanent hierarchies, based on the Good / Evil axis. This 
apparatus of hierarchical classification, however, works differently from 
the legislative apparatus because it allows to place each behavior on a 
scale of values according to a progressive approach to Good rather than a 
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binary Right / Wrong binomial. In this way, all human behaviours firstly 
can be captured and framed accurately, secondly they can be placed on a 
hierarchical scale. As Foucault states, ‘the perpetual penality that 
traverses all points and supervises every instant in the disciplinary 
institutions compares, differentiates, hierarchizes, homogenizes, 
excludes’ (183). 
A further element needs still to be explained. Disciplinary apparatuses 
are able to classify any human behaviour according to a scale of values. 
But how is this scale of values generated? It is based on the principle of 
the standard. Each disciplinary system requires a certain kind of 
performativity of behaviour, because this performativity represents the 
optimum, in terms of the Best for the discipline itself: a certain degree of 
physical training for the soldier, some degree of knowledge for the 
learner, some degree of healthiness for the population, so that the Army, 
the Education system, the State can perform at their best. The norm is the 
best standard for the health of the apparatus, and the health of the 
apparatus is, starting with disciplinary systems, the health of the 
individual, and vice versa. In the transition from the right to death to 
power over life, precisely the epochal shift of the eighteenth century 
(Foucault 1990a), ‘the power of the Norm appears through the 
disciplines. (...) Like surveillance and with it, normalization becomes one 
of the great instruments of power at the end of the classical age’ 
(Foucault 1995, 184). The norm thus establishes a principle of 'formal 
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equality' (184), which represents the optimisation of individuals with 
respect to the apparatus. All individual differences, which may constitute 
perturbations in the health of the apparatus, can be reset by the power of 
the norm, which makes behaviours homogeneous and makes them more 
easily governable. Through the complementary technique of 
examination, each individual is rendered a single, classified, and hence 
homogenised case. In other words, there exists the possibility for every 
individual to be normalised.130 
The norm does not require a judicial apparatus to function because it is 
based on small constraints that lead the subject to the introjection of the 
norm itself. A certain level of health, of physical well-being, of wealth, 
of knowledge: it is not required by the legal system that the subject meets 
some standards in these activities. The individual itself, in order to 
become true in the apparatus, internalises the norm. The norm has the 
great power to engage every single individual, which, consequently, 
makes itself accountable in front of it. As highlighted by Sinclair, 
‘Personal accountability is fidelity to personal conscience in basic values 
such as respect for human dignity and acting in a manner that accepts 
                                                 
130
 ‘It is the examination which, by combining hierarchical surveillance and normalizing 
judgement, assures the great disciplinary functions of distribution and classification, 
maximum extraction of forces and time, continuous genetic accumulation, optimum 
combination of aptitudes and, thereby, the fabrication of cellular, organic, genetic and 
combinatory individuality’ (Foucault 1995, 192). 
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responsibility for affecting the lives of others. (…) Because it is enforced 
by psychological, rather than external, controls, personal accountability is 
regarded as particularly powerful and binding’ (Sinclair 1995, 230).131 
Resuming the above list of QS activities, it is clear how each of them can 
be subject to the power of the norm, so that the individual meets the 
standard required by the apparatus: how many miles or steps do we walk 
per day; how much physical activity we do; how many calories we 
consume each day, divided into carbs, fat, protein, specific ingredients; 
what emotions we daily express in each of our activities (and what the 
right mix of them is with respect to the performance goals required); a 
certain level of intelligence and / or knowledge and / or competence; the 
number and kind of people we aim to be surrounded by; the way we 
spend free time, etc. Each of these elements falls outside the power of the 
law, but within the power of the norm. In the list above, everyone can 
easily classify its behaviors and analyse the scales of values within which 
they are framed, and the origin of these scales of value. 
But it is necessary to add to the power of the norm, the power of the 
panopticon gaze: ‘the constant scrutiny of a Panoptic gaze which 
penetrates right to the very core of each member's subjectivity creates a 
climate where self-management is assured’ (Sewell, Wilkinson 1993, 
                                                 
131
 As Mulgan pointed out, the concept of responsibility also had the same trajectory 
from exteriority to interiority: ‘After all, the term ‘responsibility’ itself has travelled a 
similar route from the external to the internal, from the capacity to ‘respond’ or answer 
to someone else, to the capacity to act freely and ‘responsibly’’ (Mulgan 2000, 561). 
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284). Digital accountability is morphing into a new form of panopticism, 
which determines a subject’s visibility according to his or her 
quantifications on digital dispositives. This panopticon disciplines and 
governs the visibility of subjects according to their exposures on digital 
dispositives. While its essence (that digital accountability as a main 
process of subjectivation, derived from the merging of the discourse of 
the master with pastoral power and normalization) is brand new, some 
features can nevertheless be seen as a remediation of past issues, already 
present in previous panopticons, namely the ones of disciplinary societies 
and control societies. An outline of the analogies and discontinuities 
between different forms of panopticon will follow. 
 All panopticons deal with individuals. Foucault already hints at this 
when he describes the first form of the panopticon in Discipline and 
Punish: ‘The crowd, a compact mass, a locus of multiple exchanges, 
individualities merging together, a collective effect, is abolished and 
replaced by a collection of separated individualities’ (Foucault 1995, 
201). Supervision and the processes of numeration keep individualities 
separated, the effect of which is the solitude of inmates, ‘sequestered and 
observed’ (201). While the dimension of observing singular 
individualities is definitely still at work in the contemporary panopticon, 
solitude is erased and transformed into the membership in a community 
by the effect of the pastoral power.  
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Like the original panopticon, the contemporary one also does not need 
the one who exercises power to be a specific human being (as opposed to 
the matter of sovereignty in absolute power). Foucault explains the 
panopticon as follows: 
 It is an important mechanism, for it automatizes and 
disindividualizes power. Power has its principle not so much 
in a person as in a certain concerted distribution of bodies, 
surfaces, lights, gazes; in an arrangement whose internal 
mechanisms produce the relation in which individuals are 
caught up. The ceremonies, the rituals, the marks by which 
the sovereign's surplus power was manifested are useless. 
There is a machinery that assures dissymmetry, 
disequilibrium, difference. Consequently, it does not matter 
who exercises power. Any individual, taken almost at 
random, can operate the machine. (202) 
 
The same way to exercise power is also retrieved in digital dispositives. 
First of all, users basically deal with interfaces. But, secondly, the digital 
machine conceals human beings exercising power behind algorithms. 
Very few know, or can describe, who is behind the power exercised in 
the digital world. Even though some founders of digital platforms have 
reached the status of celebrities, the power that the user meets in his/her 
daily practice is not the power of a specific person, but it is instead the 
power of the platform, namely the power of the algorithm.  
The first episode of the third season of the Black Mirror television series, 
Nosedive (2016), is the perfect representation of this invisibility of the 
panotical machine, in a world where every social interaction is subject to 
immediate and normative appraisal by the environment. Each individual 
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corresponds to a scale of values ranging from one to five stars. The 
average of the received ratings continuously returns a value that defines 
every person in society, in his economic possibilities, in accessing 
essential services (health system, but not only) and so forth. On the one 
hand, the machine that generates algorithms that handle Lacie's life is 
completely invisible, and it is manifested only through an application of 
Lacie’s smartphone (the invisible feature of the digital panopticon: what 
is the materiality of the Silicon Big Company Valley?). Already Zuboff 
had noticed this aspect of the new informatic panopticon: ‘The 
counterpart of the central power is a video screen’ (Zuboff 1989, 322). 
On the other hand, Lacie is perfectly accountable from the digital point of 
view: she does not question the master's speech, which judges and 
categorises every action of her life; she is led by the digital shepherd; she 
obsessively tries to respect the norm (a numeric threshold established by 
the system, which allows her access to higher social status communities 
and more qualified services). At the same time, the episode brutally 
reveals the inclusion and exclusion mechanisms of digital accountability, 
to the point that the protagonist is excluded from the marriage of her best 
friend due to her low social score. 
And, like the former panopticon, the contemporary one is characterised 
by efficiency and scalability. Foucault observed about the panopticon: ‘In 
each of its applications, it makes it possible to perfect the exercise of 
power. It does this in several ways: because it can reduce the number of 
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those who exercise it, while increasing the number of those on whom it is 
exercised’ (206). The same feature can be identified in the contemporary 
panopticon: a project designed to be efficient (some huge platforms can 
be managed by very few people) and scalable (the power of the hardware 
is the only limit for the inclusion of new members, which can be 
constantly increased). If the amount of users in the major social networks 
is well known, the efficiency and scalability of the platform allow the 
inclusion of as many people as possible not only in social media. At the 
government level, it is meant to point out, for example, the Unique ID of 
India. India is the most populous world democracy, with about one 
billion and two hundred million people. One of the country's constant 
problems is the census, so that the actual population is always under 
control and numbered. That is why the Indian government is 
implementing the largest biometric project ever existed: the Unique 
ID.132 It consists of a set of biometric data, starting from the fingerprint, 
which allows to register each individual in order to better govern it, even 
in basic services (for instance, distribution of food to less wealthy 
individuals). This digital identification program, which has raised many 
discussions, is possible because of the efficient and scalable features of 
digital panopticon. 
                                                 
132
 See http://www.wsj.com/video/can-technology-solve-india-biggest-
problem/80D7413C-3EE3-49FA-A921-29DD1A1A3E1A.html?mod=e2twi.  
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Additionally, as Foucault keenly observes about the panopticon of the 
disciplinary societies: ‘it is possible to intervene at any moment and 
because the constant pressure acts even before the offences, mistakes or 
crimes have been committed’ (206). The digital panopticon has refined 
this feature. It is not matter of precognition, like in some sci-fi 
productions. The digital dispositive is able to provide a sophisticated 
analysis of users’ behaviours in order to create behavioural patterns close 
to the profile of the specific individual. What in Minority Report still 
seemed to be science fiction, it actually has a widespread application 
today. There are numerous software (Risk Terrain Modeling,133 
HunchLab,134 PredPol,135 the Italian Keycrime136 for example) that 
support police in identifying geographic areas, communities, and - in 
some cases - the most potential criminal individuals. These software 
work according to a reductionist principle, namely an algorithm that 
classifies communities as risky, basing its induction on past delinquency 
presence. This creates a spiral, so that it identifies crime where crime 
already exists. However, it is useful to point out that these software 
actually work, and have led to the reduction of crime in the areas where 
                                                 
133
 http://www.riskterrainmodeling.com/. 
134
 https://www.hunchlab.com/. 
135
 http://www.predpol.com/. 
136
 http://www.keycrime.com/en/. 
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they were adopted through the work of risk management (discipline from 
which the predictable police genealogically derives). 
Thus, the suggestion advanced by the digital machine is so accurate that 
it seems to be delivering a message from the future, while it is simply the 
effect of a statistical inference. The user has this kind of feeling when 
Amazon suggests a book that the user includes in his/her wish list, or 
when Facebook suggests a friend from the past. The algorithm’s 
effectiveness is understood here as a kind of precognition. The 
contemporary panopticon remediates an allure of immateriality, of 
ethereality. Foucault states: ‘in these conditions, its strength is that it 
never intervenes, it is exercised spontaneously and without noise, it 
constitutes a mechanism whose effects follow from one another. 
Because, without any physical instrument other than architecture and 
geometry, it acts directly on individuals; it gives ‘power of mind over 
mind’ (206) 
The essence of the panopticon is that its hardware, and the staging of it, 
must be reduced to the minimum. The presumed virtuality of the 
contemporary panopticon has reached the limit of its immateriality, 
opening the door to some reflections about the connection between the 
absence of hardware and digital dispositives. In this sense, the power of 
mind over mind is brought to its paroxysm, for which the concealment of 
the hardware is directly proportional to the amount of power. 
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The influence of the disciplinary society is also felt in the panopticon’s 
design, which must be rapid and effective:  
There are two images, then, of discipline. At one extreme, the 
discipline-blockade, the enclosed institution, established on the 
edges of society, turned inwards towards negative functions: 
arresting evil, breaking communications, suspending time. At 
the other extreme, with panopticism, is the discipline-
mechanism: a functional mechanism that must improve the 
exercise of power by making it lighter, more rapid, more 
effective, a design of subtle coercion for a society to come. 
(209) 
Rapidity and effectiveness of dispositives, among which the panopticon 
can be considered, are not qualities of a good design. As brilliantly 
guessed by Foucault, they are ways by which the exercise of power is 
improved. The qualities of digital dispositives—a rapid response time, 
for instance, in order to provide a good user experience—function to 
improve the exercise of power. The better the user experience, the greater 
the chance of the digital dispositives’ success in subjugating the user.  
Yet the panopticon was the essence of disciplinary societies. How can we 
then find the connection between the new panopticon and the above-
defined society of accountability? In the following quote about 
disciplinary societies at least two key elements can be found to define 
this connection: 
they were expected to neutralize dangers, to fix useless or 
disturbed populations, to avoid the inconveniences of over-
large assemblies; now they were being asked to play a 
positive role, for they were becoming able to do so, to 
increase the possible utility of individuals. 
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(…) the massive, compact disciplines are broken down into 
flexible methods of control, which may be transferred and 
adapted. Sometimes the closed apparatuses add to their 
internal and specific function a role of external surveillance, 
developing around themselves a whole margin of lateral 
controls. (210–213) 
 
First of all, the panopticon aims to increase the utility of individuals. The 
same feeling is found even in the contemporary panopticon, where digital 
dispositives seem, at least, to be functional to the satisfaction of the 
users’ needs. Secondly, methods of control are immanent to digital 
dispositives, in a way that can continuously be adapted to the 
emergencies coming from the environment. All these features make the 
panopticon assure, eventually, ‘an infinitesimal distribution of the power 
relations’ (216), where “infinitesimal” can assume the meaning, in the 
contemporary world, of infinitely quantifiable.  
What is happening in China is significant to the purpose. According to 
the Financial Times (Clover 2016) and the Wall Street Journal (Chin, 
Wong 2016), the Chinese government is working on the first 
governmental project based on the principle of creditworthiness not only 
as a financial factor but also as a social factor. Creditworthiness is, in 
fact, born within the financial field, in order to measure the ability of a 
person or institution to repay a debt. The Fair Isaac Corporation137 
created an algorithm to measure the creditworthiness of each individual 
                                                 
137
 http://www.fico.com/. 
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or institution: the FICO index, now adopted globally. In simple terms, the 
FICO measures the possibility that an individual has to return the money 
that is lent to him. Born as a financial concept, it seems that the Chinese 
government intends to extend it to the social sphere and to include social 
parameters, to give birth to the social credit score. The social credit score 
will consist of a single number determined by a series of algorithms that 
will restore the individual's social reliability. Not only financial solvency, 
but also a series of other behaviors (small offenses, fines, family location 
for example) are included in the system, in order to classify each citizen 
with a single rating of good citizenship. And, like in the Black Mirror 
episode cited above, each citizen's score will mean access to certain 
services of more or less poor quality: education, health, employment (to 
name a few). From the point of view of the individual, s/he must always 
be accountable to his actions in front of the governmental system. Again, 
even in this case there is a regulatory and non-legal based response to 
political issues; and it is no coincidence that it happens in a country - 
China - that for cultural issues has received, through Marx and Mao, the 
rationalist spirit of government: ‘On the one side, exercising 
accountability therefore involves elements of monitoring and oversight. 
Its mission includes finding facts and generating evidence. On the other 
side, the norm of accountability continues the Enlightment’s project of 
subjecting power not only to the rule of law but also to the rule of reason. 
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Power should be bound by legal constraints but also by the logic of the 
public reasoning’ (Schedler 1999, 15). 
At the end of this parallel between the panopticon of the disciplinary 
societies and the panopticon generated by the digital accountability, 
despite all the possible and historically necessary divergences, one may 
subscribe to what Foucault summarised about the disciplines: 
the peculiarity of the disciplines is that they try to define in 
relation to the multiplicities a tactics of power that fulfils 
three criteria: firstly, to obtain the exercise of power at the 
lowest possible cost (economically, by the low expenditure it 
involves; politically, by its discretion, its low exteriorization, 
its relative invisibility, the little resistance it arouses); 
secondly, to bring the effects of this social power to their 
maximum intensity and to extend them as far as possible, 
without either failure or interval; thirdly, to link this 
“economic” growth of power with the output of the 
apparatuses (educational, military, industrial or medical) 
within which it is exercised; in short, to increase both the 
docility and the utility of all the elements of the system. 
(…)  what was new, in the eighteenth century, was that, by 
being combined and generalized, they attained a level at 
which the formation of knowledge and the increase of power 
regularly reinforce one another in a circular process. At this 
point, the disciplines crossed the “technological” threshold. 
First the hospital, then the school, then, later, the workshop 
were not simply “reordered” by the disciplines; they became, 
thanks to them, apparatuses such that any mechanism of 
objectification could be used in them as an instrument of 
subjection, and any growth of power could give rise in them 
to possible branches of knowledge; it was this link, proper to 
the technological systems, that made possible within the 
disciplinary element the formation of clinical medicine, 
psychiatry, child psychology, educational psychology, the 
rationalization of labour. It is a double process, then: an 
epistemological “thaw” through a refinement of power 
relations; a multiplication of the effects of power through the 
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formation and accumulation of new forms of knowledge. 
(218-224) 
 
Despite any arguments about the fracture between disciplinary societies 
and contemporary societies, the new panopticon of the digital 
accountability is, for all intents and purposes, a disciplinary system. 
But Gilles Deleuze in a dense text first published in 1992, Postscript on 
the Societies of Control, outlines in the notion of control a possible 
prosecution of disciplinary societies: 
We are in a generalized crisis in relation to all the 
environments of enclosure—prison, hospital, factory, school, 
family. The family is an “interior,” in crisis like all other 
interiors—scholarly, professional, etc. The administrations in 
charge never cease announcing supposedly necessary 
reforms: to reform schools, to reform industries, hospitals, the 
armed forces, prisons. But everyone knows that these 
institutions are finished, whatever the length of their 
expiration periods. It's only a matter of administering their 
last rites and of keeping people employed until the 
installation of the new forces knocking at the door. These are 
the societies of control, which are in the process of replacing 
disciplinary societies. “Control” is the name Burroughs 
proposes as a term for the new monster, one that Foucault 
recognizes as our immediate future. (Deleuze 1992, 4) 
 
As stated by Barbrook, ‘Gilles Deleuze – a veteran New Left philosopher 
– warned that new information technologies were providing the 
surveillance and monitoring infrastructure of the emerging authoritarian 
‘society of control’. Instead of emancipating the masses, the advent of the 
Net threatened to reinforce the power of their oppressors’ (2007, 271). 
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While the difference between discipline and control is still a matter for a 
debate that there is no intention to delve into here,138 some issues raised 
by Deleuze deserve further explication. First of all, Deleuze identifies a 
difference between disciplines and control: while disciplines are 
distinct139 and analogical, control is based on numerical modulation (‘the 
different control mechanisms are inseparable variations, forming a 
system of variable geometry the language of which is numerical (which 
doesn’t necessarily mean binary)’ (4). While an analysis of the notion of 
modulation would fall outside of the purview of this dissertation, Deleuze 
surely was able to recognise one of the main features of the development 
of disciplines nearly twenty years ago: numerability, which found a 
definite explosion with digital technologies.140 Another one of Deleuze’s 
arguments is linked to digital technologies:  
In the societies of control, on the other hand, what is important is 
no longer either a signature or a number, but a code: the code is a 
“password” (…). The numerical language of control is made of 
codes that mark access to information, or reject it. We no longer 
find ourselves dealing with the mass/individual pair. Individuals 
have become “dividuals,” and masses, samples, data, markets, or 
“banks.” (5)  
                                                 
138
 Deleuze himself, while writing this text in 1992, underscored the possibility that 
societies of control were the following stage of disciplinary societies. This dissertation 
takes analogies between the two paradigms into account more than differences.  
139
 ‘In the disciplinary societies one was always starting again (from school to the 
barracks, from the barracks to the factory), while in the societies of control one is never 
finished with anything—the corporation, the educational system, the armed services 
being metastable states coexisting in one and the same modulation, like a universal 
system of deformation’ (4). 
140
 It is worth pointing out that Gilles Deleuze, though he died in 1995, was able to see 
and use one of the first consumer network infrastructures: French Minitel, developed in 
1982 by the French telecommunications ministry. 
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In the societies of accountability, the password has become the account, 
which is not only a login procedure but also a profile, rich with 
information. Being denied access to information is no longer a common 
practice, since more accounts are provided in digital accountability. The 
more accounts are provided, the more subjects can be governed. Out of 
the dialectics individual/dividual, it is certain that the subject is reduced 
to data. Therefore, Deleuze has been able to detect some signs of 
development within disciplinary societies that, independently from the 
label of control, are surely manifest in the society of accountability, 
sometimes on a paradoxical level.141 But in the societies of accountability 
the numerical language is not only a tool for accessing information and 
for being controlled, but also the digital extension through which the 
subject is normalised, guided, interrogated: in other words, governed.  
At this time, the account that is perhaps closer to a total governmentality 
does not come from the Western world but from China, which should be 
viewed as the new digital frontier. This is WeChat,142 that in 2016 was 
numbered around one billion accounts. WeChat, developed by the big 
digital Chinese player Tencent,143 is an application of instant messaging 
                                                 
141
 ‘Accountability is sometimes taken to be more than just a mechanism of control; it 
becomes identified with control itself’ (Mulgan 2000, 563). 
142
 http://www.wechat.com. 
143
 https://www.tencent.com/en-us/index.html.  
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that includes several other functions, which made it to become the more 
complex digital account ever existed: 
• Messaging: text, voice, one-to-many (like Whatsapp, Facebook 
Messenger); 
• One-to-one sharing: photos, videos, locations (like Whatsapp, 
Facebook Messenger); 
• Conferencing and streaming (like Skype, Whatsapp, Facebook live, 
Periscope); 
• Official accounting, in order to gather and push followers (like 
Facebook); 
• Social feeding: texts, images, comments, music, links (like 
Facebook, Instagram, Twitter); 
• Mobile paying and sending money, through a digital wallet that 
interacts with QRcodes (like a credit cards, Paypal, Amazon, but 
with more features); 
• Booking: hotels, transportations, appointments (like Booking, but 
with more features); 
• Reading QRcodes, so to get more information from digital or 
physical tags; 
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• Finding entities in the physical surroundings, like friends or shops 
(like Tinder, Foursquare, Aroundme) 
• Researching (like Google); 
• Digital marketing (like Google, Facebook). 
It has been calculated that 90 minutes a day are spent on WeChat by each 
user.144 It is worth underlining two more aspects of this account: The first 
is that it is controlled by the censorship of the Chinese government, even 
in non-Chinese accounts, as the servers are located in China. The second 
aspect is that, in 2017, the WeChat Index has been launched. It measures 
the popularity of an account on a timeframe from 7 to 90 days. The Index 
includes data such as sharing, likes received, views, and readings. As far 
as it can be reported when writing this research, WeChat is the tool 
closest to the unique account ever designed. 
In conclusion, the new panopticon is a new development of the previous 
one. In the society of accountability fear, which was the main engine of 
the Orwellian Big Brother, has disappeared, and has instead been 
replaced by a insidious form of happiness: ‘At the root of each apparatus 
lies an all-too-human desire for happiness. The capture and 
subjectification of this desire in a separate sphere constitutes the specific 
                                                 
144
 All information about WeChat is from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WeChat. 
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power of the apparatus’ (Agamben 2009, 8). The fundamental aesthetic 
tune is the Kunderian second tear, namely: Kitsch (Kundera 1999). 
In a contemporary world in which visibility has become data itself, 
Foucault’s lessons about practices should not go forgotten if TruYou 
(Eggers 2013) one day appears on the horizon of world life.  
The digitally accountable human being is thus the one who follows the 
disciplined human being and the controlled human being. This shift is not 
a change of paradigm, but provides another layer to describe the 
superimposition of the disciplinary paradigm and the paradigm of 
control. The advent of digital dispositives is the necessary moment for 
the birth of this new paradigm. Its essence is digital accountability, a 
specific process of subjectivation that finds its dimension of knowledge 
in the discourse of the master and its dimension of power in the pastoral 
power and the power of the norm. Contemporary wo/men operate within 
the society of accountability.  
As Frederic Gros brilliantly summarises, the practices of the self ‘are 
programs as stylisation of existence that only make sense within the 
horizon of freedom: a freedom, however, that is not understood as a 
fundamental nature but as a game of differentiating practices’ (Gros 
2008, 298). If anonymity and anomie are human limit-conditions, 
involving radical and schizoid de-subjectivations, a free play of 
accountability seems now to be the only feasible way to an exercise of 
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freedom, so that the modern human being does not remain a prisoner of 
itself. 
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6 Conclusion: Playing Accountability 
 
The critique advanced in this dissertation requires that one take a stance 
regarding his or her presence on digital media. The basis of individual 
freedom in this regard lies in a paradoxical relationship with visibility. 
One can choose to be visible or invisible, accountable or silent. One can 
satisfy the desire for appearance or exercise the practice of the 
disappearance (Rovatti 2010, 158).  An individual’s freedom thus finds 
the conditions of its possibility in-between these two polarities. 
Furthermore, these two polarities mirror another dichotomy: the common 
impulse of digital media users towards visibility as opposed to a critique 
that encourages silence and invisibility. But, as Rovatti keenly observes:  
it is easy to ascertain that the paradox is reproduced when we 
acknowledge that we are all within this dispositive of power 
(and of “subjectivation”), that no lines of escape exist really 
immune of it, and that a praise of the unappearance, of the 
“pure” unappearance, is not a realistic strategy, namely it is 
not reachable in our standard life style. (158 [my translation])  
 
On the contrary, a strategy of invisibility on social media is perhaps 
harmful, because it places the subject outside of common daily practices 
and, in doing so, outside of history.145 
                                                 
145
 For the same reason—the distance with the ordinary life—the powerful, wide and 
radical theorisation of the Body without Organs (BwO), proposed by Antonin Artaud 
(1975) and theorized by Deleuze and Guattari (1987), has not been taken into account 
here. The French authors have defined the BwO as follows: ‘At any rate, you have one 
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Even the notion of the Temporary Autonomous Zone (Bey 1991) is 
useless, as it is a utopian, outlandish absolute-Outside, very far from the 
standard contemporary human condition. The T.A.Z. would operate like 
a dispositive that allows the re-territorialisation of any kind of possible 
life that a subject might have, par essence ek-static. But the dispositive—
the notion upon which this dissertation is grounded—cannot be a T.A.Z. 
as it is exactly the opposite: a formation of knowledge-power that 
triggers specific processes of subjectivation. The position (setzung) of the 
dispositive denies the possibility of the T.A.Z’S existence, and vice 
versa. When the subject is placed in a T.A.Z., s/he is consequently asked 
to design his/her diagrams as strategies of existence. The subject must re-
territorialise him/herself and his/her own environment while being 
                                                                                                                       
(or several). It's not so much that it pre-exists or comes ready-made, although in certain 
respects it is pre-existent. At any rate, you make one, you can't desire without making 
one. And it awaits you; it is an inevitable exercise or experimentation, already 
accomplished the moment you undertake it, unaccomplished as long as you don't. This 
is not reassuring, because you can botch it. Or it can be terrifying, and lead you to your 
death. It is nondesire as well as desire. It is not at all a notion or a concept but a practice, 
a set of practices. You never reach the Body without Organs, you can't reach it, you are 
forever attaining it, and it is a limit. [...] The BwO is what remains when you take 
everything away. What you take away is precisely the phantasy, and signifiances and 
subjectifications as a whole (151). Secondly, while this dissertation is grounded on the 
notion of the self, the BwO is the radical removal of any hypothesis of foundation of the 
subject on the notion of self: ‘The field of immanence is not internal to the self, but 
neither does it come from an external self or a nonself. Rather, it is like the absolute 
Outside that knows no Selves because interior and exterior are equally a part of the 
immanence in which they have fused’ (156). Thirdly, this dissertation is an investigation 
about processes of subjectivation, while the BwO is the radical de-subjectivation that 
eradicates the self inasmuch self: ‘To the strata as a whole, the BwO opposes 
disarticulation (or n articulations) as the property of the plane of consistency, 
experimentation as the operation on that plane (no signifier, never interpret!), and 
nomadism as the movement (keep moving, even in place, never stop moving, 
motionless voyage, desubjectification)’ (160). Lastly, the practice of the BwO has been 
understood has harmful by the same authors: ‘if in dismantling the organism there are 
times one courts death, in slipping away from significance and subjection one courts 
falsehood, illusion and hallucination and psychic death (160). 
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removed from the historical time and separated from all remaining 
processes of subjectivation. Again, one finds a subjective existence that 
has lost any possible link with ordinary daily life. 
But at the same time, the critique advanced in the present dissertation has 
outlined that a real practice of freedom on digital media is difficult to say 
the least. The discourse of the master has been demonstrated to securely 
govern contemporary subjects, having found a powerful tactical 
instrument in digital media: a subject whose desire has been quantified, 
whose autobiography is fragmented in sterile digital items and who is 
alienated from the other through his/her computerised representation. 
Thus, in order to provide a conclusion to the discourse about freedom 
within—and not outside of—contemporary digital dispositives, the 
proposal advanced begins first faces the notion of entropy,146 which 
should be verified as the epistemological ground for the ethical practices 
of existence. 
Vilèm Flusser’s notion of the technical image, which he advances in his 
text Into the Universe of Technical Images (2011), provides the first step 
for the analysis of the notion of entropy. 147 In introducing the notion of 
technical image, Flusser proposes a taxonomy of them:  
                                                 
146
 A short definition of entropy is provided by Prigogine and Stengers: ‘the entropy law 
describes (…)  the evolution toward a “disorder,” toward the most probable state’ 
(Progogine and Stengers 1984, 19). 
147
 One can find similar arguments in the text that Flusser dedicated to photography: 
Towards a Philosophy of Photography (2006). 
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This essay is about the universe of technical images, the 
universe that for the past few decades has been making use of 
photographs, films, videos, television screens, and computer 
terminals to take over the task formerly served by linear texts, 
that is, the task of transmitting information crucial to society 
and to individuals. (5)  
 
And, soon after, a more theoretical definition of the notion is 
provided:  
technical images rely on texts from which they have come and, 
in fact, are not surfaces but mosaics assembled from particles. 
They are therefore not prehistoric, two-dimensional structures 
but rather posthistorical, without dimension. We are not 
turning back to a two-dimensional prehistory but rather 
emerging into a posthistorical, dimensionless state. (6) 
 
Flusser consequently deduces that, unlike traditional images, technical 
images do not represent a state of things, but are instead representation of 
concepts. Technical images are created by techno codes, which allow the 
transformation of concepts into images. The photographer, for instance, 
does not reproduce a state of things, but s/he represents the concepts 
related to what makes signification for the state of things. And the 
concepts themselves are not completely free, in the sense of the free 
choice of the photographer. The photographer is asked to select a 
concept, appropriate for that specific state of thing, but only from a 
limited set of concepts: the ones that the photographic “apparatus” (as 
Flusser names it) allows to exist. Flusser states: ‘if we look more closely, 
we can confirm that the photographic gesture, in fact, does somehow 
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carry out the apparatus’s inner instructions. The apparatus does as the 
photographer desires, but the photographer can only desire what the 
apparatus can do’ (20).148 McLuhan had already demonstrated that the 
medium is the condition of possibility for the existence of any 
expression, and the limit of the medium is the limit of the expression.149 
Flusser’s discourse is consistent with this McLuhanian assumption, yet 
he goes further insofar as he has been able to connect the apparatus (a 
more powerful notion than medium) with its specific epistemological 
background. Media apparatuses produce technical images, but are 
themselves the result of the application of some scientific knowledge. It 
results that the photograph a photographer takes here and now is the 
effect of a media apparatus that is the effect of a scientific knowledge. 
Flusser advances a strong theoretical assumption: namely, that the world 
of technical images (whose boundaries can be extended to any digital 
production) is subjugated by a hidden level of power-knowledge, 
constituted by the scientific knowledge through which the technical 
apparatus is built. Even if Flusser did not apply this terminology, one can 
nonetheless see the discourse of the master at work, which exerts a 
                                                 
148
 The connection between desire and apparatus is clarified very precisely in a 
following paragraph: ‘human freedom no longer consists in being able to shape the 
world to one’s own desires (apparatuses do this better) but to instruct (program) the 
apparatus as to the desired form and to stop (control) it when this form has been 
produced.’ (73) 
149
 Aesthetics of communication aims to explore this link. See, for instance, the work of 
Mario Costa L’ estetica della comunicazione. Come il medium ha polverizzato il 
messaggio. Sull'uso estetico della simultaneità a distanza (1999). 
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powerful and effective influence in creating the conditions of possibility 
for technical images.  
But Flusser’s discourse is not limited to grounding a hidden political and 
epistemological layer of the production of technical images. Flusser 
makes an impressive conceptual effort to situate the production of 
technical images within the context of evolution, thus he also takes 
notions like probability, information and entropy into account. The first 
connection regards probability and information:  
‘“Probable” and “improbable” are concepts from informatics, 
in which information can be defined as an improbable situation: 
the more improbable, the more informative. The second law of 
thermodynamics suggests that the emerging particle universe 
tends toward an increasingly probable situation, toward 
disinformation, that is, to a steadily more even distribution of 
particles, until form is finally lost altogether.’ (17) 
 
If information is linked to improbability, it follows that what is not 
informative is more probable. The second law of thermodynamics is 
entropy, for which everything in the universe is destined to lack form and 
information (disinformation). Following the law of entropy, 
disinformation is the more probable state of the universe. Flusser is able 
to situate apparatuses in this scenario, which he claims aim to generate 
improbable situations. He adds one more element to the dichotomy of 
improbable/information versus probable/disinformation: visibility. While 
the probable, characterised by invisibility, tends towards the absence of 
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form, the improbable (whose informative content is higher) is defined by 
its visibility. It follows that:  
image-making mechanisms were invented, namely, to 
produce improbable, informative situations to consolidate 
invisible possibilities into visible improbabilities.[…] The 
apparatus is programmed to generate improbable situations. 
This means that such improbable situations are in their 
programs and do not arise as errors, as in the program of the 
universe, but as situations that are deliberately sought, that 
become more probable as the program runs. (18) 
 
But Flusser himself reveals that every apparatus is linked to another 
apparatus, with a progressive mise en abyme:  
Around these transmission points sit functionaries who press 
the keys of apparatuses, especially those that compute 
images. For these images model the behavior, perception, and 
experience of all other functionaries. The functionaries 
instruct the images about how the images should instruct the 
receivers. The apparatuses instruct the functionaries how they 
are to instruct the images. And other apparatuses instruct 
these apparatuses about how the functionaries are to instruct. 
Throughout this seeming and self-obscuring hierarchy of 
instruction, one senses a general entropic tendency toward a 
global metaprogram, and no one and nothing other than this 
implacable self-determination is behind it all. (75) 
 
Thus, at the end of the relationship between human beings and 
technical apparatuses one finds the entropy of the metaprogram. 
Entropy is to be understood in its physical meaning: a global state of 
indifferentation ruled by the probable. As entropy increases, 
everything in the universe naturally tends to deteriorate and loses its 
specific difference from its surroundings. Things move from the 
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least to the most probable state, from a state of organisation and 
differentiation in which distinctions and forms exist, to a state of 
chaos and sameness. If this discourse is translated into the dialectics 
of the Same and the Other, entropy should be understood as the 
dominion of the Same over the Other. This argument seems to run 
counter to the common thinking about human production, which 
aims to produce novelties. Flusser takes this possible objection into 
account: 
  But it is human to oppose entropy. This is why humans 
produced the apparatus in the first place: to produce 
improbable situations. They lost control of the apparatus, and 
now it produces the probable automatically. And so the 
question is, can they regain control and so achieve the opposite 
of the probable, the opposite of a totalitarian apparatus? (76) 
 
A physician could answer that, even if entropy is unavoidable in closed 
systems, entropy is nonetheless not inevitable in presence of external 
sources of information or energy. It can even decrease in open systems. 
The opposite of entropy is negentropy, namely negative entropy. It 
designates the temporary reversal of the process of entropy, which occurs 
when differentiated structures and systems emerge in the midst of 
disorder. In this regard, Prigogine and Stengers (1984) define the relation 
between entropy and information, or between information theory and 
thermodynamics, as ambiguous.150 They label the islands of negentropy 
                                                 
150
 The whole text Order Out of Chaos is devoted to clarify the notion of entropy under 
several issues, where the ignorance of the observer plays a relevant role: ‘There should 
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that form in the river of time ‘dissipative structures’, which relate to a 
form of super molecular organisation (Prigogine and Stengers, 1984, 
143). These structures work against entropy, in the sense that they work 
against its tendency towards dissipation. They are, in a certain way, 
forms of organisation that arise in a macroscopic scale in systems far 
from the equilibrium. Dissipative structures “fight” against entropy and, 
in so doing, enable the appearance of novelties in a world moving 
towards indifferentiation due to the work of entropy. Prigonine defines 
the moment in which novelty appears as bifurcation, which warrants the 
existence of a future:  
Nature’s form of choice is what I call bifurcation. In complex 
natural systems, just as in society, the future is not given. 
Within bounds, it can go this way or that. Events in nature 
correspond to novelties that we find at all levels, from 
cosmology to microbiology. We may thus speak of the 
creativity of nature. (Prigogine 2004)  
 
Prigogine expresses the conviction that information technology has 
brought contemporary human beings to a significant historical moment of 
bifurcation. This bifurcation results from a new, specific assembly of the 
human condition that we call the networked society. Prigogine asks 
himself: ‘Will the networked society act more like large ant colonies or a 
civilization of free people?’ (Prigogine 2004). But individual choices 
                                                                                                                       
exist only irreversible processes. This is the stumbling block for all universal 
interpretations of entropy that concentrate on our ignorance of initial (or boundary) 
conditions. Irreversibility is not a universal property’ (239). 
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nonetheless play a role in this scenario, so one need not necessarily be 
pessimistic. Even in the networked society,  
the future is not given. Especially in this time of globalization 
and the network revolution, behavior at the individual level 
will be the key factor in shaping the evolution of the entire 
human species. Just as one particle can alter macroscopic 
organisation in nature, so the role of individuals is more 
important now than ever in society. (2004)  
 
Prigogine and Stengers warn of the risk of linking entropy to the human 
condition,151 yet a provisional summary about the insertion of the notion 
of entropy in this dissertation shall still be provided. Entropy has been 
defined thus far as the irreversible evolutionary tension towards a 
probable and undifferentiated state. Furthermore, Flusser has suggested 
that contemporary technical apparatuses favour entropy, instead of 
fighting it. Translating this discourse in Foucauldian terms: contemporary 
digital dispositives trigger processes of subjectivation that lead the 
subject to the undifferentiated. Entropy would result from the basis of 
contemporary processes of subjectivation, which aim to reduce the 
subject to the Same instead of giving the subject the possibility of the 
exploration of the Other. Thus the digital world’s processes of 
                                                 
151
 ‘It is not surprising that the entropy metaphor has tempted a number of writers 
dealing with social or economic problems. Obviously here we have to be careful; human 
beings are not dynamic objects, and the transition to thermodynamics cannot be 
formulated as a selection principle maintained by dynamics. On the human level 
irreversibility is a more fundamental concept, which is for us inseparable from the 
meaning of our existence. Still it is essential that in this perspective we no longer see the 
internal feeling of irreversibility as a subjective impression that alienates us from the 
outside world, but as marking our participation in a world dominated by an evolutionary 
paradigm’ (1984, 298). 
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subjectivation may likely lead to holding individual subjects to a 
common standard, that would have—according to Flusser—a totalitarian 
flavour. Consequently, the only strategy the subject has left at its disposal 
in order to escape processes of subjectivation—which aim to reduce the 
subject to an identitary model—is a constant fight against the Same.  
First, the cybernetic model is taken into account. Niklas Luhmann states: 
‘For an observer, a system is entropic if information about one element 
does not permit inferences about others’ (Luhmann 1995, 50). This 
definition works within closed self-referential systems. In fact  
as an evolutionary universal, meaning finally corresponds to 
the hypothesis of the closure of self-referential system 
formations. The closure of the self-referential order is 
synonymous here with the infinite openness of the world. 
This openness is constituted through the self-referentiality of 
meaning and is continuously reactualized by it. Meaning 
always refers to meaning and never reaches out of itself for 
something else. Systems bound to meaning can therefore 
never experience or act in a manner that is free from 
meaning. They can never break open the reference from 
meaning to meaning in which they themselves are 
inescapably implicated. (63) 
 
But even self-referential systems are just a contemporary version of the 
discourse of the master. In the above-mentioned quotation, “master” 
should be read instead of “observer”. It results that entropy appears in the 
discourse of the master at the moment that new information cannot be 
linked to any precedent information. At this epistemological level, the 
digital dispositive is a self-referential system, able to reduce the infinite 
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openness of the world to the same meanings. Given this,  the subject can 
assume any ethical position against an informational background because 
every practice of freedom is included in the system from the very 
beginning.152 The fight against the Same cannot be played in a cybernetic 
system, and thus other battlefields must be sought. 
The first figure of the Same taken into account here is being-in-fashion. 
In order to understand the meaning of the being-in-fashion, one should 
first consider the second Untimely Meditation written by Friedrich 
Nietzsche in 1874, titled On the uses and disadvantages of history for life 
(Nietzsche 1997, 57-124). At the beginning of the Meditation, Nietzsche 
states:  
 This meditation too is untimely, because I am here attempting 
to look afresh at something of which our time is rightly 
proud—its cultivation of history—as being injurious to it, a 
defect and deficiency in it; because I believe, indeed, that we 
are all suffering from a consuming fever of history and ought 
at least to recognize that we are suffering from it. (60)  
 
                                                 
152
 Deleuze keenly proved the connection between information and control: ‘What is 
information? It is not very complicated, everyone knows what it is. Information is a set 
of imperatives, slogans, directions—order-words. When you are informed, you are told 
what you are supposed to believe. In other words, informing means circulating an order-
word. [...] We are not asked to believe but to behave as if we did. That is information, 
communication. And outside these orders and their transmission, there is no 
information, no communication. This is the same thing as saying that information is 
exactly the system of control.’ (Deleuze 1998, 320-321) 
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Untimeliness is thus a disconnection from the present time. In his short 
and dense text What is the Contemporary? (2006, 39-54), Agamben 
comments upon the above mentioned quote from Nietzsche as follows:  
Nietzsche situates his own claim for “relevance” […], his 
“contemporariness” with respect to the present in a 
disconnection and out-of-jointness. Those who are truly 
contemporary, who truly belong to their time, are those who 
neither perfectly coincide with it nor adjust themselves to its 
demands. They are thus in this sense irrelevant. (40) 
 
What is timely is relevant, and what is untimely is irrelevant. But 
Nietzsche locates his contemporariness in his being untimely. How can 
this overturning occur? How can the subject be untimely and 
contemporary at the same time? Agamben provides a provisional answer: 
‘precisely because of this condition, precisely through this disconnection 
and this anachronism, they are more capable than others of perceiving 
and grasping their own time’ (40). The subject who is untimely to 
his/herself and to his/her contemporary world is the only one who can 
perceive his/her own time. So a contemporariness grounded on an 
untimely position is a point of view that offers a real comprehension of 
the world. The complete definition of contemporariness provided by 
Agamben sheds more light on this specific condition:  
Contemporariness is, then, a singular relationship with one’s 
own time, which adheres to it and, at the same time, keeps a 
distance from it. More precisely, it is that relationship with 
time that adheres to it through a disjunction and an 
anachronism. Those who coincide too well with the epoch, 
those who are perfectly tied to it in every respect, are not 
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contemporaries, precisely because they do not manage to see 
it; they are not able to firmly hold their gaze on it. (41) 
 
A subject who is too deeply immersed in his/her time is not able to “see” 
it, inasmuch s/he is immersed in it. Only the one who is able to observe 
his/her time from the outside is the one entitled to be contemporary. 
Contemporariness is grounded on a distance between the subject and 
his/her time. This is not a subject who takes shelter in another epoch, but 
conversely a subject who is able to live his/her time, but from the outside. 
Agamben proposes a second description for this condition: ‘The 
contemporary is he who firmly holds his gaze on his own time so as to 
perceive not its light, but rather its darkness’ (44). Thus, the subject has 
firstly to position him/herself out of the world in which s/he lives; 
secondly, s/he is required to observe, from this point of view, the 
darkness of his/her era. The analogy between visibility and lights of the 
century on the one hand, and darkness and obscurity of the other hand, is 
quite clear. Nevertheless, Agamben is aware of the extreme 
metaphoricity of his discourse, thus he feels the urge to explain his 
conception of darkness:  
Why should we be at all interested in perceiving the obscurity 
that emanates from the epoch? Is darkness not precisely an 
anonymous experience that is by definition impenetrable; 
something that is not directed at us and thus cannot concern 
us? On the contrary, the contemporary is the person who 
perceives the darkness of his time as something that concerns 
him, as something that never ceases to engage him. Darkness 
is something that—more than any light—turns directly and 
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singularly toward him. The contemporary is the one whose 
eyes are struck by the beam of darkness that comes from his 
own time. (45) 
 
Contemporariness is an ethical issue, before being epistemological. It is a 
description of the ethical relationship between the subject and his/her 
time. The contemporary is the subject who can engage in discovering 
what is dark, hidden, concealed and not illuminated by the strong lights 
of the century. While lights are addressed to the crowd, darkness affects 
the single subject, which it needs in order to provide an ethical response. 
Going back to Nietzsche, the contemporary subject is the one who is at 
the same time untimely and irrelevant to his/her time, because s/he is not 
involved in the process of absolute visibility on which each time grounds 
itself. Being contemporary and untimely means being irrelevant and, so 
to say, unproductive. The contemporary is noxious to his/her time, 
insofar as s/he is unproductive.  
The answer that the present time offers to the contemporary subject is to 
include him/her in the figure of the being-in-fashion. As Agamben 
claims, ‘Fashion can be defined as the introduction into time of a peculiar 
discontinuity that divides it according to its relevance or irrelevance, its 
being-in-fashion or no-longer-being-in-fashion’ (47). Being-in-fashion is 
the opposite of the always irrelevant untimely. As the untimely implies 
the quest for darkness, it follows that being-in-fashion is a condition of 
pure visibility, a way in which the subject lives the lights of the century. 
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But Agamben argues that being-in-fashion also has a very specific 
temporal dimension:  
The time of fashion, therefore, constitutively anticipates itself 
and consequently is also always too late. It always takes the 
form of an ungraspable threshold between a “not yet” and a 
“no more.”’ (48) The being-in-fashion is a life spent on a 
threshold, because ‘the “now,” the kairos of fashion is 
ungraspable: the phrase, “I am in this instant in fashion” is 
contradictory, because the moment in which the subject 
pronounces it, he is already out of fashion”. (49)  
 
Being-in-fashion is thus a paradoxical condition. The subject who wants 
to be-in-fashion (namely: to be relevant to his/her time, to be enlightened 
by the lights of his/her century) will never accomplish his/her mission. 
Being-in-time is a condition that, even though it can never happen, is 
able to trap the subject forever,153 because the fulfilment of this condition 
is destined to always be deferred. In the moment the subject believes s/he 
has fulfilled it, s/he is asked to renew his/her effort, ad infinitum. The 
pure visibility of being-in-fashion is more than social status: it is a 
process in which the subject is asked to continuously relaunch his/her 
search for visibility—because once one thinks that s/he has attained 
                                                 
153
 Manovich comments the power of the being-in-fashion: ‘The Web 2.0 paradigm 
represents the most dramatic reconfiguration of the strategies/tactics relationship to date. 
According to De Certeau’s original analysis, tactics do not necessary result in objects or 
anything stable or permanent; “Unlike the strategy, it [the tactic] lacks the centralised 
structure and permanence that would enable it to set itself up as a competitor to some 
other entity… it renders its own activities an “unmappable” form of subversion.”  Since 
the 1980s, however, consumer and culture industries have started to systematically turn 
every subculture (particularly every youth subculture) into a product. In short, the 
cultural tactics evolved by people were turned into strategies now sold to them. If you 
want to ‘oppose the mainstream’, you now had plenty of lifestyles available – with 
every subcultural aspect, from music and visual styles to clothes and slang – available 
for purchase.” (Manovich  2008, 38) 
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complete visibility a more complete visibility will be offered. The search 
for visibility falls under the domain of the Same, since it is grounded on 
the perfect presence of the subject within his/her time. Being-in-fashion 
is a figure of the Same in the form of the relevance to the present time. 
Facebook—as synecdoche for social media—is certainly a dispositive-in-
fashion. Rooted in the dynamics of the present time, 
 it is the quintessence of the being-in-fashion, if this 
coincides with the triumph of the ephemeral. It is the 
ephemeral of a constant daily update, an update that, day 
by day, promises an exposition of oneself that, potentially, 
can last a lifetime (Kirckmayr 2010, 101). 
 
The figure of the Same operates thusly on social media, while the 
untimely subject can be regarded as a primary figure fighting the domain 
of the Same. The second figure will be defined as the being-offline 
subject, proposed by Zielinski (2012). 
The being-offline subject is theorised from the notion of moveability. 
This is a property of the subject, asked to find an orientation in a world 
that consistently offers heterogeneous stimuli. Zielinski defines 
moveability as follows: 
Arts and theories that possess an affinity to advanced 
thinking and advanced technologies demand maximum 
moveability. This moveability is not the same as the mobility 
that is demanded of us day in, day out, and proclaimed as an 
inherent necessity. Moveability does not offer itself for 
exploitation and, in turn, it does not exploit. Our moveability 
gets by with a minimum of possessions albeit carefully 
selected ones. It cultivates a life of wandering and attempts to 
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orient itself in the world without prescribed disciplines. 
(2012, 29)  
 
Moveability is thus a specific attitude—a process of subjectivation—of 
the subject who is able to place him/herself outside of disciplinary 
systems. It is the liminal condition of the subject who places him/herself 
in territories where disciplines have not yet been born. It results that ‘it is 
in the best sense undisciplined. It cannot be disciplined’ (29). Can the 
network be taken into account as the specific place to practice 
moveability? The answer Zielinski provides is trenchant:  
This is a plea for theory and practice situated in the in-between 
of disciplines, between staked-out territories, between the 
dispositifs of power, which Michel Foucault identified above 
all as sexuality, truth, and knowledge. To this we can add the 
network. (29) 
 
Zielinski lists several arguments for which moveability cannot be 
practiced in networks, which at on the contrary are considered effective 
disciplinary systems: the life in technology societies as a permanent 
testing situation (30); the dissipation of time and energy in trying occupy 
the centre of technological power (31); the hard and paradoxical balance 
between visible and invisible (33); and an existence that is required to 
deal with its temporal dimension either too much or too little (34). But, 
above all: 
  To be permanently connected and perpetually wired rapidly 
tires the mind and the body. (My feet are so tired, my brain is 
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so wired, sang Bob Dylan in “Love Sick”.) This state is 
comparable to a prolonged artificial paradise, the stretching of 
time that only drugs can induce but machines can simulate. The 
Long Now154 is an obscene project that was developed by 
engineers and programmers who want to play God. (33-34) 
 
However, the subject cannot avoid the disciplinary systems that governs 
him, network included. Moveability is the answer to this impossibility. 
Thus the practice of moveability can be grounded in what Zielinski 
defines “a conscious split” between existing online and being offline:  
We work, organise, publish, and amuse ourselves in 
networks. We rhapsodise, meditate, enjoy, believe, and trust 
in autonomous, separate situations, each to his/her own and 
sometimes with other individuals. This adds up to a balancing 
act: in a single lifetime we have to learn to exist online and be 
offline. If we don’t succeed in this, we shall become mere 
appendages of the world that we have created, merely its 
technical functions. We should not allow cybernetics, the 
science of optimal control and predictability, this triumph. 
 
One can hear the echo of the Husserlian notion of life-world in 
Zielinski’s argument. Moveability—which encompasses activities such 
as rhapsodising, meditating, enjoying, and believing—are proper to the 
pre-logic world, in which the subject can experiment processes of 
subjectivation outside of the disciplinary systems. If existing online is a 
practice that one cannot avoid, the risk is that the subject will be 
completely absorbed by this practice. The consequence is a life 
completely under the control of the cybernetic dispositive, whose largest 
                                                 
154
 The Long Now is a Foundation founded in 1996 and based in San Francisco. It aims 
to think the destiny of the world on the long-term of 10.000 years (http://longnow.org/). 
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contemporary manifestation is the network. Being-offline is the attitude 
that allows an escape from this slavery. 
And in the practice of moveability the subject encounters other subjects. 
The subject is, always and forever, a self who is exposed to other selves. 
The relationship with others can be delineated in the form of the 
friendship. Adding a friend is one of the most popular labels in 
Facebook, yet as Turkle observes, on social networks, ‘we treat 
individuals as unit. Friends becomes fans’ (2012, 168). Friends are 
viewed on networks as an indiscriminate mass; the commitment to 
cultivating friendship becomes a superficial dispatch. Instead of unique 
and whole persons, one finds an indiscriminate simulacrum of them. 
Friendship on a social network is a pale representation of a complex 
relationship: intimate, free from evaluation, rooted in a shared happiness, 
based on the enthusiasm for the same interests, views, tastes and feelings. 
In fact friendship is an interpersonal relationship based on the suspension 
of the balance of powers. Friendship can be rooted on shared activities, 
and implies—above all—a commitment to each other as unique persons. 
Friendship cannot be translated in the form of a quantified function. For 
these reasons, the third figure considered here is the friend. While talking 
about friendship, a famous sentence from Aristotle is often quoted: ‘Oi 
philoi, oudeis philos’. The common translation is ‘Oh friends, there is no 
friend’, which underscores the difficulty of dealing with true friendship. 
Agamben has recently suggested that it should be interpreted ‘He who 
 285 
 
has (many) friends, does not have a single friend’ (Agamben 2006, 27), 
which emphasises the exclusivity of friendship. Following this argument, 
Agamben then defines the friend as heteros autos (other self), and 
friendship as community—but with some restraints: ‘What is a friendship 
other than a proximity that resists both representation and 
conceptualization?’ (31). Is Facebook able to retain this sense of 
proximity? If one considers proximity to be a purely spatial relationship 
then the answer should be negative, but one must nonetheless accept that 
the subject today is immersed in continuous flows of information. S/he 
surfs in a more fluid way than in the past. What was once strictly related 
to the physical world has nowadays been contaminated by the digital 
flow and should be reviewed from this perspective. Adopting this point 
of view offers the subject the possibility of assuming a new ethical 
position for to build new sociality and, in a certain way, new politics. For 
instance, ‘the group should not be an agonic bond that links individuals 
within a hierarchy, but rather a constant generator of deindividualisation’ 
(Foucault 2001, 1240 [my translation]). Assuming that 
deindividualisation is a practice of individual freedom, then the new 
ethical choice should comprehend how to adopt a mode of behaviour on 
networks that deal with proximity in order to transform a connection on 
Facebook into another self. 
Contemporariness, moveability and friendship are three possible 
processes of subjectivation that actively fight against the Same. 
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Contemporariness makes the subject irrelevant to his/her time and, doing 
so, it pushes him/her to search for the Otherness in the darkness. 
Moveability puts the subject in territories uncovered by the disciplinary 
systems (also including the network), so that the subject is not 
conditioned by pre-defined regimes of truth. Friendship is a way, pre-
logic and de-individualising, to deal with other(s) in a space outside of 
the discourse of the master. The above-mentioned processes of 
subjectivation all require an accountable subject. But here the 
accountability must be practiced by the subject to his or her self. In this 
case, the subject must above all be accountable to him/herself: in 
engaging him/herself in the search for darkness, in committing to 
avoiding comfortable disciplinary systems, and in cultivating friendship. 
This relationship of the subject to his or herself must therefore dismiss a 
constitutive foundation of the notion of “self”, that—as has been shown 
several times during this dissertation—is easily imprisoned by the 
discourse of the master. The abandonment of a subjugated (in the form of 
quantified) self can bring the subject to a different dimension of 
accountability, namely: the accountability of life. Locating the 
foundation of the subject in life, rather than in the foundation of the self, 
has been the main task of Foucault’s late research. His return to the 
analysis of the Greek world is better understood if one considers that, at 
the end of his production, the French philosopher was not looking for a 
different way to understand the self, which would have just represented 
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another way to delineate the discourse of the master, but a different 
understanding of the entire subject. This understanding has been found in 
the notion of life and its practices. As Foucault claims:  
I want to show that the general Greek problem was not the 
tekhne of the self, it was the tekhne of life, the tekhne tou 
biou, how to live. It’s quite clear from Socrates to Seneca or 
Pliny, for instance, that they didn't worry about the afterlife, 
what happened after death, or whether God exists or not. That 
was not really a great problem for them; the problem was: 
Which tekhne do I have to use in order to live well as I ought 
to live? (Foucault 1997, 260).  
 
The tekhne tou biou, the practices of life, are the set of actions by which 
the subject can be accountable to him/herself. Where does this idea of 
accountability find a place in this discourse? Namely, why are the 
techniques of life accountable? The reason is clearly explained by 
Foucault himself: ‘No technique, no professional skill can be acquired 
without exercise; nor can the art of living, the tekhne tou biou, be learned 
without an askesis that should be understood as a training of the self by 
oneself’ (1994, 208). The continual effort, the endeavour the subject 
makes to take care of his/her practices of life, within the dimension of the 
perpetuation of the exercise, is a practice of accountability of the subject 
to his or her self.  And this practice can play out in any identitary 
dispositives, since it is a relationship of the subject with him/herself out 
of any regime of truth. 
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Foucault died suddenly in 1984. His last public appearances took place at 
the Collège de France some months before, while holding the course The 
Courage of the Truth (2012, first published in French in 2009). The 
course aimed to explore the relationship between truth and care of the 
self. In a twist of fate, he was late to deliver his last class on the 28th of 
March, so the final words he intended to address to students were never 
spoken, although we can find them in the manuscript of that class. His 
last sentence was supposed to be: 
 what I would like to stress in conclusion is this: there is no 
establishment of the truth without an essential position of otherness; 
the truth is never the same; there can be truth only in the form of the 
other world and the other life. (Foucault 2012, 340)  
 
This dissertation has humbly aimed to demonstrate that Foucault was 
right. A real accountability is always paradoxical, because it can be 
practiced only outside of the discourse of the master. The real truth of 
accountability is the report that the subject provides when asking 
him/herself: am I living well? The subject can only find an answer 
outside of the domain of the Same and outside of the domain of 
quantification: only in the exploration of a life that is always Other.  
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